Appropriate use
Use after releases, incidents, major defects, automation migrations, or recurring QA pain.
Reviews a completed release, incident, project, or testing cycle to identify escaped-risk patterns, process failures, effective controls, and owned preventive actions.
This page defines the behaviour, controls, evidence, and outputs required from the skill. It does not claim that a language model can enforce security or correctness by wording alone.
Use after releases, incidents, major defects, automation migrations, or recurring QA pain.
Do not use for blame, performance ranking, unsupported storytelling, or creating actions without owners and validation measures.
Each phase has explicit inputs and outputs. Approval gates are hard stops bound to exact versions and hashes.
Confirm event, time window, participants, facilitator, data sources, privacy, no-blame principle, and what decisions the retrospective may make.
Build a factual sequence of requirements, code changes, test planning, execution, defects, decisions, rollout, incidents, recovery, and customer signals.
Identify what succeeded, what failed, escaped defects, false alarms, delayed detection, repeated manual work, missing coverage, and operational cost.
Examine requirements, architecture, ownership, environment, data, automation, observability, release controls, communication, and incentives without reducing the event to one person.
Assess which prevention, detection, containment, and recovery controls worked, failed, were missing, or produced false confidence.
Create specific preventive, detective, recovery, or learning actions with owner, due condition, priority, success measure, cost, and dependency.
Present the narrative, uncertainties, proposed actions, rejected actions, and ownership. Separate consensus from unresolved disagreement.
Publish the retrospective, create linked work items, schedule outcome reviews, and close actions only after the defined success measure is observed.
An approval cannot be reused after its environment, source, action plan, or approved document changes.
| Gate | Decision | Required binding |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gate 1 · approve retrospective scope | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
| 2 | Gate 2 · approve actions | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
| 3 | Gate 3 · publish | Approval stores approver, role, timestamp, context hash, approved document hash, expiry, and invalidation state. |
Attempt outcomes remain separate from these workflow results. Errors, cancellations, and invalid context are never silently converted into a pass.
The control or practice reduced risk as intended.
The control helped but had material limits or gaps.
The control did not prevent, detect, contain, or recover as expected.
No relevant control existed for the observed risk.
The control appeared healthy while failing to measure the real risk.
The retrospective cannot support a confident conclusion.
Evidence has provenance, capture context, privacy classification, retention, and integrity metadata. A convenient artifact is not automatically sufficient proof.
| Claim | Primary evidence | Required validation |
|---|---|---|
| Timeline | Timestamped authoritative sources | Facts and recollections are distinguished. |
| Escape | Requirement-to-release trace | The point where the risk could have been prevented or detected is evidenced. |
| Impact | Customer and operational data | Scope and recovery cost are not exaggerated. |
| Control | Expected and actual behaviour | The control's purpose and limitation are explicit. |
| Action | Owned measurable work item | Completion criteria measure outcome, not document creation alone. |
| Follow-up | Post-action evidence | An action closes only after effectiveness is checked. |
These controls belong in the runtime, connector permissions, sandbox, renderer, storage layer, and review process.
Analysis focuses on system conditions, decisions, and controls while preserving accountability for actions.
Recollections are useful but labelled and checked against records.
Prefer a small number of high-value owned actions over a long unprioritised list.
Training, documentation, or automation is not assumed effective without a measure.
Customer, security, incident, and personnel data follow the correct audience policy.
Actions have review dates and cannot disappear after publication.
The first applicable high-severity outcome takes precedence. A manual override is recorded separately and never rewrites the calculated result.
Collect missing records before drawing material conclusions.
High-impact missing or false-confidence controls require priority action.
Owned actions address material but manageable weaknesses.
Controls were broadly effective and refinements are recorded.
The workflow documents what it cannot prove and what further evidence would change confidence.
Human summaries are generated from validated structured records. They are not maintained as separate, drifting sources of truth.
retro-context.jsonVersioned output produced by the workflow.
timeline.jsonlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
outcome-analysis.mdVersioned output produced by the workflow.
contributing-systems.yamlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
control-review.csvVersioned output produced by the workflow.
actions.yamlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
decision-log.jsonlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
follow-up-plan.mdVersioned output produced by the workflow.
retrospective.htmlVersioned output produced by the workflow.
artifacts/qa/qa-retrospective/<run-id>/ ├── retro-context.json ├── timeline.jsonl ├── outcome-analysis.md ├── contributing-systems.yaml ├── control-review.csv ├── actions.yaml ├── decision-log.jsonl ├── follow-up-plan.md └── retrospective.html
Run a QA retrospective for the release where a webOS black-screen issue escaped to customers. Focus on requirements, platform coverage, automation, rollout monitoring, and support detection.
Retrospective outcome: SYSTEMIC RISK Key finding: The release smoke suite treated webOS 6 as one equivalence group, although laboratory evidence already showed model-specific browser differences. False-confidence control: A single representative device passed and was reported as webOS 6 coverage. Actions: 1. Split the platform matrix by browser engine and model family. 2. Add repeat-launch playback coverage. 3. Add model-segmented rollout telemetry. 4. Review effectiveness after the next two webOS releases.
The written skill is only one layer. The repository, runtime, connectors, evidence storage, and publication path must implement these requirements.
Reviews a completed release, incident, project, or testing cycle to identify escaped-risk patterns, process failures, effective controls, and owned preventive actions.