BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
for
Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile
based on Organisational Security Policies
(FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7
from
German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI)
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-414 V1.40
BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on
Organisational Security Policies (FSDPP_OSP),
Version 1.7
developed by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
Assurance Package claimed in the Protection Profile:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_FLR.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1,
ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The Protection Profile identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction
with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection
Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect
to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 25. February 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
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BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for Protection Profiles
(PP).
A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a
category of products which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security.
The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an existent one gives
consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs without referring to a special
product. Product or system certifications can be based on Protection Profiles. For products
which have been certified based on a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be
issued.
Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI or a
sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection Profile
according to Common Criteria [1].
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Protection Profile Overview..........................................................................................12
2 Security Functional Requirements...............................................................................12
3 Security Assurance Requirements...............................................................................13
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation........................................................................................13
5 Obligations and notes for the usage............................................................................14
6 Protection Profile Document.........................................................................................14
7 Definitions.....................................................................................................................14
7.1 Acronyms...............................................................................................................14
7.2 Glossary.................................................................................................................14
8 Bibliography..................................................................................................................15
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................17
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................27
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BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry
of the Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1[2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [7]
● Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a
mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on CC -
under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
2.1 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed
in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the
CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States of America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification
schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security
Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on
Organisational Security Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7 was conducted by the ITSEF
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
10 December 2009. The ITSEF SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI)
The PP was developed by: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 Certification Report
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the Protection Profile as indicated.
In case of changes to the certified version of the Protection Profile, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance
continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified Protection Profile, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any
security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
5 Publication
The Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security
Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [4]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor7
of the
Protection Profile. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the
internet address stated above.
7
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
Godesberger Allee 185-189
53175 Bonn
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BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the certified Protection Profile,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
1 Protection Profile Overview
The Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security
Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7 [6] is established by the German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) as a basis for the development of Security Targets in order to
perform a certification of an IT-product (TOE).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) described in the Protection Profile (PP) is a system that
provides fingerprint spoof detection either as part of or in front of a biometric system for
fingerprint recognition.
The TOE determines whether a fingerprint presented to the biometric system is genuine or
spoofed. The term spoofed biometric characteristics hereby refers to artificially created
fake fingers which are currently known to circumvent fingerprint recognition systems.
For this purpose the spoof detection system acquires spoofing evidences for a presented
fingerprint using a sensor device. This sensor can either be part of the capture device that
is used to capture the biometric sample of the fingerprint (or even be identical to it) or be a
separate sensor device (or more than one) that is completely dedicated to spoof detection.
Beside the fingerprint spoof detection functionality every TOE that claims conformance to
the PP shall implement:
● Management functionality to modify security relevant parameters
● Quality control for management parameters
● Audit functionality for security relevant events
● Protection of residual and security relevant data
The assets to be protected by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP are defined in the
Protection Profile [6], chapter 4.2. Based on these assets the Security Problem Definition
is defined in terms of Assumptions and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in
the Protection Profile [6], chapters 4.3 to 4.5.
These Assumptions and Organisational Security Policies are split into Security Objectives
to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP and Security Objectives to be
fulfilled by the operational environment of a TOE claiming conformance to this PP. These
Security Objectives are outlined in the PP [6], chapter 5.
The Protection Profile [6] requires a Security Target based on this PP or another PP
claiming this PP, to fulfil the CC requirements for strict conformance.
2 Security Functional Requirements
Based on the Security Objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP
the security policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements to be
implemented by a TOE. It covers the following issues: Biometric spoof detection, security
audit, residual information protection and TOE security management.
These TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) are outlined in the PP [6], chapter
7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one of them is newly defined.
Thus the SFR claim is called:
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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3 Security Assurance Requirements
Due to the special character of the technology described in this PP, an explicit assurance
package has been defined for the TOE. It has been chosen for this Protection Profile as
the PP should focus on application cases for which it is sufficient to determine whether the
Security Functionality claimed by a TOE is working correctly without performing a
dedicated vulnerability assessment.
The TOE security assurance package claimed in the Protection Profile is based entirely on
the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria. Thus, this assurance
package is called:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
This explicit assurance package is based on EAL 2 and consists of the following
Assurance Families:
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_FLR.1, ASE_CCL.1,
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1,
ASE_TSS.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see part C or [1],
part 3 for details).
The only differences compared to EAL 2 are the omitted AVA_VAN.2 assurance
component and the added ALC_FLR.1 assurance component.
Additional guidance in form of the Fingerprint Spoof Detection Evaluation Guidance [8]
has been provided for some of the assurance components due to the special nature of
the biometric technology.
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [5] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [7] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components
of the class APE.
The following assurance components were used:
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Protection Profile as defined in
chapter 1.
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5 Obligations and notes for the usage
The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the Protection Profile:
Due to the special character of the technology described in this PP, the Fingerprint Spoof
Detection Evaluation Guidance [8] shall be applied during evaluation. This document will
provide the evaluator with additional information and guidance for some assurance
requirements.
6 Protection Profile Document
The Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security
Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7 [6] is being provided within a separate document as
Annex A of this report.
7 Definitions
7.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FSDPP Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
7.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
8 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[5] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 09 December 2009, Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) for a PP evaluation, Certification ID: BSI-CC-PP-0062, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[6] Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security
Policies (FSDPP_OSP), BSI-CC-PP-0062, Version 1.7, 27 November 2009, Federal
Office for Information Security (BSI)
[7] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.
[8] Fingerprint Spoof Detection Evaluation Guidance, Version 2.0 (or a more recent
version), Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
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BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Documents AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
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Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational
Security Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7 [6] provided within a separate
document.
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