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Title: The Prince



Author: Niccolò Machiavelli



Translator: W. K. Marriott



Release date: February 11, 2006 [eBook #1232]

                Most recently updated: October 29, 2024



Language: English



Credits: John Bickers, David Widger and Others





*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE ***



The Prince



by Nicolo Machiavelli



Translated by W. K. Marriott





Contents



 INTRODUCTION

 YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94

 OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512

 LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27

 THE MAN AND HIS WORKS

 DEDICATION



 THE PRINCE

 CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

 CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

 CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

 CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

 CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

 CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

 CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

 CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

 CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

 CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

 CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

 CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

 CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN

 CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR

 CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

 CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

 CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

 CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

 CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

 CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

 CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

 CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

 CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

 CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

 CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

 CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS



 DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI



 THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA









_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to

1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic

missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512;

later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd

June 1527._









INTRODUCTION





Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the

second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute,

and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were

members of the old Florentine nobility.



His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly

enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of

Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an

Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico.

The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year

Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career

Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted

until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his

office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they

were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s

literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few

weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his

fifty-eighth year, without having regained office.









YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94





Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the

Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of

this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been

described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by

the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving

Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have

been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the

fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a

gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed

prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean

rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli

strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to

Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_.



Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the

young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer

than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other

kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming,

and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with

wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly

was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli

shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and

leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes:

“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure,

especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than

which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to

me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your

share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn

out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then,

you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters

and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I

have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success

and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help

you if you help yourself.”









OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512





The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the

free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the

expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After

serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed

Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and

Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of

Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the

affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and

dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere

recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and

soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and

supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters

which illustrate _The Prince_.



His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli”

of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it

is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on

fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is

urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.



In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for

continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct

of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft

summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also,

it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support

to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge

that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the

faith of princes.



Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out

of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the

Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The

Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke

for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have

seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the

pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed

by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the

duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the

fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that

might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save

him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens;

and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims

that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen

fatality.



On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to

watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia

cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano

delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most

reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election,

says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to

forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had

ruined Cesare.



It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that

pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought

to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing

chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius

that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and

women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man

that will win and hold them both.



It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian

states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany,

with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those

events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they

impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with

Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has

already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as

the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but

who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who,

had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have

been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men

of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but

Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the

secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man,

without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to

carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of

his wishes.



The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with

events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the

three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the

object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in

the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won

in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during

these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out

between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had

dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II

finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance

of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy

of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the

Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st

September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal

for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end

to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining

office.









LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27





On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had

vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence,

was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he

was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,

imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope,

Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at

San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In

a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a

very interesting description of his life at this period, which

elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After

describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he

writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at

the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt,

and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass

into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly

received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I

do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their

actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I

feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay,

death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men.

And because Dante says:



Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,

Unfruitful else,



I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have

composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as

fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a

principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how

they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever

pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince,

especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it

to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will

be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had

with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.”



The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form

in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work

during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some

unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although

Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or

presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo

ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any

employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime,

_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still

disputable.



Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this

little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that

during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have

neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by

one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my

loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not

now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as

I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my

honesty.”



Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his

“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read

concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied

him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look

after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the

Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her

citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new

constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on

one pretext or another it was not promulgated.



In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to

settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly

remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he

was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.”

It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance

of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which

occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have

determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer

observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will

endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play

with.”



When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to

Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in

the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is

somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The

Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained

power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence”

to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year

the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left

Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This

was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular

party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more

banished.



Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his

return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of

Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached

Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.









THE MAN AND HIS WORKS





No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence

has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her

most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have

found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the

germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle

to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name,

it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which

this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that

the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more

reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy

necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade.



Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and

industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and

with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced

retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he

depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the

successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only

moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political

employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII,

overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren

of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery

that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct

of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear

by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of

compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to

suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when

he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him

in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and

there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.



Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The

Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they

are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as

they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet

they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of

Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical

incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which

Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and

conduct.



Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish

some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The

Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men

are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the

days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices

which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.

Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them

to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses;

prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to

a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an

empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the

arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to

fight.



