/network-qaQA-1234

Application network-path investigation

Investigates connectivity failures across interfaces, DNS, proxy, TLS, firewall, redirects, private-network rules, endpoints, and application behaviour while protecting network and customer secrets.

  1. Scope
  2. Application failure signature
  3. Path inventory
  4. Comparison plan
  5. Diagnostic execution
  6. Isolation analysis
  7. Finding
  8. Publish redacted report
Scope and intent

A controlled workflow specification

This page defines the behaviour, controls, evidence, and outputs required from the skill. It does not claim that a language model can enforce security or correctness by wording alone.

Use when

Appropriate use

Use when behaviour differs by Wi-Fi, Ethernet, VLAN, VPN, proxy, region, DNS, or endpoint reachability.

Do not use when

Non-goals

Do not use for unauthorised scanning, packet interception outside approved scope, bypassing enterprise controls, or exposing internal network details in public reports.

8
versioned workflow phases
4
explicit approval gates
6
defined result states
9
versioned output artifacts
Material changes to the source, environment, identity, approved actions, or expected behaviour invalidate dependent approvals and require revalidation.
Workflow

The 8 phases

Each phase has explicit inputs and outputs. Approval gates are hard stops bound to exact versions and hashes.

Phase 1: Scope and authorisation preflight Gate 1 · approve network scope

Confirm device, environment, interfaces, network owner, approved endpoints, capture method, privacy boundary, and prohibited tests.

device · interface · network · endpoint allowlist · consent

Phase 2: Application failure signature

Record the exact user-visible symptom, application logs, timing, active interface, IP family, last-known-good path, and recovery behaviour.

symptom · trigger · duration · interface · recovery

Phase 3: Path inventory

Collect interface state, IP, gateway, DNS, proxy, VPN, certificate chain, required domains, redirects, private-network access, and service dependencies.

local path · name resolution · proxy · TLS · remote origins

Phase 4: Comparison plan Gate 2 · approve diagnostics

Design safe comparisons across Wi-Fi, Ethernet, hotspot, alternate DNS, proxy bypass when authorised, known-good device, and known-good application content.

single-variable comparisons · stop conditions · no scanning

Phase 5: Diagnostic execution

Run bounded DNS, TCP, TLS, HTTP, WebSocket, redirect, and application-level checks. Record timestamps and redact internal addresses where required.

resolution · connect · handshake · request · response · application result

Phase 6: Isolation analysis

Determine whether the signal follows interface, DNS, proxy, certificate, firewall, route, endpoint, application config, device, or remains unknown.

correlation · counterexample · confidence · affected scope

Phase 7: Finding and guidance review Gate 3 · confirm conclusion

Prepare a classification, evidence-backed explanation, safe customer or IT request, workaround when verified, and escalation owner.

application · network · proxy · TLS · DNS · firewall · third party

Phase 8: Publish redacted report Gate 4 · publish

Separate internal diagnostic detail from customer-safe wording, preserve restricted captures, and remove temporary configuration changes.

internal report · external summary · cleanup · retention
Approval contract

Every gate approves an exact decision object

An approval cannot be reused after its environment, source, action plan, or approved document changes.

Approval gates and binding requirements
GateDecisionRequired binding
1Gate 1 · approve network scopeApproval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state.
2Gate 2 · approve diagnosticsApproval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state.
3Gate 3 · confirm conclusionApproval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state.
4Gate 4 · publishApproval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state.
Result model

Defined states prevent vague conclusions

Attempt outcomes remain separate from these workflow results. Errors, cancellations, and invalid context are never silently converted into a pass.

APPLICATION

Network path is healthy enough and the failure follows application behaviour or configuration.

DNS

Name resolution is missing, wrong, delayed, or inconsistent for required endpoints.

PROXY OR FIREWALL

An intermediary blocks, rewrites, terminates, or filters required traffic.

TLS

Certificate validation, handshake, protocol, SNI, or interception causes the failure.

ROUTING OR INTERFACE

The active interface, gateway, route, VLAN, IP family, or switching state causes the issue.

UNKNOWN

Available comparisons cannot isolate the failing layer.

Evidence contract

Evidence must directly support the claim

Evidence has provenance, capture context, privacy classification, retention, and integrity metadata. A convenient artifact is not automatically sufficient proof.

Required evidence by claim type
ClaimPrimary evidenceRequired validation
Interface stateOS or device network statusActive interface, IP, gateway, and time are recorded.
DNSBounded resolution resultsResolver, answer, TTL, and failure type are captured.
TLSHandshake and certificate metadataSecrets and private keys are never captured.
HTTPRedacted request and responseRedirect chain and contacted origins are verified against allowlist.
ComparisonSame-device or same-network matrixVariables changed between paths are explicit.
ApplicationRuntime log and user-visible resultTransport success is not assumed to equal application success.
Trust and safety

Controls that must be enforced outside the prompt

These controls belong in the runtime, connector permissions, sandbox, renderer, storage layer, and review process.

