# Privacy Certification — FAILED

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Target Repo | `/Users/masa/Projects/tripbot7` |
| Commit SHA | `18e2e72e610009b7e89066ee16cf4e154b774a7f` |
| Policy Path | `/Users/masa/Projects/tripbot7/content/privacy.md` |
| Policy SHA-256 | `5d445c9fee71e76a...` |
| Generated At | 2026-04-05 23:10:45 UTC |
| Generator Version | `3.0.76` |
| Auditor Model | `anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5` |
| Schema Version | `1.0` |
| Content Hash | `1926bcbea8b80ff6b2baac49792c48e2` |

## Summary

| Status | Count |
|---|---|
| Pass | 8 |
| Fail | 2 |
| Insufficient Evidence | 8 |
| Manual Review | 2 |
| Ignored | 0 |
| Total | 20 |

## Claim Verdicts

### Claim `a47dd0f37640`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 9
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that the application collects Google Profile information (name, email, profile image) through Google OAuth authentication. However, the evidence provided does not contain code snippets showing actual data collection implementation. Evidence #7 (src/lib/auth.ts lines 16-27) shows authorization logic checking if a user is logged in, but does not reveal what data is collected during authentication. Evidence #3 references content/privacy.md but only shows metadata headers. Evidence #4-6 mention authentication-related files but provide no implementation details. No evidence shows Google OAuth configuration, profile data extraction, or storage of name/email/profile image. Without seeing the actual authentication provider configuration or data collection code, we cannot verify whether the specific Google Profile fields mentioned in the claim are actually collected.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `auth.ts`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 9, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `README.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > # TripBot

**Evidence #2** — `content/terms.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > The Service, including its design, code, and branding, is the intellectual property of tripbot.tours. You may not copy, modify, or distribute any part of the Service without prior written consent.

**Evidence #3** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–4 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > --- title: Privacy Policy - tripbot.tours description: Privacy Policy for tripbot.tours ---


---

### Claim `212f4f503978`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that trip data and user preferences stored in Vercel Blob are encrypted. Evidence #1 shows AES-256-GCM encryption implementation (ALGORITHM constant and cipher operations with authentication tags). Evidence #8 demonstrates encryptTripPII function that encrypts trip.rawText before storage using encryptWithPrefix. Evidence #17 shows encodePrefs function that encrypts user preferences using encryptWithPrefix before storage. Evidence #5 shows encryptWithPrefix adds a prefix and encrypts data. Evidence #7 shows decryptTripPII for retrieval, confirming round-trip encryption. Evidence #16 confirms Vercel Blob is used with path format trips/{userId}/{tripId}.json. The encryption uses authenticated encryption (AES-GCM with auth tags per Evidence #1), which is cryptographically sound. The code demonstrates that both trip data (specifically rawText field) and user preferences are encrypted before being stored to Vercel Blob, directly supporting the privacy claim. No evidence of plaintext storage of these data types was found.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 23–38 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {   if (!plaintext) return plaintext    const key = getMasterKey()   const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)

**Evidence #2** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 108–111 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function decryptWithPrefix(value: string): string {   if (!value || !isEncrypted(value)) return value   return decrypt(value.slice(PREFIX.length)) }

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 70–81 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encryptFields<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(   obj: T,   fields: (keyof T)[] ): T {   const result = { ...obj }   for (const field of fields) {     if (result[field] && typeof result[fie


---

### Claim `fe49cf0abab9`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states 'We do not sell your data to third parties.' Evidence #10 confirms this statement exists in content/privacy.md line 28, showing the policy document contains this claim. However, the evidence provided does not contain sufficient code-level verification to confirm this claim is upheld in practice. Evidence #1 shows the application uses third-party services (Auth.js, Vercel Blob, Vercel KV, OpenRouter, Tavily Search API), and Evidence #9 states 'We send only the minimum data necessary for each service to function,' but there is no code evidence showing whether data is sold versus shared for functional purposes. The search queries attempted to find data transfer, upload, telemetry, and external API calls, but returned mostly documentation and configuration files rather than actual implementation code that would show data handling practices. Evidence #4-6 and #12 show various API calls and data operations, but none directly address whether data is sold to third parties. Without access to actual data transmission code, payment processing logic, or data sharing agreements in the codebase, there is insufficient evidence to verify the claim is implemented in code. This requires manual review of business logic, contracts, and actual data flow patterns not visible in the provided evidence.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `8bab8faa0069`

