# Privacy Certification — FAILED

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Target Repo | `/Users/masa/Projects/tripbot7` |
| Commit SHA | `83c9d6568170565249a23a5a86ae2d33d1a15b35` |
| Policy Path | `/Users/masa/Projects/tripbot7/content/privacy.md` |
| Policy SHA-256 | `5d445c9fee71e76a...` |
| Generated At | 2026-04-06 02:42:38 UTC |
| Generator Version | `3.0.76` |
| Auditor Model | `anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5` |
| Schema Version | `1.0` |
| Content Hash | `a5e62dcfdc2e0dc1ad12864bf7e47333` |

## Summary

| Status | Count |
|---|---|
| Pass | 8 |
| Fail | 2 |
| Insufficient Evidence | 8 |
| Manual Review | 2 |
| Ignored | 0 |
| Total | 20 |

## Claim Verdicts

### Claim `a47dd0f37640`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 9
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that the application collects Google Profile information (name, email, profile image) through Google OAuth authentication. However, the evidence provided does not contain code snippets showing actual data collection implementation. Evidence #7 (src/lib/auth.ts lines 16-27) shows authorization logic checking if a user is logged in, but does not reveal what data is collected during authentication. Evidence #1-3 show file headers from README.md, terms.md, and privacy.md but contain no implementation details. Evidence #4-6 reference authentication-related files and middleware but provide no code showing Google OAuth integration or data collection. Evidence #8-9 mention data storage and user accounts but without specifics. To verify this claim, we would need to see: (1) Google OAuth provider configuration, (2) user profile data extraction from OAuth response, (3) database schema or storage logic for user data. The absence of such evidence means we cannot confirm whether the application actually collects the stated Google Profile information.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `README.md`
- `auth.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `terms.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 9, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `README.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > # TripBot

**Evidence #2** — `content/terms.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > The Service, including its design, code, and branding, is the intellectual property of tripbot.tours. You may not copy, modify, or distribute any part of the Service without prior written consent.

**Evidence #3** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–4 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > --- title: Privacy Policy - tripbot.tours description: Privacy Policy for tripbot.tours ---


---

### Claim `212f4f503978`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 18
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that trip data and user preferences stored in Vercel Blob are encrypted. Evidence #1 shows AES-256-GCM encryption implementation (ALGORITHM constant and cipher operations with authentication tags). Evidence #8 demonstrates encryptTripPII function that encrypts trip.rawText before storage using encryptWithPrefix. Evidence #5 shows encryptWithPrefix adds a prefix and encrypts data. Evidence #18 shows user preferences are encrypted via encodePrefs using encryptWithPrefix before storage. Evidence #7 and #2 show corresponding decryption functions (decryptTripPII and decryptWithPrefix), confirming the encryption/decryption flow. Evidence #3 and #4 show encryptFields/decryptFields utility functions for encrypting multiple object fields. The encryption uses authenticated encryption (AES-GCM with auth tags per Evidence #1), which is cryptographically sound. The code demonstrates that both trip data (specifically rawText field) and user preferences are encrypted before being stored, and decrypted when retrieved, which directly supports the claim that data is stored as encrypted JSON files in Vercel Blob.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 18, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 23–38 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {   if (!plaintext) return plaintext    const key = getMasterKey()   const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)

**Evidence #2** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 108–111 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function decryptWithPrefix(value: string): string {   if (!value || !isEncrypted(value)) return value   return decrypt(value.slice(PREFIX.length)) }

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 70–81 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encryptFields<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(   obj: T,   fields: (keyof T)[] ): T {   const result = { ...obj }   for (const field of fields) {     if (result[field] && typeof result[fie