It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government

should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the

people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of

society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little.

Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments

otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and

insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The

Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the

incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which

still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other

and their neighbours.



In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an

exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent

paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression.

Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he

wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his

substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit

unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_

In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not

only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an

Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was

in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius

of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to

the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example:

the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy

adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would

by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every

contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that

“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting

their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and

ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome

maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four

words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity

of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to

the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that

the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may

overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.



The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:



Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di

trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto

dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da

Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;

Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’

Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di

Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,

1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence,

1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in

verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose,

1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in

terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il

riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di

Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie

fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.



Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti

carnascialeschi.



Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence,

6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols.,

1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.



Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E.

Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G.

Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri

intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D.

Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.









DEDICATION





To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici



Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed

to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in

which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses,

arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented

to princes, worthy of their greatness.



Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some

testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my

possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as,

the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience

in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which,

having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now

send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.



And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,

nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable,

seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to

offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all

that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and

dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent

words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic

allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed

to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour

should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the

weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.



Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low

and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of

princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves

below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of

lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves

upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it

needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be

of the people.



Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I

send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you

will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness

which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your

Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your

eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a

great and continued malignity of fortune.









THE PRINCE









CHAPTER I.

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE

ACQUIRED





All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been

and are either republics or principalities.



Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long

established; or they are new.



The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or

they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the

prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of

the King of Spain.



Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a

prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of

the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.









CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES





I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another

place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to

principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,

and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.



I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary

states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than

new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of

his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,

for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless

he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if

he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to

the usurper, he will regain it.



We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have

withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius

in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the

hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it

happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices

cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects

will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and

duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are

lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.









CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES





But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be

not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken

collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from

an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for

men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and

this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein

they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have

gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common

necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have

submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships

which he must put upon his new acquisition.



In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in

seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends

who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the

way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,

feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed

forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill

of the natives.



For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied

Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it

only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the

gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future

benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is

very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,

they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with

little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the

delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in

the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time

it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the

borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to

bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be

defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above

mentioned.



 [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who

 married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and

 died in 1510.



Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second

time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains

to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and

what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself

more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.



Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an

ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country

and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold

them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;

and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of

the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in

other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will

live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,

and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,

although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the

customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst

themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has

only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of

their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws

nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will

become entirely one body with the old principality.



But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,

customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great

energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real

helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside

there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has

made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other

measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled

there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the

spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy

them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are

great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the

country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied

by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have

more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He

who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost

caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested

from him with the greatest difficulty.



The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,

which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do

this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A

prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense

he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority

only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them

to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and

scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being

uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not

to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have

been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not

costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as

has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one

has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,

because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious

ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man

ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.



But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much

more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,

so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are

exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting

of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and

all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their

own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such

guards are as useless as a colony is useful.



Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects

ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful

neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care

that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a

footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be

introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of

ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were

brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where

they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And

the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner

enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the

hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to

those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over

to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he

has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold

of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,

and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of

them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does

not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,

and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and

troubles.



The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these

measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]

the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the

greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.

Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and

Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was

humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and

Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor

did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends

without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make

them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because

the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,

who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for

which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it

is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the

medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;

for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic

fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but

difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either

detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but

difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the

evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise

man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not

having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that

every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the

Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to

avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war

is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of

others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in

Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided

both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which

is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the

benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and

prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring

with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.



 [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”



But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the

things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as

the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held

possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he

has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain

a state composed of divers elements.



 [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,

 died 1515.



 [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.



King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who

desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I

will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a

foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every

door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to

accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have

succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not

made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,

regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;

the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of

Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of

Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,

the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then

could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,

which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made

the king master of two-thirds of Italy.



Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could

have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above

laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although

they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the

Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been

forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have

made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no

sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to

occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was

weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had

thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by

adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater

authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to

follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of

Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was

himself forced to come into Italy.



And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and

deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,

divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter

in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country

and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and

whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he

drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out

in turn.