**Status:** [FAIL]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that the Service integrates with Google OAuth for authentication and account management. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) and Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) both confirm 'Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth' is part of the tech stack, which supports the Google OAuth portion of the claim. However, the claim appears incomplete (ends with 'managem' instead of 'management'), suggesting there may be additional third-party providers listed that are not shown. More critically, Evidence #8 (src/components/google-analytics.tsx lines 7-24) and Evidence #9 (src/app/events/[city]/[eventId]/visit-source-button.tsx lines 14-63) demonstrate integration with Google Analytics for tracking and analytics purposes, which is a third-party service not mentioned in the claim. Evidence #14 and #15 reference content/privacy.md discussing third-party services, but the snippets don't show the complete list. The claim fails because it presents an incomplete list of third-party integrations - Google Analytics is clearly integrated but not disclosed in the claim statement provided.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `google-analytics.tsx`
- `privacy.md`
- `visit-source-button.tsx`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `24181d3ac96f`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that 'each third-party provider operates under their own privacy policy.' Evidence #14 shows content/privacy.md mentions 'The Service integrates with the following third-party providers' and Evidence #15-16 reference a 'Third-Party Services' section and a statement about not selling data to third parties. However, the evidence snippets do not show whether the privacy policy actually states that third-party providers operate under their own policies. Evidence #3-4 identify third-party services in use (Google OAuth, Vercel services, Anthropic AI, Tavily Search), and Evidence #8-9 show Google Analytics integration, but none of the evidence demonstrates that the privacy policy explicitly acknowledges these providers operate under their own privacy policies. The evidence is too fragmentary to confirm the claim is properly documented in the privacy policy, though the privacy.md file appears to have a third-party services section. Without seeing the complete content of that section, we cannot verify the claim is upheld.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `60b654ec4220`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 9
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #2 shows the claim exists in content/privacy.md, confirming the policy statement itself. However, none of the evidence provides actual code implementation that demonstrates data minimization practices when sending data to third-party services. Evidence #4 shows cost tracking code (tracker.ts) but doesn't reveal what data is sent to external services. Evidence #5-9 are documentation and research files that don't contain relevant implementation details. To verify this claim, we would need to see actual API calls to third-party services showing what data fields are transmitted, but no such code evidence is present. The absence of code showing data transmission patterns means we cannot confirm whether the implementation upholds the stated policy of sending only minimum necessary data.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`
- `tracker.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 9, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `content/terms.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > The Service is provided "as is" without warranties of any kind, express or implied. We are not liable for missed events, incorrect times, canceled activities, travel disruptions, or any losses arising

**Evidence #2** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > Each third-party provider operates under their own privacy policy. We send only the minimum data necessary for each service to function.

**Evidence #3** — `content/terms.md` lines 12–12 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ## 2. Description of Service


---

### Claim `bfe93a245394`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 35%
**Evidence Count:** 26
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The claim states users have the right to request complete deletion of their account and all associated data. Evidence #25 confirms this right is stated in content/privacy.md. However, the code evidence does not demonstrate implementation of account deletion functionality. Evidence #1-9 show export-related functions (ExportMenu, exportTripAsJSON, exportTripAsMarkdown, exportTripAsPrintHTML) which relate to data portability, not deletion. Evidence #18 shows saveTrip function in src/lib/storage/blob.ts for storing trips, and Evidence #20 shows encryption functions, but no deletion endpoints or functions are present. Evidence #15 mentions 'Fix the DELETE export' in route.ts but this appears to be about HTTP method exports for the API handler, not user account deletion. Evidence #16 shows DELETE is exported as an HTTP method handler, but without seeing the actual implementation, we cannot confirm it handles account deletion. The evidence lacks any clear implementation of user account deletion, user data deletion endpoints, or related business logic that would fulfill the privacy claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `route.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 26, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `106a04abbf51`