---

### Claim `fe49cf0abab9`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states 'We do not sell your data to third parties.' Evidence #10 confirms this statement exists in content/privacy.md line 28, showing the policy document contains this claim. However, the evidence provided does not contain sufficient code-level verification to confirm this claim is upheld in practice. Evidence #1 shows the application uses third-party services (Auth.js, Vercel Blob, Vercel KV, OpenRouter, Tavily Search API), and Evidence #9 states 'We send only the minimum data necessary for each service to function,' but there is no code evidence showing whether data is sold versus shared for functional purposes. The search queries attempted to find data transfer, upload, telemetry, and external API calls, but returned mostly documentation and configuration files rather than actual implementation code that would show data handling practices. Evidence #4-6 and #12 show various API calls and data operations, but none directly address whether data is sold to third parties. Without access to actual data transmission code, payment processing logic, or data sharing agreements in the codebase, there is insufficient evidence to verify the claim is implemented in code. This requires manual review of business logic, contracts, and actual data flow patterns not visible in the provided evidence.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `8bab8faa0069`

**Status:** [FAIL]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that the Service integrates with Google OAuth for authentication and account management. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) and Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) both confirm 'Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth' is part of the tech stack, which supports the Google OAuth portion of the claim. However, the claim appears incomplete (ends with 'managem' instead of 'management'), suggesting there may be additional third-party providers listed that are not shown. More critically, Evidence #8 (src/components/google-analytics.tsx lines 7-24) and Evidence #9 (src/app/events/[city]/[eventId]/visit-source-button.tsx lines 14-63) demonstrate integration with Google Analytics for tracking and analytics purposes, which is a third-party service not mentioned in the claim. Evidence #14 and #15 reference content/privacy.md discussing third-party services, but the snippets don't show the complete list. The claim fails because it does not accurately represent all third-party integrations present in the codebase - specifically omitting Google Analytics, which is clearly integrated based on the evidence.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `google-analytics.tsx`
- `privacy.md`
- `visit-source-button.tsx`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `24181d3ac96f`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that 'each third-party provider operates under their own privacy policy.' Evidence #14 shows content/privacy.md mentions 'The Service integrates with the following third-party providers' and Evidence #15-16 reference a 'Third-Party Services' section and a statement about not selling data to third parties. However, the evidence snippets do not show whether the privacy policy actually states that third-party providers operate under their own policies. Evidence #3-4 identify third-party services in use (Google OAuth, Vercel services, Anthropic AI, Tavily Search), and Evidence #8-9 show Google Analytics integration, but none of the evidence demonstrates that the privacy policy explicitly acknowledges these providers operate under their own privacy policies. The privacy.md file appears relevant but the snippets provided do not contain the specific language needed to verify this claim. Without seeing the complete third-party services section of the privacy policy, there is insufficient evidence to confirm whether this disclosure is properly made.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `60b654ec4220`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 9
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #2 shows the claim exists in content/privacy.md, confirming this is a stated policy. However, none of the evidence provides actual code implementation that demonstrates data minimization practices when sending data to third-party services. Evidence #4 shows cost tracking code (tracker.ts) but doesn't reveal what data is sent to external services. Evidence #5-9 are documentation snippets unrelated to data transmission. To verify this claim, we would need to see actual API calls to third-party services showing what data fields are included in requests, but no such code evidence is present. The absence of code evidence means we cannot confirm whether the implementation matches the policy statement.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`
- `tracker.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 9, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `content/terms.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > The Service is provided "as is" without warranties of any kind, express or implied. We are not liable for missed events, incorrect times, canceled activities, travel disruptions, or any losses arising

**Evidence #2** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > Each third-party provider operates under their own privacy policy. We send only the minimum data necessary for each service to function.

**Evidence #3** — `content/terms.md` lines 12–12 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ## 2. Description of Service


---

### Claim `bfe93a245394`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 35%
**Evidence Count:** 26
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The claim states users have the right to request complete deletion of their account and all associated data. Evidence #25 confirms this right is stated in content/privacy.md. However, the code evidence does not demonstrate implementation of account deletion functionality. Evidence #1-9 show export-related functions (ExportMenu, exportTripAsJSON, exportTripAsMarkdown, exportTripAsPrintHTML) which relate to data portability, not deletion. Evidence #18 shows saveTrip function in src/lib/storage/blob.ts for storing trips, and Evidence #20 shows encryption functions, but no deletion endpoints or functions are present. Evidence #15 mentions 'Fix the DELETE export' in route.ts but this appears to be about HTTP method exports for the API handler, not user account deletion. Evidence #16 shows DELETE is exported as an HTTP method handler, but without seeing the actual implementation, we cannot confirm it handles account deletion. The evidence lacks any clear implementation of user account deletion, user data deletion endpoints, or related business logic that would fulfill the privacy claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `route.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 26, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `106a04abbf51`

