# Privacy Certification — FAILED

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Target Repo | `/Users/masa/Projects/tripbot7` |
| Commit SHA | `18e2e72e610009b7e89066ee16cf4e154b774a7f` |
| Policy Path | `/Users/masa/Projects/tripbot7/content/privacy.md` |
| Policy SHA-256 | `5d445c9fee71e76a...` |
| Generated At | 2026-04-05 23:19:55 UTC |
| Generator Version | `3.0.76` |
| Auditor Model | `anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5` |
| Schema Version | `1.0` |
| Content Hash | `4b98318bf9c665a1ceb399fb88149728` |

## Summary

| Status | Count |
|---|---|
| Pass | 8 |
| Fail | 2 |
| Insufficient Evidence | 8 |
| Manual Review | 2 |
| Ignored | 0 |
| Total | 20 |

## Claim Verdicts

### Claim `a47dd0f37640`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 9
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that the application collects Google Profile information (name, email, profile image) through Google OAuth authentication. However, the evidence provided does not contain code snippets showing actual data collection implementation. Evidence #7 (src/lib/auth.ts lines 16-27) shows authorization logic checking if a user is logged in, but does not reveal what data is collected during authentication. Evidence #3 references content/privacy.md but only shows metadata headers. Evidence #1-2 and #4-9 provide tangential references to authentication and privacy documentation but no concrete code demonstrating Google OAuth integration or the specific data fields being collected. To verify this claim, we would need to see: (1) Google OAuth provider configuration code, (2) user profile data extraction from Google's OAuth response, and (3) database schema or data models showing storage of name, email, and profile image fields. Without this evidence, we cannot confirm whether the application actually collects the stated information.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `auth.ts`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 9, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `README.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > # TripBot

**Evidence #2** — `content/terms.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > The Service, including its design, code, and branding, is the intellectual property of tripbot.tours. You may not copy, modify, or distribute any part of the Service without prior written consent.

**Evidence #3** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–4 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > --- title: Privacy Policy - tripbot.tours description: Privacy Policy for tripbot.tours ---


---

### Claim `212f4f503978`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that trip data and user preferences stored in Vercel Blob are encrypted. Evidence #1 shows AES-256-GCM encryption implementation (ALGORITHM constant and cipher operations with authentication tags). Evidence #8 demonstrates encryptTripPII function that encrypts trip.rawText before storage using encryptWithPrefix. Evidence #17 shows encodePrefs function that encrypts user preferences using encryptWithPrefix before storage. Evidence #5 shows encryptWithPrefix adds a prefix and calls the encrypt function. Evidence #3 and #4 show encryptFields/decryptFields functions for encrypting specific object fields. Evidence #7 shows decryptTripPII for decryption on retrieval. Evidence #1 confirms the use of authenticated encryption (AES-256-GCM with IV and authTag), which is cryptographically sound. The code demonstrates that both trip data (specifically rawText field) and user preferences are encrypted before being stored, and the encryption uses industry-standard AES-256-GCM. While we cannot verify all trip data fields are encrypted (only rawText is shown), the core claim about encryption being applied to data stored in Vercel Blob is substantiated by the evidence.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 23–38 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {   if (!plaintext) return plaintext    const key = getMasterKey()   const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)

**Evidence #2** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 108–111 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function decryptWithPrefix(value: string): string {   if (!value || !isEncrypted(value)) return value   return decrypt(value.slice(PREFIX.length)) }

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 70–81 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encryptFields<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(   obj: T,   fields: (keyof T)[] ): T {   const result = { ...obj }   for (const field of fields) {     if (result[field] && typeof result[fie