**Status:** [FAIL]
**Confidence:** 90%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #8 clearly shows the implementation of Google Analytics tracking code in src/components/google-analytics.tsx (lines 7-24), which loads the Google Tag Manager script and initializes gtag tracking. Evidence #9 further demonstrates active usage of this tracking in src/app/events/[city]/[eventId]/visit-source-button.tsx (lines 14-63), where gtag events are fired for user engagement tracking. Google Analytics is a third-party tracking service that uses cookies for analytics purposes. While the claim states 'We do not use advertising cookies, tracking cookies, or third-party marketing cookies,' the presence of Google Analytics directly contradicts this statement, as Google Analytics inherently uses tracking cookies (including third-party cookies in many configurations) to track user behavior across sessions. Evidence #14 and #30 from content/privacy.md acknowledge third-party service integration, which aligns with the actual implementation but contradicts the specific claim being evaluated. The code clearly implements third-party tracking functionality.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `google-analytics.tsx`
- `privacy.md`
- `visit-source-button.tsx`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `e08257259bbf`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 21
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that trip data and user preferences stored in Vercel Blob are encrypted. Evidence #1 shows AES-GCM encryption implementation using createCipheriv with authentication tags. Evidence #8 demonstrates encryptTripPII function that encrypts trip.rawText before storage using encryptWithPrefix. Evidence #7 shows the corresponding decryptTripPII function for retrieval. Evidence #17 shows user preferences are encrypted via encodePrefs using encryptWithPrefix and JSON.stringify. Evidence #3-4 show encryptFields/decryptFields functions for selective field encryption. Evidence #5-6 show the prefix-based encryption wrapper that marks encrypted data. The encryption uses AES-256-GCM (authenticated encryption) with random IVs per Evidence #1, which is cryptographically sound. Evidence #20 confirms the privacy policy statement matches the claim. The code demonstrates a complete encrypt-at-rest implementation for both trip data (via encryptTripPII in blob.ts) and user preferences (via encodePrefs in store.ts) before storage in Vercel Blob. No evidence of plaintext storage was found for these data types.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `store.ts`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 21, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 23–38 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {   if (!plaintext) return plaintext    const key = getMasterKey()   const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)

**Evidence #2** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 108–111 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function decryptWithPrefix(value: string): string {   if (!value || !isEncrypted(value)) return value   return decrypt(value.slice(PREFIX.length)) }

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/crypto/encrypt.ts` lines 70–81 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > function encryptFields<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(   obj: T,   fields: (keyof T)[] ): T {   const result = { ...obj }   for (const field of fields) {     if (result[field] && typeof result[fie


---

### Claim `f22fe10df1e8`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 92%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Google OAuth is used for authentication and account management. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth' as part of the tech stack. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) confirms 'Auth: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAuth'. Evidence #14 (tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md line 27) shows a validation section titled 'Auth.js v5 + App Router + Google OAuth -- CONFIRMED', indicating this integration has been validated. Evidence #11 and #12 reference auth configuration files (scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md), and Evidence #15 mentions middleware.ts for auth middleware. Evidence #16 (privacy.md) references third-party provider integrations, consistent with Google OAuth being a third-party service. Multiple independent documentation sources consistently confirm Google OAuth is implemented for authentication, providing strong direct evidence that supports the claim.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `middleware.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md`
- `tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `174679593c20`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 95%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that itinerary text is sent to OpenRouter and Anthropic for AI processing. Evidence #15 directly confirms this in content/privacy.md, stating 'OpenRouter / Anthropic: AI processing for itinerary extraction and recommendations. Itinerary text is sent to AI providers for processing.' Evidence #14 provides technical implementation details from docs/research/e2e-flow-audit-2026-04-04.md showing the code uses createOpenRouter from @openrouter/ai-sdk-provider with model anthropic/claude-3.5-haiku and generateObject with itinerarySchema for extraction. Evidence #6 confirms the @openrouter/ai-sdk-provider dependency in package.json. Evidence #4 in CLAUDE.md lists 'AI: Vercel AI SDK + OpenRouter (Claude Haiku via OpenRouter)' in the tech stack. Evidence #3 in README.md confirms 'Vercel AI SDK (@ai-sdk/anthropic) for entity extraction with Claude Haiku'. Evidence #16 references the actual implementation file src/lib/ai/extract-itinerary.ts. The evidence consistently demonstrates that itinerary text is indeed sent to OpenRouter/Anthropic for AI processing as claimed.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `e2e-flow-audit-2026-04-04.md`
- `extract-itinerary.ts`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `a7ee56c348bb`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 85%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Tavily is used for real-time event and activity search. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Tavily Search for hyperlocal event discovery' as part of the tech stack. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) confirms 'Search: Tavily Search API for hyperloca[l]' in the technical architecture. Evidence #6 (package.json lines 1-44) shows '@tavily/core': '^0.7.2' as a direct dependency, proving Tavily is actually integrated into the codebase. Evidence #14 and #15 (tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md) reference Tavily in the context of hyperlocal event search and event search alternatives, further confirming its intended use case. The combination of documentation stating Tavily is used for event discovery, the presence of the Tavily package in dependencies, and multiple references to its event search purpose provides strong direct evidence that the claim is accurate.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `package.json`
- `tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `7ea956b47d69`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 95%
**Evidence Count:** 17
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Evidence #16 directly confirms the claim. The file content/privacy.md explicitly states 'Mapbox: Map display and travel time calculations.' This is the privacy policy document that lists third-party services, and it matches the claim exactly. Evidence #14 from docs/design/treatment.md also references a 'Travel Time Engine' with real-time routing capabilities, which aligns with the stated use of Mapbox for travel time calculations. The claim is about what Mapbox is used for according to the privacy policy, and the evidence directly confirms this statement appears in the privacy documentation.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `privacy.md`
- `treatment.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 17, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `92fa3a460644`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 92%
**Evidence Count:** 16
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim states that Vercel is used for application hosting, data storage, and caching. Evidence #3 (README.md lines 1-8) explicitly lists 'Vercel Blob for private JSON storage (itineraries, user profiles)' and 'Vercel KV (Redis) for event cache', directly confirming data storage and caching. Evidence #4 (CLAUDE.md lines 1-9) corroborates this with 'Storage: Vercel Blob (private JSON for itineraries/user data)' and 'Cache: Vercel KV (Redis) for event cache by date:country:city'. Evidence #6 (package.json lines 1-44) shows dependencies '@vercel/blob' and '@vercel/kv', confirming these services are integrated in the codebase. Evidence #14 (README.md lines 50-52) shows deployment instructions using 'vercel' command, confirming Vercel is used for application hosting. Evidence #15 (content/privacy.md lines 1-2) provides additional confirmation: 'Vercel Blob: Trip data and user preferences are stored as encrypted private JSON files' and 'Vercel KV: Event search results are cached temporarily'. Evidence #16 (docs/research/scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md line 61) references 'src/lib/search/cache.ts -- Vercel KV Cache', indicating actual implementation. All three aspects of the claim (hosting, data storage, and caching) are clearly demonstrated through multiple independent evidence sources.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `CLAUDE.md`
- `README.md`
- `cache.ts`
- `package.json`
- `privacy.md`
- `scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 16, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–5 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > ### Phase 3: Enrichment Pipeline (following sprint) - Per-segment enrichment API endpoint - Cost estimation via AI - Transfer routing via AI (or future API integration) - Opening hours via search/API

