Appropriate use
Use when behaviour differs by Wi-Fi, Ethernet, VLAN, VPN, proxy, region, DNS, or endpoint reachability.
Investigates connectivity failures across interfaces, DNS, proxy, TLS, firewall, redirects, private-network rules, endpoints, and application behaviour while protecting network and customer secrets.
This page defines the behaviour, controls, evidence, and outputs required from the skill. It does not claim that a language model can enforce security or correctness by wording alone.
Use when behaviour differs by Wi-Fi, Ethernet, VLAN, VPN, proxy, region, DNS, or endpoint reachability.
Do not use for unauthorised scanning, packet interception outside approved scope, bypassing enterprise controls, or exposing internal network details in public reports.
Each phase has explicit inputs and outputs. Approval gates are hard stops bound to exact versions and hashes.
Confirm device, environment, interfaces, network owner, approved endpoints, capture method, privacy boundary, and prohibited tests.
Record the exact user-visible symptom, application logs, timing, active interface, IP family, last-known-good path, and recovery behaviour.
Collect interface state, IP, gateway, DNS, proxy, VPN, certificate chain, required domains, redirects, private-network access, and service dependencies.
Design safe comparisons across Wi-Fi, Ethernet, hotspot, alternate DNS, proxy bypass when authorised, known-good device, and known-good application content.
Run bounded DNS, TCP, TLS, HTTP, WebSocket, redirect, and application-level checks. Record timestamps and redact internal addresses where required.
Determine whether the signal follows interface, DNS, proxy, certificate, firewall, route, endpoint, application config, device, or remains unknown.
Prepare a classification, evidence-backed explanation, safe customer or IT request, workaround when verified, and escalation owner.
Separate internal diagnostic detail from customer-safe wording, preserve restricted captures, and remove temporary configuration changes.
An approval cannot be reused after its environment, source, action plan, or approved document changes.
| Gate | Decision | Required binding |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gate 1 · approve network scope | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
| 2 | Gate 2 · approve diagnostics | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
| 3 | Gate 3 · confirm conclusion | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
| 4 | Gate 4 · publish | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
Attempt outcomes remain separate from these workflow results. Errors, cancellations, and invalid context are never silently converted into a pass.
Network path is healthy enough and the failure follows application behaviour or configuration.
Name resolution is missing, wrong, delayed, or inconsistent for required endpoints.
An intermediary blocks, rewrites, terminates, or filters required traffic.
Certificate validation, handshake, protocol, SNI, or interception causes the failure.
The active interface, gateway, route, VLAN, IP family, or switching state causes the issue.
Available comparisons cannot isolate the failing layer.
Evidence has provenance, capture context, privacy classification, retention, and integrity metadata. A convenient artifact is not automatically sufficient proof.
| Claim | Primary evidence | Required validation |
|---|---|---|
| Interface state | OS or device network status | Active interface, IP, gateway, and time are recorded. |
| DNS | Bounded resolution results | Resolver, answer, TTL, and failure type are captured. |
| TLS | Handshake and certificate metadata | Secrets and private keys are never captured. |
| HTTP | Redacted request and response | Redirect chain and contacted origins are verified against allowlist. |
| Comparison | Same-device or same-network matrix | Variables changed between paths are explicit. |
| Application | Runtime log and user-visible result | Transport success is not assumed to equal application success. |
These controls belong in the runtime, connector permissions, sandbox, renderer, storage layer, and review process.
Only approved hosts, ports, methods, and request counts are allowed.
Internal IPs, proxy credentials, certificates, and captures follow restricted handling.
Redirects, iframes, WebSockets, and downloads are checked, not only the initial URL.
Temporary DNS, proxy, VPN, or interface changes are restored and recorded.
Clock state is captured because TLS and log correlation depend on it.
External summaries request concrete IT checks without publishing sensitive topology.
The first applicable high-severity outcome takes precedence. A manual override is recorded separately and never rewrites the calculated result.
The requested diagnostic would exceed authorisation or expose restricted data.
Evidence points to DNS, proxy, firewall, TLS, routing, or interface ownership.
The network path is sufficient and product behaviour remains incorrect.
The leading layer is uncertain and another controlled comparison is required.
Required endpoints and application flow succeed across the approved path.
The workflow documents what it cannot prove and what further evidence would change confidence.
Human summaries are generated from validated structured records. They are not maintained as separate, drifting sources of truth.
network-context.jsonVersioned output produced by the workflow.
endpoint-allowlist.yamlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
path-inventory.mdVersioned output produced by the workflow.
comparison-plan.mdVersioned output produced by the workflow.
diagnostic-ledger.jsonlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
restricted-captures/Versioned output produced by the workflow.
isolation-analysis.mdVersioned output produced by the workflow.
customer-summary.mdVersioned output produced by the workflow.
network-report.htmlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
artifacts/qa/network-qa/<run-id>/ ├── network-context.json ├── endpoint-allowlist.yaml ├── path-inventory.md ├── comparison-plan.md ├── diagnostic-ledger.jsonl ├── restricted-captures/ ├── isolation-analysis.md ├── customer-summary.md └── network-report.html
Investigate why an SCOS device works on Wi-Fi but fails on Ethernet VLAN. Check DNS, TLS, redirects, CloudFront, and Google endpoints without scanning the network.
Network conclusion: NETWORK OWNER ACTION Isolation: - Wi-Fi: DNS, TLS, and application requests succeed. - Ethernet VLAN: DNS succeeds, TCP connects, but TLS sessions are closed during handshake for required CloudFront and Google origins. - Same device, build, content, and time. Classification: Proxy, firewall, or TLS interception on the Ethernet path. Customer-safe request: Ask network IT to review TLS inspection and allow the documented required domains for the affected VLAN.
The written skill is only one layer. The repository, runtime, connectors, evidence storage, and publication path must implement these requirements.
Investigates connectivity failures across interfaces, DNS, proxy, TLS, firewall, redirects, private-network rules, endpoints, and application behaviour while protecting network and customer secrets.