---

### Claim `fe49cf0abab9`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states 'We do not sell your data to third parties.' Evidence #10 confirms this statement exists in content/privacy.md line 28, showing the policy document contains this claim. However, the evidence provided does not contain sufficient code-level verification to confirm this claim is upheld in practice. Evidence #1 shows the application uses third-party services (Vercel Blob, Vercel KV, OpenRouter, Tavily Search API, Auth.js with Google OAuth), and Evidence #9 states 'We send only the minimum data necessary for each service to function,' but there is no code evidence showing: (1) what data is actually transmitted to these services, (2) whether any financial transactions or data selling arrangements exist, or (3) implementation of controls preventing data sales. The evidence consists primarily of documentation and configuration references rather than actual data flow code (e.g., API calls, data transmission logic). Evidence #4-6 and #12 show generic HTTP operations but don't reveal data sharing practices. Without examining the actual implementation of data transmission to third parties (API client code, service integrations, payment/monetization logic), we cannot verify whether the 'no selling' claim is technically enforced. This requires manual review of service agreements, data flow implementations, and business logic not present in the provided evidence.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `8bab8faa0069`

**Status:** [FAIL]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that the Service integrates with Google OAuth for authentication and account management. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) and Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) both confirm 'Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth' is part of the tech stack, which supports the Google OAuth portion of the claim. However, the claim appears incomplete (ends with 'managem' instead of 'management'), suggesting there may be additional third-party providers listed that are not shown. More critically, Evidence #8 (src/components/google-analytics.tsx lines 7-24) and Evidence #9 (src/app/events/[city]/[eventId]/visit-source-button.tsx lines 14-63) demonstrate integration with Google Analytics for tracking and analytics purposes, which is a third-party service not mentioned in the claim. Evidence #14 and #15 reference content/privacy.md discussing third-party services, but the snippets don't show the complete list. The claim fails because it presents an incomplete list of third-party integrations - Google Analytics is clearly integrated but not disclosed in the claim statement provided.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `google-analytics.tsx`
- `privacy.md`
- `visit-source-button.tsx`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `24181d3ac96f`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that 'each third-party provider operates under their own privacy policy.' Evidence #14 shows content/privacy.md mentions 'The Service integrates with the following third-party providers' and Evidence #15-16 reference a 'Third-Party Services' section and a statement about not selling data to third parties. However, the evidence snippets do not show whether the privacy policy actually states that third-party providers operate under their own policies. Evidence #3-4 identify third-party services in use (Google OAuth, Vercel services, Anthropic AI, Tavily Search), and Evidence #8-9 show Google Analytics integration, but none of the evidence demonstrates that the privacy policy explicitly acknowledges these providers operate under their own privacy policies. The evidence is too fragmentary to confirm the claim is properly documented in the privacy policy, though the privacy.md file appears to have a third-party services section. Without seeing the complete content of that section, we cannot verify the claim is upheld.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `60b654ec4220`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 9
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #2 shows the claim exists in content/privacy.md as a policy statement, but no code evidence demonstrates actual implementation of data minimization practices. Evidence #4 shows cost tracking code in src/lib/costs/tracker.ts that collects operation, cost, and optional city data, but without context of what data is sent to third-party services, we cannot verify minimization. Evidence #1, #3, #5-#9 are unrelated to data transmission practices. To verify this claim, we would need to see: (1) actual API calls to third-party services showing request payloads, (2) data filtering or sanitization logic before transmission, or (3) configuration limiting data fields sent. The current evidence only confirms the claim is stated in policy documentation but provides no code-level verification of implementation.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`
- `tracker.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 9, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `content/terms.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > The Service is provided "as is" without warranties of any kind, express or implied. We are not liable for missed events, incorrect times, canceled activities, travel disruptions, or any losses arising

**Evidence #2** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > Each third-party provider operates under their own privacy policy. We send only the minimum data necessary for each service to function.