The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always

do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but

when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is

folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with

her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she

ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with

the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she

got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had

not the excuse of that necessity.



Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,

he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he

brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did

not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to

injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from

the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought

Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to

humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have

consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have

kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would

never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also

because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order

to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not

have had the courage.



And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander

and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given

above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,

because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your

disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king

had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in

exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to

Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the

faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.



 [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and

 married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to

 retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.



 [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a

 cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.



Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the

conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and

wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that

is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes

with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope

Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal

Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I

replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning

that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such

greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the

Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin

may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which

never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming

powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about

either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him

who has been raised to power.









CHAPTER IV.

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL

AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH





Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly

acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great

became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was

scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole

empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained

themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose

among themselves from their own ambitions.



I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to

be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of

servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his

favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity

by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons

have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and

hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a

prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,

because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as

superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as

to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular

affection.



The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the

King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one

lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into

sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and

changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the

midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,

and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king

take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both

of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state

of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The

causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that

the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can

he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the

lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his

ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with

great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when

they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them,

for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in

mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his

own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has

been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot

replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this

prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the

others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not

rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.



The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because

one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,

for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,

for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the

victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with

infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from

those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated

the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves

the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either

to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings

the opportunity.



Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of

Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and

therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him

in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which

victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,

for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would

have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults

raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.



But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted

like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the

Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities

there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them

endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the

power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed

away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting

afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself

his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed

there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other

than the Romans were acknowledged.



When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with

which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which

others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;

this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the

conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.









CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER

THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED





Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been

accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three

courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the

next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live

under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an

oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a

government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand

without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support

him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will

hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other

way.



There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held

Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they

lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,

dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as

the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did

not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities

in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them

otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city

accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be

destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of

liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither

time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do

or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges

unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they

immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been

held in bondage by the Florentines.



But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and

his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to

obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in

making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern

themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a

prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But

in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire

for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of

their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them

or to reside there.









CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND

ABILITY





Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities

as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of

state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,

and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely

to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A

wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to

imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not

equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the

clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far

distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow

attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their

strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of

so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.



I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a

new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,

accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired

the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station

presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of

these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.

Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the

strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no

other state, is compelled to reside there in person.



But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,

have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,

and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not

discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet

he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy

to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have

acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their

particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be

found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.

And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed

anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material

to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that

opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and

without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.



It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of

Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that

they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of

bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and

that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should

become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary

that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of

the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace.

Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians

dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,

and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity

whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.



Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a

principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The

difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules

and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their

government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there

is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or

more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the

introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for

enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and

lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This

coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on

their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily

believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.

Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the

opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others

defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along

with them.



It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter

thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves

or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate

their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In

the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass

anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they

are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have

conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the

reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it

is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that

persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when

they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by

force.



If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not

have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to

Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things

immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no

means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the

unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties

in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the

ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are

overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,

they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards

powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.



To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some

resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like

kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private

station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to

fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him

for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their

prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one

who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.

This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old

alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on

such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had

endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.



 [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.









CHAPTER VII.

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF

OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE





Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private

citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they

have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they

have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state

is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as

happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the

Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might

hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those

emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens

came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the

fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable

things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;

because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not

reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having

always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it

because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.



States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature

which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and

correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not

overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become

princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be

prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,

and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became

princes, they must lay _afterwards_.



 [1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and

 correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of

 “correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth

 centuries.



Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or

fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and

these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper

means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be

Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties

he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called

by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy

of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he

had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise

and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and

fortunes of others had bestowed on him.



 [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria

 Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,

 on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli

 was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia

 (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations

 of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to

 his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years

 before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his

 “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare

 Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the

 present work.



Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations

may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be

laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,

therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be

seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not

consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what

better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;

and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but

the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.



Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had

many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see

his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the

Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke

of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini

were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he

saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been

assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,

namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved

him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,

so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was

easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other

reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not

only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving

the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy

with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He

was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the

attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the

king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the

Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was

hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to

him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that

the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,

that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might

themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the

same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and

attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And

as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the

Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from

that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the

arms and the luck of others.



