Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government



For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety

consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be

usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be

drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under

one government, there will be but one national civil list to support;

if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many

different national civil lists to be provided for—and each of them, as

to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be

necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the

States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too

extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. The

ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem

generally turned toward three confederacies—one consisting of the four

Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern

States. There is little probability that there would be a greater

number. According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise

an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great

Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a

confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less

comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been

proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a

certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the

same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater

extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is

no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary

to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we

consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of

the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people,

and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the

passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no

reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to

perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power,

properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a

very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part

of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate

institutions.



The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be

likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive

than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition,

more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as

the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to

geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the

habits and prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to

conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league

themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, from all the

causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection, may

with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is,

would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank

to the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that

would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State

to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful

combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission

into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the

Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own

navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and

dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various

circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the

encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give

unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the

purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to

confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy. As she

must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with

her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of

the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern,

Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the

Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania,

if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood

of more than one confederacy to the south of that State.



Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able

to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or

any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight

in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on

the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to

take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on

mistaken ground.



If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we

take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed

to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies

against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of

the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military

establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from

the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the

States would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation

would be not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity,

commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.