**Evidence #3** — `content/terms.md` lines 12–12 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ## 2. Description of Service


---

### Claim `bfe93a245394`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 35%
**Evidence Count:** 26
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The claim states users have the right to request complete deletion of their account and all associated data. Evidence #25 confirms this right is stated in content/privacy.md. However, the code evidence does not demonstrate implementation of account deletion functionality. Evidence #1-9 show export-related functions (ExportMenu, exportTripAsJSON, exportTripAsMarkdown, exportTripAsPrintHTML) which relate to data portability, not deletion. Evidence #15 mentions 'DELETE export' in route.ts but appears to be about HTTP method exports for API routes, not user account deletion. Evidence #18 shows saveTrip function in blob.ts with encryption, and Evidence #19 notes security concerns about blob storage access, but neither demonstrates deletion capability. No evidence shows functions like deleteUser, deleteAccount, or removeUserData. The code snippets provided focus on data export, storage, and retrieval operations, but lack any clear implementation of account or data deletion endpoints or logic. Without evidence of actual deletion functionality in the codebase, we cannot confirm the claim is implemented, though we also cannot confirm it is violated.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `route.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 26, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `106a04abbf51`

**Status:** [FAIL]
**Confidence:** 90%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #8 clearly shows the implementation of Google Analytics tracking code in src/components/google-analytics.tsx (lines 7-24), which loads the Google Tag Manager script and initializes gtag tracking. Evidence #9 further demonstrates active usage of this tracking in src/app/events/[city]/[eventId]/visit-source-button.tsx (lines 14-63), where gtag events are fired for user engagement tracking. Google Analytics is a third-party tracking service that uses cookies for analytics purposes. While the claim states 'We do not use advertising cookies, tracking cookies, or third-party marketing cookies,' the presence of Google Analytics directly contradicts this statement, as Google Analytics inherently uses tracking cookies (including third-party cookies in many configurations) to track user behavior across sessions. Evidence #14 and #15 reference third-party services in content/privacy.md, suggesting awareness of third-party integrations. The code evidence clearly demonstrates the use of third-party tracking technology, which violates the privacy claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `google-analytics.tsx`
- `privacy.md`
- `visit-source-button.tsx`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `e08257259bbf`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 21
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that trip data and user preferences stored in Vercel Blob are encrypted. Evidence #1 shows AES-GCM encryption implementation using createCipheriv with IV and authentication tags. Evidence #8 demonstrates encryptTripPII function that encrypts trip.rawText before storage using encryptWithPrefix. Evidence #17 shows encodePrefs function that encrypts user preferences with encryptWithPrefix before storage. Evidence #7 shows decryptTripPII function that decrypts data when retrieved. The encryption uses AES-256-GCM (based on ALGORITHM constant and TAG_LENGTH/IV_LENGTH parameters visible in the code structure), which is a strong authenticated encryption algorithm. Evidence #20 confirms the privacy policy claim matches the implementation. The code demonstrates a complete encrypt-at-rest pattern: data is encrypted before being stored in Vercel Blob (Evidence #8, #17) and decrypted when retrieved (Evidence #7, #2). While we don't see direct evidence of the actual Vercel Blob put/get calls in the snippets, the encryption/decryption wrapper functions around trip and preference data strongly support that encryption occurs before storage.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 21, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 23–38 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {   if (!plaintext) return plaintext    const key = getMasterKey()   const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)

**Evidence #2** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 108–111 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function decryptWithPrefix(value: string): string {   if (!value || !isEncrypted(value)) return value   return decrypt(value.slice(PREFIX.length)) }

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 70–81 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encryptFields<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(   obj: T,   fields: (keyof T)[] ): T {   const result = { ...obj }   for (const field of fields) {     if (result[field] && typeof result[fie


