The Same Subject Continued



(Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)



From the New York Packet.



Tuesday, February 26, 1788.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



We have seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the

federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State

legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other

side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own

elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right

would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the

representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be

the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in

such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men

in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to

particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at

large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this

seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational

calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the

disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply,

could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other,

it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should

ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form

altogether different and far more decisive.



The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from

this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an

immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed

by the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this

characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious

seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by

a victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a

privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded

to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate

policy of the government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is

altogether inconceivable and incredible.



In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a

more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The

dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national

government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought

into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a

concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is

sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners,

and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union, to

occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives

towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an

intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual

assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well

physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently

nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But

the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in

the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several

component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being

to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State

legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the

people, there would be little probability of a common interest to

cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular

class of electors.



As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of “time and

manner,” which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national

government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will

direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State

legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of

that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the

discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what

inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which

itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be

established, in reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could

not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this

case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it

would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same

time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If

we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the

power in question is placed whether in their hands or in those of the

Union.



But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the

national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between

the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds

of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean

in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the

mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the

fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it

court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the

exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?



If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned

in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it

will readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between

landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is

infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in

the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should

predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be, that a

conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to

be dreaded from the former than from the latter.



The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and

commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a

few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most

of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either

prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for

the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety

of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be

found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either

of them with a decided partiality, than the representation of any

single State.



In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the

rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon

the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest

prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a

correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally

be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot

therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile

class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal

legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general

observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by

the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot,

upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would

be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the

same situation must have the same effect, in the primative composition

at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias

towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this

quarter as from the other.



In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it

may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national

government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of

the federal administration to the landed class? As there is little

likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors

for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to

this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark,

first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that

any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than

in those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no

temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class,

because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as

great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly, that men

accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large

scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be

inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the

entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a

share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the

view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of

a body which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the

urgent calls of public necessity.



I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a

preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of

industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of

the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They

appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which

they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description

of “the wealthy and the well-born.” These, it seems, are to be exalted

to an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At

one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of

the smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to be

effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of

exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.



But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election

to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference?

Are “the wealthy and the well-born,” as they are called, confined to

particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous

instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of

residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are

they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as

avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of

their predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent

man knows it to be[1]) is it not evident that the policy of confining

the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive

of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The

truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the

preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property

either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of

the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority

would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the

PLACES, the MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who

may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are

defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the

legislature.



Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient

suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally

taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an

apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were

overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine it will

hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an

enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force

sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people.

The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has

been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but

that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in

the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a

force might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be

in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a

disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with

the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the

persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the

ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference

to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a

conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would

they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by

one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients

which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might

terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would

they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their

rights, would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States

to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to

substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of

the people?



PUBLIUS.



 [1] Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.









THE FEDERALIST.