Runtime control

No scanning

Only approved hosts, ports, methods, and request counts are allowed.

Runtime control

Network secret protection

Internal IPs, proxy credentials, certificates, and captures follow restricted handling.

Runtime control

Per-request allowlist

Redirects, iframes, WebSockets, and downloads are checked, not only the initial URL.

Runtime control

Configuration rollback

Temporary DNS, proxy, VPN, or interface changes are restored and recorded.

Runtime control

Time synchronisation

Clock state is captured because TLS and log correlation depend on it.

Runtime control

Customer-safe reporting

External summaries request concrete IT checks without publishing sensitive topology.

Decision policy

Ordered outcomes, not averaged pass counts

The first applicable high-severity outcome takes precedence. A manual override is recorded separately and never rewrites the calculated result.

SECURITY OR PRIVACY STOP

The requested diagnostic would exceed authorisation or expose restricted data.

NETWORK OWNER ACTION

Evidence points to DNS, proxy, firewall, TLS, routing, or interface ownership.

APPLICATION OWNER ACTION

The network path is sufficient and product behaviour remains incorrect.

MORE ISOLATION

The leading layer is uncertain and another controlled comparison is required.

PATH HEALTHY

Required endpoints and application flow succeed across the approved path.

Known limitations

Uncertainty and coverage limits remain visible

The workflow documents what it cannot prove and what further evidence would change confidence.

  • Limit 1. Successful ping does not prove DNS, TLS, HTTP, WebSocket, or application health.
  • Limit 2. Enterprise proxies may intentionally hide their behaviour.
  • Limit 3. Packet capture may be unavailable or prohibited.
  • Limit 4. Mobile hotspot success narrows the issue but does not identify the exact enterprise control.
  • Limit 5. IPv4 and IPv6 can follow different paths.
  • Limit 6. Network conditions change over time and results need timestamps.
Outputs

Versioned records for review and continuation

Human summaries are generated from validated structured records. They are not maintained as separate, drifting sources of truth.

network-context.json

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

endpoint-allowlist.yaml

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

path-inventory.md

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

comparison-plan.md

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

diagnostic-ledger.jsonl

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

restricted-captures/

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

isolation-analysis.md

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

customer-summary.md

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

network-report.html

Versioned output produced by the workflow.

artifacts/qa/network-qa/<run-id>/
├── network-context.json
├── endpoint-allowlist.yaml
├── path-inventory.md
├── comparison-plan.md
├── diagnostic-ledger.jsonl
├── restricted-captures/
├── isolation-analysis.md
├── customer-summary.md
└── network-report.html
Example

Example request and controlled output

Request

Input

Investigate why an SCOS device works on Wi-Fi but fails on Ethernet VLAN. Check DNS, TLS, redirects, CloudFront, and Google endpoints without scanning the network.
Result

Output excerpt

Network conclusion: NETWORK OWNER ACTION

Isolation:
- Wi-Fi: DNS, TLS, and application requests succeed.
- Ethernet VLAN: DNS succeeds, TCP connects, but TLS sessions are closed during handshake for required CloudFront and Google origins.
- Same device, build, content, and time.

Classification:
Proxy, firewall, or TLS interception on the Ethernet path.

Customer-safe request:
Ask network IT to review TLS inspection and allow the documented required domains for the affected VLAN.
Production readiness

Required before operational use

The written skill is only one layer. The repository, runtime, connectors, evidence storage, and publication path must implement these requirements.

  • Required. Tool, filesystem, repository, command, secret, and network permissions are enforced outside the model.
  • Required. Every source, environment, build, plan, and approval has a version or content hash.
  • Required. Untrusted values are escaped, length-bounded, path-safe, and separated from executable instructions.
  • Required. Attempt outcomes, scenario verdicts, workflow decisions, and publication status remain separate.
  • Required. Raw evidence, publishable evidence, access control, retention, redaction, and deletion are defined.
  • Required. Concurrent runs use unique IDs, locks, idempotency keys, and conflict-aware updates.
  • Required. Material changes invalidate dependent approvals and outcomes.
  • Required. The repository validator passes before the skill is considered production-ready.
In one line

/network-qa

Investigates connectivity failures across interfaces, DNS, proxy, TLS, firewall, redirects, private-network rules, endpoints, and application behaviour while protecting network and customer secrets.