---

### Claim `f22fe10df1e8`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 92%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Google OAuth is used for authentication and account management. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth' as part of the tech stack. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) confirms 'Auth: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth'. Evidence #14 (tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md line 27) shows a validation section titled 'Auth.js v5 + App Router + Google OAuth -- CONFIRMED', indicating this integration has been validated. Evidence #11 and #12 reference auth configuration files (scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md), and Evidence #15 mentions middleware.ts for auth middleware. Evidence #16 (privacy.md) references third-party provider integrations, consistent with Google OAuth being a third-party service. Multiple independent documentation sources consistently confirm Google OAuth is implemented for authentication, providing strong direct evidence that supports the claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `middleware.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md`
- `tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `174679593c20`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 95%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that itinerary text is sent to OpenRouter and Anthropic for AI processing. Evidence #15 directly confirms this in content/privacy.md, stating 'OpenRouter / Anthropic: AI processing for itinerary extraction and recommendations. Itinerary text is sent to AI providers for processing.' Evidence #14 provides technical implementation details from docs/research/e2e-flow-audit-2026-04-04.md, showing the code uses createOpenRouter from @openrouter/ai-sdk-provider with model anthropic/claude-3.5-haiku and generateObject for itinerary extraction. Evidence #6 confirms the @openrouter/ai-sdk-provider dependency in package.json. Evidence #4 in CLAUDE.md lists 'AI: Vercel AI SDK + OpenRouter (Claude Haiku via OpenRouter)' as part of the tech stack. Evidence #16 references src/lib/ai/extract-itinerary.ts as the AI extraction implementation file. The evidence consistently demonstrates that itinerary text is indeed sent to OpenRouter/Anthropic for AI processing, with both documentation and code implementation confirming this practice.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `e2e-flow-audit-2026-04-04.md`
- `extract-itinerary.ts`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `a7ee56c348bb`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly states 'Tavily Search for hyperlocal event discovery', and Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) confirms 'Search: Tavily Search API for hyperloca[l]'. Evidence #6 (package.json lines 1-44) shows the dependency '@tavily/core': '^0.7.2' is installed in the project. Evidence #14 and #15 (tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md) reference 'Tavily for Hyperlocal Event Search' and 'Event Search Alternatives', indicating Tavily is being used for event search functionality. Evidence #16 (privacy.md line 1) mentions 'The Service integrates with the following third-party providers', which contextually includes Tavily. The claim states Tavily is used for 'real-time event and activity search', and the evidence consistently shows Tavily is integrated for 'hyperlocal event discovery/search', which aligns with real-time event and activity search functionality. The presence of the package dependency and multiple documentation references provide strong direct evidence supporting the claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`
- `tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `7ea956b47d69`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 95%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #16 directly confirms the claim. The file content/privacy.md explicitly states 'Mapbox: Map display and travel time calculations.' This is a privacy policy document that lists third-party services, and it matches the claim exactly. Evidence #14 from docs/design/treatment.md also references a 'Travel Time Engine' with real-time routing capabilities, which aligns with the stated use of Mapbox for travel time calculations. The claim is about what Mapbox is used for according to the privacy policy, and the evidence directly confirms this statement in the privacy documentation.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`
- `treatment.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `92fa3a460644`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 92%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Vercel is used for application hosting, data storage, and caching. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Vercel Blob for private JSON storage (itineraries, user profiles)' and 'Vercel KV (Redis) for event cache', directly confirming data storage and caching. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) corroborates this with 'Storage: Vercel Blob (private JSON for itineraries/user data)' and 'Cache: Vercel KV (Redis) for event cache by date:country:city'. Evidence #6 (package.json lines 1-44) shows dependencies '@vercel/blob' and '@vercel/kv', confirming these services are integrated into the codebase. Evidence #14 (README.md lines 50-52) shows deployment instructions using 'vercel' command, confirming Vercel is used for application hosting. Evidence #15 (content/privacy.md lines 1-2) provides additional confirmation: 'Vercel Blob: Trip data and user preferences are stored as encrypted private JSON files' and 'Vercel KV: Event search results are cached temporarily'. Evidence #16 (docs/research/scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md line 61) references 'src/lib/search/cache.ts -- Vercel KV Cache', indicating actual implementation. All three aspects of the claim (hosting, data storage, and caching) are clearly demonstrated through multiple independent evidence sources.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `cache.ts`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`
- `scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `3c52d6f6197b`