For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in

Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,

making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to

their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that

in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned

entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the

Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came

to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length

that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,

called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the

rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless

dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the

French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by

trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse

to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the

mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with

all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the

Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his

power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned

their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good

foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of

Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he

gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,

and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.



 [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.



When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak

masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave

them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was

full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing

to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it

necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer

Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest

power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the

greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not

advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but

that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the

country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their

advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some

hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the

people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if

any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in

the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took

Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the

piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The

barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied

and dismayed.



 [4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.



But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding

himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate

dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great

measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if

he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,

for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would

not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and

to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards

the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.

It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would

have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.



Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future

he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church

might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which

Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by

exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as

to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to

himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope

with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the

college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before

the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first

shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had

accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords

as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the

Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And

as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,

for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his

protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French

were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and

in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down

upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through

hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines

would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was

prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much

power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer

have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his

own power and ability.



But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He

left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the

rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick

unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and

he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the

foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not

had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he

would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his

foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a

month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst

the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they

could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope

him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not

have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of

Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day

that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought

of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had

provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,

when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.



 [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.



 [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad

 Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.



When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to

blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to

offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of

others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and

far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and

only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness

frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to

secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome

either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the

people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate

those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of

things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to

destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship

with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal

and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the

actions of this man.



Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he

made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope

to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected

Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any

cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they

became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom

he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,

San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear

him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their

relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the

kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above

everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,

failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages

to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his

choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.



 [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.









CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS





Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither

of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is

manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be

more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are

when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the

principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private

person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first

method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other

modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these

two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.



Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a

private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a

potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous

life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of

mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,

he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established

in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself

prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that

which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding

for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,

was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the

senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating

to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the

senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held

the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he

was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not

only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for

its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time

raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme

necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,

leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.



 [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.



Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will

see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as

he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any

one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were

gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly

held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent

to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,

without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not

glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and

extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his

greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be

seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.

Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite

wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent

men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.



In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da

Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by

his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his

youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his

discipline, he might attain some high position in the military

profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,

and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body

and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a

paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some

citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than

its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So

he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many

years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look

upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire

anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he

had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would

be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and

he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably

by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also

to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.



Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,

and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he

lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having

arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a

solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of

Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual

in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave

discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son

Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and

others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to

be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a

chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after

him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places

and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,

mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief

magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to

obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the

prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and

strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a

way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only

was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all

his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as

that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by

Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia,

as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this

parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made

his leader in valour and wickedness.



Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after

infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his

country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be

conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by

means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold

the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this

follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be

called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are

applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are

not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage

of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding

they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than

decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God

or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is

impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.



 [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern

 equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than

 the more obvious “cruelties.”



Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought

to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for

him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to

repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to

reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does

otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to

keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor

can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and

repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so

that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given

little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.



And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such

a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall

make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled

times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help

you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be

under any obligation to you for them.









CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY





But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the

prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,

but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil

principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain

to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a

principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the

favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties

are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be

ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and

oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in

cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or

anarchy.



A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,

accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the

nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the

reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that

under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,

finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of

one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his

authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles

maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the

aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around

him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can

neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches

sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around

him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.



Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,

satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is

more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,

while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added

also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,

because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure

himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect

from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile

nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will

rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and

astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain

favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is

compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well

without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and

to give or take away authority when it pleases him.



Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to

be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape

their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or

they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought

to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt

with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a

natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,

especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in

prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.

But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it

is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,

and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they

were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.



Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people

ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only

ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the

people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above

everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may

easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they

receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more

closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more

devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their

favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as

these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,

so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the

people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.



Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,

and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his

country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was

only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this

would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not

let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who

builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a

private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that

the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the

magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as

happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in

Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,

who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who

does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and

energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find

himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his

foundations well.



 [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus

 in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.



 [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s

 “Florentine History,” Book III.