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/itinerary-schema-proposal-2026-04-04.md` lines 238–238 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_code
  > segments: ItinerarySegment[]

**Evidence #3** — `README.md` lines 1–8 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Next.js 15** (App Router, TypeScript, strict mode) - **Hono** mounted as API handler via catch-all route - **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Google OAuth - **Vercel Blob** for private JSON storage (i


---

### Claim `3c52d6f6197b`

**Status:** [MANUAL REVIEW]
**Confidence:** 100%
**Evidence Count:** 19
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Claim is marked as non-testable — requires human review.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 19, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `8d10d73fbfca`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 25
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The claim states users can request complete deletion of their account and all associated data. The evidence provided primarily shows data export functionality (Evidence #1-9 show export functions for trips in JSON, Markdown, PDF formats) but does not demonstrate account or data deletion capabilities. Evidence #15 mentions 'DELETE export' in route.ts but appears to be about HTTP method exports for API routes, not user data deletion. Evidence #16 shows DELETE as an HTTP method handler but without implementation details. Evidence #18 shows a saveTrip function in blob.ts but no deletion logic. Evidence #25 references a 'User Accounts' section in terms.md but the snippet is empty. No evidence shows actual deletion endpoints, account removal logic, or data erasure workflows. The privacy.md file (Evidence #10-13) discusses data storage and usage but does not mention deletion rights. Without code demonstrating deletion functionality or API endpoints that handle account/data deletion requests, there is insufficient evidence to confirm the claim is implemented.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `blob.ts`
- `privacy.md`
- `route.ts`
- `terms.md`

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 25, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `793a5a89f8cb`

**Status:** [PASS]
**Confidence:** 82%
**Evidence Count:** 27
**KG Path Present:** Yes

**Reasoning:** The evidence strongly supports that users can request a copy of their trip data in standard formats. Evidence #2 shows an ExportMenu component exists. Evidence #3, #4, and #5 demonstrate concrete export functions: exportTripAsJSON (JSON format), exportTripAsMarkdown (Markdown format), and exportTripAsPrintHTML (PDF/HTML format). Evidence #12 and #26 reference standard format mappings and schema.org compatibility, indicating the exported data follows recognized standards. Evidence #14 explicitly mentions 'Export Formats' in documentation. The presence of multiple export format implementations (JSON, Markdown, PDF/HTML) directly fulfills the claim that users can request trip data in standard formats. The ExportMenu component suggests this functionality is accessible to users through the UI. While we don't see the complete implementation details or API endpoints, the existence of these export functions with standard format outputs provides strong evidence the claim is upheld.

