Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory

Answered



From the New York Packet.



Friday, November 30, 1787.



MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign

danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of

our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for

those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the

Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction,

which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which

alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains,

within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection

that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union

embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper,

as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are

availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the

practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by

imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they

endeavor in vain to find.



The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has

been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that

it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a

republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from

the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was

also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the

people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they

assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A

democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic

may be extended over a large region.



To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of

some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in

forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects

either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to

heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by

placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by

citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient

Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an

easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a

democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can never be

established but among a small number of people, living within a small

compass of territory.



Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular

governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in

modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation,

no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the

same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of

discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple

agency of which the will of the largest political body may be

concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good

requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis

of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be lamented that any

of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of

displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive

system now under her consideration.



As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central

point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as

often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater

number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a

republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the

representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the

administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the

United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who

recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union,

that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the

States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members

from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater

intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the

neighborhood of Congress.



That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting

subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The

limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic,

on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the

Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some

instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as

the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that

latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and

forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three

common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to

seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the

distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and

three-fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi

does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison

of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the

practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be

demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a diet

representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland

before the late dismemberment, where another national diet was the

depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find

that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the

representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to

travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most

remote parts of the Union.



Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain

which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.



In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government

is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering

laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which

concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be

attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate

governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects

which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority

and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish

the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have

some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to

show that if they were abolished the general government would be

compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in

their proper jurisdiction.



A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the

federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive

States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other

States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods,

which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that

may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which

lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further

discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.



Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout

the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will

everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for

travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on

our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the

whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the

Western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each,

will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which

the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art

finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.



A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost

every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus

find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices

for the sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the

greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course,

may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be

at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will

consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its

strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the

States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their

representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more

so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support

alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by

the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less

benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less

distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other

respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained

throughout.



I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full

confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions

will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never

suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however

fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into

the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion

would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you

that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords

of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same

family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual

happiness; can no longer be fellowcitizens of one great, respectable,

and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells

you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a

novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in

the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it

is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against

this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it

conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American

citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their

sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of

their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be

shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild

of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us

in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our

happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be

rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the

glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent

regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not

suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to

overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of

their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this

manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the

world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the

American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had

no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which

a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which

an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States

might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims

of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight

of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of

mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human

race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a

revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They

reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of

the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is

incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works

betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred

most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to

be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of

your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate

and to decide.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.