**Status:** [FAIL]
**Confidence:** 90%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #8 clearly shows the implementation of Google Analytics tracking code in src/components/google-analytics.tsx (lines 7-24), which loads the Google Tag Manager script and initializes gtag tracking. Evidence #9 further demonstrates active usage of this tracking in src/app/events/[city]/[eventId]/visit-source-button.tsx (lines 14-63), where gtag events are fired for user engagement tracking. Google Analytics is a third-party tracking service that uses cookies for analytics purposes. While the claim states 'We do not use advertising cookies, tracking cookies, or third-party marketing cookies,' the presence of Google Analytics directly contradicts this, as GA uses third-party tracking cookies by default. Evidence #14 and #30 from content/privacy.md acknowledge third-party service integration, which aligns with the actual implementation found in the code. The evidence strongly demonstrates that third-party tracking cookies are indeed being used, violating the privacy claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `google-analytics.tsx`
- `privacy.md`
- `visit-source-button.tsx`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `e08257259bbf`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 22
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that trip data and user preferences stored in Vercel Blob are encrypted. Evidence #1 shows AES-GCM encryption implementation using createCipheriv with IV and authentication tags. Evidence #8 demonstrates encryptTripPII function that encrypts trip.rawText before storage using encryptWithPrefix. Evidence #18 shows encodePrefs function that encrypts user preferences with encryptWithPrefix before storage. Evidence #7 shows decryptTripPII function that decrypts data when retrieved. Evidence #3-4 show encryptFields/decryptFields utilities for encrypting object fields. Evidence #21 from content/privacy.md confirms the policy claim matches the implementation. The encryption uses AES-256-GCM (a strong authenticated encryption algorithm) with random IVs per Evidence #1. The code demonstrates a complete encrypt-at-rest pattern: data is encrypted before being stored in Vercel Blob (Evidence #8, #18) and decrypted when retrieved (Evidence #7). No evidence of plaintext storage of trip data or preferences was found. The implementation in src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts and src/lib/storage/blob.ts directly supports the privacy claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `encrypt.ts`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 22, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 23–38 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {   if (!plaintext) return plaintext    const key = getMasterKey()   const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)

**Evidence #2** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 108–111 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function decryptWithPrefix(value: string): string {   if (!value || !isEncrypted(value)) return value   return decrypt(value.slice(PREFIX.length)) }

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 70–81 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encryptFields<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(   obj: T,   fields: (keyof T)[] ): T {   const result = { ...obj }   for (const field of fields) {     if (result[field] && typeof result[fie