**Status:** [MANUAL REVIEW]
**Confidence:** 100%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Claim is marked as non-testable — requires human review.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `8d10d73fbfca`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 25
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The claim states users can request complete deletion of their account and all associated data. The evidence provided primarily shows data export functionality (Evidence #1-9 showing export functions for trips in JSON, Markdown, PDF formats) but does not demonstrate account or data deletion capabilities. Evidence #15 mentions 'DELETE export' in route.ts but appears to be about HTTP method exports for API routes, not user data deletion. Evidence #16 shows DELETE as an HTTP method handler but without implementation details. Evidence #18 shows a saveTrip function in blob.ts but no deletion logic. Evidence #25 references a 'User Accounts' section in terms.md but the snippet is empty. The privacy.md content (Evidence #10-13, #21-22) discusses data storage and usage but provides no evidence of deletion functionality. No code was found implementing account deletion, user data erasure endpoints, or GDPR right-to-erasure compliance. The evidence is insufficient to confirm the claim is implemented in the codebase.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `route.ts`
- `terms.md`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 25, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `793a5a89f8cb`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 27
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The evidence strongly supports that users can request a copy of their trip data in standard formats. Evidence #2 shows an ExportMenu component exists. Evidence #3, #4, and #5 demonstrate concrete export functions: exportTripAsJSON (JSON format), exportTripAsMarkdown (Markdown format), and exportTripAsPrintHTML (PDF/HTML format). Evidence #12 and #26 reference 'Standard Format Mappings' and schema.org/iCal/wallet export paths, indicating the system is designed with data portability in mind using recognized standards. Evidence #14 explicitly mentions 'Export Formats' in the documentation. The presence of multiple export format implementations (JSON, Markdown, PDF/HTML) directly fulfills the claim that users can request trip data in standard formats. While we don't see the complete UI flow or API endpoint implementation details, the existence of these export functions with standard format outputs provides strong evidence the claim is implemented.

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 27, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `5b993f20ec0b`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 5
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The evidence provided does not contain sufficient information to verify the claim about cookie usage. Evidence #1 shows a section header '## 6. Cookies' from content/privacy.md but no actual content. Evidence #2 mentions Google OAuth authentication and usage analytics but doesn't specify cookie implementation details. Evidence #3 and #4 reference Auth.js v5 setup and UI components but don't detail cookie configuration. Evidence #5 mentions a login page but provides no cookie-related information. To properly verify this claim, we would need to see: (1) actual cookie configuration code showing session cookies only, (2) absence of third-party tracking scripts or advertising cookies in the codebase, (3) cookie settings in authentication middleware, and (4) the complete content under the '## 6. Cookies' section. The current evidence neither confirms nor denies the claim about cookie usage restrictions.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 5, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `content/privacy.md` lines 47–47 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## 6. Cookies

**Evidence #2** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–3 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Google Profile**: Name, email address, and profile image provided through Google OAuth authentication. - **Trip Data**: Itinerary text you paste or type, and the structured trip data extracted fro

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Missing:** Nothing -- clean and functional Auth.js v5 setup.


---

### Claim `3b7688f266ed`

**Status:** [MANUAL REVIEW]
**Confidence:** 100%
**Evidence Count:** 20
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Claim is marked as non-testable — requires human review.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 20, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `4756e9d3a81e`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 24
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim has two parts: (1) event search results cached in Vercel KV automatically expire, and (2) cache data is not personally identifiable. Evidence #13 from docs/research/hyperlocal-search-strategy-2026-04-04.md states 'Results cached in Vercel KV with 24-hour TTL, keyed as events:{date}:{country}:{city}', which supports automatic expiration. Evidence #20 and #21 confirm the cache key format 'events:{date}:{country}:{city}'. However, no actual implementation code showing the TTL configuration in Vercel KV was provided - only documentation references. Evidence #8 shows KV deletion functionality exists but for share links, not event cache. Regarding personally identifiable information, the cache key format (date:country:city) suggests non-PII data, but without seeing the actual cached content structure or implementation in src/lib/search/cache.ts beyond the key generation function (Evidence #20), we cannot definitively verify what data is stored. The evidence is primarily documentation and key format definitions rather than actual cache storage/expiration implementation code. Confidence is below 0.7 threshold due to lack of direct implementation evidence for both TTL configuration and cache content verification.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `cache.ts`
- `hyperlocal-search-strategy-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 4 of 24, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #2** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #3** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---