These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from

the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either

rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their

government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on

the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and

who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with

great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not

the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the

citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,

are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will

always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For

such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when

citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with

him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to

die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its

citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this

experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore

a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will

always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state

and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.









CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO

BE MEASURED





It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of

these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in

case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether

he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite

clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by

their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise

a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack

them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot

show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to

defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been

discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second

case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision

and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.

And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the

other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often

repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are

always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it

will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town

well fortified, and is not hated by his people.



The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country

around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits

them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,

because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the

taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they

have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they

always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking,

and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss

to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the

community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city,

and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold

military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to

uphold them.



Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself

odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only

be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this

world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a

whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever

should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it

burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and

self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that

a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by

giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for

long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving

himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.



Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin

the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot

and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the

prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the

damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer

any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with

their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that

their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his

defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they

confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is

well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the

minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not

fail to support and defend them.









CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES





It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching

which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they

are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held

without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of

religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the

principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.

These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have

subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are

not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,

and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate

themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being

upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak

no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would

be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.



Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church

has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from

Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have

been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)

have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France

trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and

to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not

appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.



Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was

under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the

Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal

anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;

the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those

about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.

To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as

it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made

use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini

and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with

arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate

weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a

courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could

rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a

cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a

pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to

speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would

arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet

would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the

temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.



 [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.



Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have

ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to

prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by

reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things

which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although

his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,

nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,

which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all

his labours.



Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all

the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the

chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the

way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been

practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only

followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin

the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these

enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,

inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any

private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within

the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them

some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:

the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and

the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused

the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their

cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster

the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to

support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders

and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope

Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,

if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more

venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.



 [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.









CHAPTER XII.

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES





Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such

principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having

considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and

having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and

to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of

offence and defence which belong to each of them.



We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his

foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to

ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or

composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good

laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are

well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the

discussion and shall speak of the arms.



I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state

are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.

Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds

his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for

they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,

valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the

fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so

long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war

by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for

keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to

make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your

soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take

themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble

to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by

resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they

formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet

when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that

Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in

hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the

truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have

related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who

have also suffered the penalty.



 [1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_

 of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized

 Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his

 quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the

 country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King

 Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a

 kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy

 without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont

 to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands,

 to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.”



I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The

mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,

you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own

greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others

contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are

ruined in the usual way.



And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,

whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted

to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in

person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its

citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it

ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so

that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes

and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and

mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to

bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its

citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and

Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely

armed and quite free.



Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who

were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the

Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.

After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of

their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their

liberty.



Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against

the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2]

allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His

father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left

her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms

of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the

Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these

arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have

defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been

favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have

stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and

others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer

was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot

be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the

Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the

Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco

turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the

kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while

ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most

prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest

renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have

been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became

the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if

they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their

achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and

gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed

gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned

to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they

forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the

beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much

territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to

fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under

Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him

a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),

and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they

feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they

were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to

lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order

to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their

captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of

Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not

gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost

that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much

trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed

and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.



 [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.



 [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.



 [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John

 Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by

 Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into

 Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many

 wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible

 Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of

 Bernabo Visconti.



 [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,

 executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.



 [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San

 Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria,

 in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano;

 Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.



 [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509.



And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled

for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,

in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better

prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has

recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired

more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more

states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms

against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were

oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain

authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became

princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the

hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of

priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both

commenced to enlist foreigners.



The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8]

the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,

Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After

these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms

of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been

overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted

by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to

lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own.

They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory,

they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not

give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a

moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs

were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand

soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They

had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to

themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking

prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at

night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night;

they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did

they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their

military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both

fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and

contempt.



 [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in

 Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,”

 composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.









CHAPTER XIII.

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN





Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a

prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by

Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise

against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to

auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his

assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in

themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always

disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their

captive.



 [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),

 surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516.



And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish

to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which

cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw

himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune

brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his

rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the

Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all

expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not

become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his

auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.



The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand

Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other

time of their troubles.



The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten

thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not

willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to

the infidels.



 [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.



Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,

for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them

the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to

others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and

better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one

community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you

have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough

authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most

dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has

always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing

rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming

that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.



I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke

entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French

soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,

such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,

discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;

whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and

dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference

between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one

considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when

he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he

relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and

found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when

every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.



I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am

unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I

have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by

the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted

like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him

that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to

pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with

aliens.



I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament

applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with

Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed

him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them

on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to

meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of

others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind

you fast.



Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4]

having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,

recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he

established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and

infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and

began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as

is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised

the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of

his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his

men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so

accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they

can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot

stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come

off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become

mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms

together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone,

but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for

the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of

Charles had been enlarged or maintained.



 [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died

 1461.



 [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.



But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks

well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I

have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a

principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not

truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster

to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have

commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time

the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour

which had raised it passed away to others.



 [5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the

 reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of

 the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence.

 When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank

 under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was

 ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power

 was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to

 fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this

 obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May

 1906.



I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having

its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good

fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And

it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing

can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own

strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of

subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or

auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily

found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one

will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many

republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which

rules I entirely commit myself.









CHAPTER XIV.

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR





A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything

else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is

the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force

that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often

enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the

contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than

of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing

it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is

to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from

a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding

the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons.

For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to

be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince

ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing

proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not

reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him

who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed

servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other

suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And

therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and

above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by

his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to

have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should

addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two

ways, the one by action, the other by study.



As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well

organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he

accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of

localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the

valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of

rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which

knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his

country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by

means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands

with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study

hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and

marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance

to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of

one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the

prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable

that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his

enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to

besiege towns to advantage.



Philopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which

writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he

never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in

the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If

the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here

with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best

advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,

how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went,

all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their

opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these

continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any

unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.



 [1] Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183

 B.C.



But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and

study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne

themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,

so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as

an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been

praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he

always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated

Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of

Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of

Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity,

affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things

which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to

observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but

increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be

available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find

him prepared to resist her blows.









CHAPTER XV.

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR

BLAMED





It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a

prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have

written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in

mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from

the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a

thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me

more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the

imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities

which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is

so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is

done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his

preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his

professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much

that is evil.



Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how

to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.

Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,

and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are

spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are

remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or

praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly,

using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is

still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly

who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed

generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless,

another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave;

one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one

sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another

frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know

that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a

prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but

because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human

conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently

prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which

would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible,

from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he

may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need

not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without

which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is

considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like

virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which

looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.









CHAPTER XVI.

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS





Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I

say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,

liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation

for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should

be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the

reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among

men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of

magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts

all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to

maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax

them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him

odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by

any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded

few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by

whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing

to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being

miserly.



Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of

liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if

he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in

time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that

with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself

against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without

burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises

liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,

and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.



We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have

been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was

assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he

did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King

of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax

on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his

long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken

or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A

prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that

he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he

is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a

reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will

enable him to govern.



And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and

many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,

and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,

or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is

dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal;

and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;

but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his

expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should

reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies,

who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends

that which is his own or his subjects’ or else that of others. In the

first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to

neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes

forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion,

handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary,

otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is

neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, as were

Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your

reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only

squandering your own that injures you.



And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst

you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor

or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a

prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised

and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to

have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,

than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to

incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.









CHAPTER XVII.

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED

THAN FEARED





Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every

prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.

Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare

Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled

the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if

this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more

merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for

cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so

long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the

reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more

merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to

arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to

injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a

prince offend the individual only.



 [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi

 factions in 1502 and 1503.



And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the

imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence

Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign

owing to its being new, saying:



“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt

Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”[2]



Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he

himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and

humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and

too much distrust render him intolerable.



 [2] . . . against my will, my fate

A throne unsettled, and an infant state,

Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,

And guard with these severities my shores.



Christopher Pitt.



Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than

feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to

be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it

is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be

dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that

they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as

you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,

property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far

distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince

who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other

precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by

payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be

earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied

upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than

one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation

which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for

their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which

never fails.



Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he

does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well

being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he

abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their

women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of

someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,

but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others,

because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss

of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are

never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always

find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for

taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner

lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a

multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard

the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army

united or disposed to its duties.



Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that

having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to

fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or

against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This

arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his

boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his

soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not

sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his

deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal

cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been

sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most

excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,

against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from

nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more

license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was

upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of

the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,

yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate

punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in

the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew

much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This

disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have

destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the

control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed

itself, but contributed to his glory.



Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the

conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing

according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself

on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must

endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.









CHAPTER XVIII.[1]

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH





 [1] “The present chapter has given greater offence than any other

 portion of Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297.



Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and

to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience

has been that those princes who have done great things have held good

faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect

of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on

their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one

by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the

second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient,

it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is

necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast

and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient

writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were

given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his

discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who

was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know

how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not

durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the

beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot

defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against

wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares

and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do

not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor

ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him,

and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If

men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they

are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to

observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince

legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless

modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and

engagements have been made void and of no effect through the

faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the

fox has succeeded best.



 [2] “Contesting,” _i.e_. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out

 that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”:

 “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum

 per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum

 est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.”



But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,

and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and

so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will

always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent

example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing

else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he

always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power

in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would

observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to

his wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind.



 [3] “Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The

 words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.



Alexander never did what he said,

Cesare never said what he did.



Italian Proverb.



Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities

I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And

I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe

them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear

merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with

a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able

and know how to change to the opposite.



And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,

cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often

forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4]

friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him

to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and

variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to

diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then

to know how to set about it.



 [4] “Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto

 fede,” “altogether faithful,” in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy

 that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were

 omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction

 of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the

 word “fede” was “the faith,” _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as

 rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word

 “religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being

 used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the

 religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot

 heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this

 passage as follows: “That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,

 Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political

 scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but

 the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.’”



For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything

slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five

qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether

merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing

more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as

men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it

belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you.

Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and

those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who

have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all

men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge,

one judges by the result.



For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding

his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be

praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a

thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are

only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have

no ground to rest on.



One prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never

preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most

hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of

reputation and kingdom many a time.



 [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it

 would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here

 without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308.









CHAPTER XIX.

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED





Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I

have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss

briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has

been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him

hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will

have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other

reproaches.



It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,

and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from

both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor

their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has

only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease

in many ways.



It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,

effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince

should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in

his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his

private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are

irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can

hope either to deceive him or to get round him.



That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,

and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,

provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by

his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a

prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his

subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From

the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,

and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will

always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they

should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should

affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations

and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will

resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.



But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has

only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can

easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by

keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for

him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most

efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not

to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a

prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the

conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have

the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a

conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the

conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires

cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he

believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to

a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content

himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so

that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the

other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare

friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith

with you.



And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side

of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of

punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the

majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and

the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the

popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to

conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the

execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to

the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and

thus cannot hope for any escape.



Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content

with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer

Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the

present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had

conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer

Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination

the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the

popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in

Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after

the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese,

having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in

Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a

blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of

their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due

course to the government.



 [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He

 ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of

 conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience

 (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his

 alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.



For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies

of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is

hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear

everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have

taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep

the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most

important objects a prince can have.



Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,

and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty

and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its

authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of

the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths

would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the

hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to

protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care

of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be

liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people

for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who

could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the

king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or

a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can

draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs

of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in

their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish

the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.



It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths

of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to

my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great

qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have

been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing,

therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of

some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were

not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only

submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who

studies the affairs of those times.



It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to

the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were

Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son

Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.



There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the

ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be

contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to

put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so

beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard

thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the

people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring

prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,

cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should

exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give

vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors

were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great

authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the

principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,

were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about

injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes

cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to

avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they

ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the

most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had

need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the

people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,

accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.



From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being

all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,

and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died

honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,

and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,

being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always

kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated

nor despised.



But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,

who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not

endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,

having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt

for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his

administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as

much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a

prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for

when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain

yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you

have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works

will do you harm.