**Evidence** (showing 9 of 27, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/lib/preferences/store.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  - KG path: setUserPreferences -> getUserPreferences -> trackEventInteraction -> getUserPreferences -> trackTripCreated -> getUserPreferences
  > [function] getUserPreferences

**Evidence #2** — `src/components/export-menu.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] ExportMenu

**Evidence #3** — `src/lib/export/json.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsJSON

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/export/markdown.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsMarkdown

**Evidence #5** — `src/lib/export/pdf.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] exportTripAsPrintHTML

**Evidence #6** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #7** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #8** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #9** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---

### Claim `5b993f20ec0b`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 30%
**Evidence Count:** 5
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The evidence provided does not contain sufficient information to verify the claim about cookie usage. Evidence #1 shows a section header '## 6. Cookies' from content/privacy.md but no actual content. Evidence #2 mentions Google OAuth authentication and usage analytics but doesn't specify cookie implementation details. Evidence #3 and #4 reference Auth.js v5 setup and UI components but don't detail cookie configuration. Evidence #5 mentions a login page but provides no cookie-related information. To properly verify this claim, we would need to see: (1) actual cookie configuration code showing session cookies only, (2) absence of third-party tracking scripts or advertising cookies in the codebase, (3) cookie settings in authentication middleware, and (4) the complete content under the '## 6. Cookies' section in privacy.md. The search results appear to have missed relevant code files that would contain cookie implementation details.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `Auth.js`
- `privacy.md`

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 5, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `content/privacy.md` lines 47–47 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## 6. Cookies

**Evidence #2** — `content/privacy.md` lines 1–3 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > - **Google Profile**: Name, email address, and profile image provided through Google OAuth authentication. - **Trip Data**: Itinerary text you paste or type, and the structured trip data extracted fro

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/scaffold-status-report-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Missing:** Nothing -- clean and functional Auth.js v5 setup.


---

### Claim `3b7688f266ed`

**Status:** [MANUAL REVIEW]
**Confidence:** 100%
**Evidence Count:** 20
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** Claim is marked as non-testable — requires human review.

**Evidence** (showing 3 of 20, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `CLAUDE.md` lines 1–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > ## Tech Stack - **Framework**: Next.js 15 App Router (TypeScript, strict mode) - **API Layer**: Hono (mounted as catch-all in Next.js route handlers) - **Auth**: Auth.js v5 (NextAuth) with Google OAut

**Evidence #2** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 1–1 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **Sources:** [Tavily API docs](https://docs.tavily.com/documentation/api-reference/endpoint/search), [SerpAPI Google Events API](https://serpapi.com/google-events-api), [SERP API comparison](https://d

**Evidence #3** — `docs/research/tech-stack-validation-2026-04-04.md` lines 9–9 | score: 0.000 | tool: search_hybrid
  > **File:** `app/api/[[...route]]/route.ts`


---

### Claim `4756e9d3a81e`

**Status:** [INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE]
**Confidence:** 45%
**Evidence Count:** 24
**KG Path Present:** No

**Reasoning:** The claim has two parts: (1) event search results cached in Vercel KV automatically expire, and (2) cache data is not personally identifiable. Evidence #13 from docs/research/hyperlocal-search-strategy-2026-04-04.md states 'Results cached in Vercel KV with 24-hour TTL, keyed as events:{date}:{country}:{city}', which supports automatic expiration. Evidence #20 and #21 confirm the cache key format 'events:{date}:{country}:{city}'. However, no actual implementation code showing the TTL configuration in Vercel KV was provided - only documentation references. Evidence #8 shows KV deletion functionality exists but for share links, not event cache. Regarding personally identifiable information, the cache key format (date:country:city) suggests non-PII data, but without seeing the actual cached content structure or implementation in src/lib/search/cache.ts beyond the key generation function (Evidence #20), we cannot definitively verify what data is stored. The evidence is primarily documentation and key format definitions rather than actual cache storage/expiration implementation code. Confidence is below 0.7 threshold due to lack of direct implementation evidence for both TTL configuration and cache content verification.

**Key Evidence Files Referenced by Judge:**
- `cache.ts`
- `hyperlocal-search-strategy-2026-04-04.md`

**Evidence** (showing 4 of 24, sorted by relevance score):

**Evidence #1** — `src/app/about/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #2** — `src/app/privacy/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #3** — `src/app/terms/page.tsx` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [function] generateMetadata

**Evidence #4** — `src/lib/events/city-wiki-data.ts` lines n/a | score: 0.700 | tool: kg_query
  > [module] city-wiki-data


---