---

### Claim `f22fe10df1e8`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 92%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Google OAuth is used for authentication and account management. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth' as part of the tech stack. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) confirms 'Auth: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth'. Evidence #14 (tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md line 27) shows a validation section titled 'Auth.js v5 + App Router + Google OAuth -- CONFIRMED', indicating this integration has been validated. Evidence #11 and #12 reference auth configuration files (scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md), and Evidence #15 mentions middleware.ts for auth middleware. Multiple independent documentation sources consistently confirm Google OAuth is implemented for authentication. No contradictory evidence was found suggesting alternative or additional authentication methods that would violate this claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `middleware.ts`
- `scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md`
- `tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `174679593c20`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 95%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that itinerary text is sent to OpenRouter and Anthropic for AI processing. Evidence #15 directly confirms this in content/privacy.md, stating 'OpenRouter / Anthropic: AI processing for itinerary extraction and recommendations. Itinerary text is sent to AI providers for processing.' Evidence #14 provides technical implementation details from docs/research/e2e-flow-audit-2026-04-04.md showing the code uses createOpenRouter from @openrouter/ai-sdk-provider with model anthropic/claude-3.5-haiku and generateObject with itinerarySchema for extraction. Evidence #6 confirms the @openrouter/ai-sdk-provider dependency in package.json. Evidence #4 in CLAUDE.md lists 'AI: Vercel AI SDK + OpenRouter (Claude Haiku via OpenRouter)' in the tech stack. Evidence #3 in README.md confirms 'Vercel AI SDK (@ai-sdk/anthropic) for entity extraction with Claude Haiku'. Evidence #16 references the actual implementation file src/lib/ai/extract-itinerary.ts. The evidence consistently demonstrates that itinerary text is indeed sent to OpenRouter/Anthropic for AI processing as claimed.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `e2e-flow-audit-2026-04-04.md`
- `extract-itinerary.ts`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `a7ee56c348bb`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly states 'Tavily Search for hyperlocal event discovery', and Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) confirms 'Search: Tavily Search API for hyperloca[l]'. Evidence #6 (package.json lines 1-44) shows the dependency '@tavily/core': '^0.7.2' is installed in the project. Evidence #14 and #15 (tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md) reference 'Tavily for Hyperlocal Event Search' and 'Event Search Alternatives', indicating Tavily is being used for event search functionality. Evidence #16 (privacy.md line 1) mentions 'The Service integrates with the following third-party providers', which contextually includes Tavily. The claim states Tavily is used for 'real-time event and activity search', and the evidence consistently shows Tavily is integrated for 'hyperlocal event discovery/search', which aligns with real-time event and activity search functionality. The presence of the package dependency and multiple documentation references provide strong direct evidence supporting the claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`
- `tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `7ea956b47d69`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 95%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #16 directly confirms the claim. The file content/privacy.md explicitly states 'Mapbox: Map display and travel time calculations.' This is the privacy policy document that lists third-party services, and it matches the claim exactly. Evidence #14 from docs/design/treatment.md also references a 'Travel Time Engine' with real-time routing capabilities, which aligns with the stated use of Mapbox for travel time calculations. The claim is about what Mapbox is used for according to the privacy policy, and the evidence directly confirms this statement appears in the privacy documentation.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`
- `treatment.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `92fa3a460644`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 92%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Vercel is used for application hosting, data storage, and caching. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Vercel Blob for private JSON storage (itineraries, user profiles)' and 'Vercel KV (Redis) for event cache', directly confirming data storage and caching. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) corroborates this with 'Storage: Vercel Blob (private JSON for itineraries/user data)' and 'Cache: Vercel KV (Redis) for event cache by date:country:city'. Evidence #6 (package.json lines 1-44) shows dependencies '@vercel/blob' and '@vercel/kv', confirming these services are integrated in the codebase. Evidence #14 (README.md lines 50-52) shows deployment instructions using 'vercel' command, confirming Vercel is used for application hosting. Evidence #15 (content/privacy.md lines 1-2) provides additional confirmation: 'Vercel Blob: Trip data and user preferences are stored as encrypted private JSON files' and 'Vercel KV: Event search results are cached temporarily'. Evidence #16 (docs/research/scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md line 61) references 'src/lib/search/cache.ts -- Vercel KV Cache', indicating actual implementation. All three aspects of the claim (hosting, data storage, and caching) are clearly demonstrated through multiple independent evidence sources.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `cache.ts`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`
- `scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `3c52d6f6197b`

**Status:** [MANUAL REVIEW]
**Confidence:** 100%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Claim is marked as non-testable — requires human review.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `8d10d73fbfca`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 35%
**Evidence Count:** 25
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The claim states users can request complete deletion of their account and all associated data. The evidence provided primarily shows data export functionality (Evidence #1-9 showing export functions for trips in JSON, Markdown, PDF formats) but does not demonstrate account or data deletion capabilities. Evidence #15 mentions 'DELETE export' in route.ts but appears to be about HTTP method exports for API routes, not user data deletion. Evidence #16 shows DELETE as an exported HTTP handler, but without implementation details. Evidence #18 shows a saveTrip function in blob.ts with encryption, and Evidence #19 mentions blob storage security concerns, but neither addresses deletion. Evidence #25 references a 'User Accounts' section in terms.md but provides no content about deletion rights. The privacy.md snippets (Evidence #10-13, #21-22) discuss data storage and usage but do not mention account deletion procedures. No code evidence shows functions like deleteUser, deleteAccount, or data purging logic. The evidence is insufficient to confirm the claim is implemented in the codebase.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `route.ts`
- `terms.md`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 25, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `793a5a89f8cb`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 27
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The evidence demonstrates that users can request a copy of their trip data in standard formats. Evidence #3 shows exportTripAsJSON function in src/lib/export/json.ts, Evidence #4 shows exportTripAsMarkdown in src/lib/export/markdown.ts, and Evidence #5 shows exportTripAsPrintHTML in src/lib/export/pdf.ts. Evidence #2 confirms an ExportMenu component exists in src/components/export-menu.tsx, indicating a user-facing interface for data export. Evidence #12 and #26 reference standard format mappings and schema.org compatibility, demonstrating the exports use standard formats. Evidence #18 shows trip data storage structure that would be exported. The combination of export functions in multiple standard formats (JSON, Markdown, PDF/HTML) with a UI component for accessing them directly supports the claim that users can request copies of their trip data in standard formats.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `export-menu.tsx`
- `json.ts`
- `markdown.ts`
- `pdf.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 27, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `5b993f20ec0b`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 5
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The evidence provided does not contain sufficient information to verify the claim about cookie usage. Evidence #1 shows a section header '## 6. Cookies' from content/privacy.md but no actual content. Evidence #2 mentions Google OAuth authentication and usage analytics but doesn't specify cookie implementation details. Evidence #3 and #4 reference Auth.js v5 setup and UI components but don't detail cookie configuration. Evidence #5 mentions a login page but provides no cookie-related information. To properly verify this claim, we would need to see: (1) actual cookie configuration code showing session cookies only, (2) absence of third-party tracking scripts or advertising cookies in the codebase, (3) cookie settings in authentication middleware, and (4) the complete content under the '## 6. Cookies' section in privacy.md. The search results appear to have missed relevant code files that would contain cookie implementation details.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 5, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `content/privacy.md` lines 47–47 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## 6. Cookies

**Evidence #2** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–3 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Google Profile**: Name, email address, and profile image provided through Google OAuth authentication. - **Trip Data**: Itinerary text you paste or type, and the structured trip data extracted fro

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Missing:** Nothing -- clean and functional Auth.js v5 setup.


---

### Claim `3b7688f266ed`

**Status:** [MANUAL REVIEW]
**Confidence:** 100%
**Evidence Count:** 20
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Claim is marked as non-testable — requires human review.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 20, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `4756e9d3a81e`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 24
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that event search results cached in Vercel KV automatically expire and are not personally identifiable. Evidence #13 from docs/research/hyperlocal-search-strategy-2026-04-04.md confirms 'Results cached in Vercel KV with 24-hour TTL, keyed as events:{date}:{country}:{city}', and Evidence #21 from CLAUDE.md states 'Events cached in Vercel KV with TTL, keyed as events:{date}:{country}:{city}'. Evidence #20 shows the cache key structure in src/lib/search/cache.ts uses only date, country, and city parameters. However, the evidence does not show the actual implementation code that sets the TTL/expiration in Vercel KV, nor does it demonstrate what data fields are stored in the cache to verify they are not personally identifiable. The cache key structure suggests non-PII data, but without seeing the actual cached values or the KV set operation with expiration parameters, we cannot definitively confirm both parts of the claim. The documentation references support the claim but lack implementation-level proof.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `cache.ts`
- `hyperlocal-search-strategy-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 4 of 24, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #2** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #3** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---