But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,

that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in

the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by

him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who

allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the

army conspired against him, and murdered him.



Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus

Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and

rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to

commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except

Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour

that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed

by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much

admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were

kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and

satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were

great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the

fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a

prince to imitate.



Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in

Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to

Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the

praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to

aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy

before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the

Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this

there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the

whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the

Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in

the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he

considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided

to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that,

being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that

dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that

the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted

by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger,

and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the

Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had

received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this

ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him

out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will,

therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a

most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and

respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be

wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well,

because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which

the people might have conceived against him for his violence.



But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent

qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and

acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of

fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which

caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and

cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single

murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those

of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by

those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the

midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that

such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and

desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who

does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the

less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do

any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the

service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had

contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily

threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was

a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.



But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to

hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and

he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his

people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave

himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he

might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not

maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete

with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the

imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being

hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against

and was killed.



It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike

man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,

of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the

throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated

and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought

him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great

indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to

his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the

imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity

by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,

practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at

the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa

rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy

conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,

besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were

disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so

many against him, murdered him.



I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being

thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this

discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this

difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far

less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some

indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that

are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were

the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary

to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more

necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy

the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more

powerful.



From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him

twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend

the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,

putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them

his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in

the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the

people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state

of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that

it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an

hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old

prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by

those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this

being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality,

because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in

new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state

is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its

hereditary lord.



But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will

consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been

fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how

it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in

another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to

unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for

Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was

heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly

destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated

Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in

his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot

imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow

those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which

are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are

proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and

firm.









CHAPTER XX.

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,

ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?





1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their

subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;

others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid

themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning

of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown

and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on

all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those

states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as

comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.



2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather

when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by

arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted

become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your

subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be

armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be

handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they

quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,

considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and

service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm

them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either

for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions

breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it

follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character

already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient

to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects.

Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has

always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a

prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old

one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those

who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time

and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters

should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state

shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.



3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed

to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by

fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their

tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This

may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way

balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for

to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;

rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided

cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always

assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The

Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the

Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although

they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these

disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their

differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not

afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one

party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,

therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be

permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the

more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but

if war comes this policy proves fallacious.



4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the

difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore

fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who

has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes

enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may

have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,

as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many

consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with

craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed

it, his renown may rise higher.



5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and

assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were

distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo

Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been

distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak

generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say

this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been

hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support

themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they

will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as

they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad

impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always

extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too

much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands

it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours

has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which

induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural

affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then

he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for

it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons

for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern

affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends

of those men who were contented under the former government, and are

therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it,

were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.



6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states

more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit

to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of

refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been

made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in

our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello

so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on

returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia,

razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and

considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the

Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,

therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you

good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be

reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than

from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear

from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The

castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make,

more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the

state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by

the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they

will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be

wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you.

It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use

to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count

Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to

withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and

thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that

time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses

were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her,

and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore,

it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have

been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these

things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as

well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them,

cares little about being hated by the people.



 [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia

 Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that

 Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the

 countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,”

 wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me

 that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary

 to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine

 Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.









CHAPTER XXI.

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN





Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and

setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the

present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he

has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be

the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds

you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the

beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the

foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without

any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile

occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;

thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power

and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and

of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the

foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.

Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater

schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and

clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable

example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,

he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his

achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the

minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the

issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of

the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against

him.



Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal

affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da

Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life

doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some

method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about.

And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action

to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.



A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a

downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he

declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course

will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two

of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character

that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In

either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare

yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if

you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the

conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been

conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to

protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want

doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who

loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in

hand, court his fate.



Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out

the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the

Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the

Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed

in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged

them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that

which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your

state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous;

because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or

consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always

happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality,

whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with

arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally

follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince

declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with

whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful

and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is

established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to

become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all

are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard,

especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you

may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you

become companions on a fortune that may rise again.



In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that

you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it

greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of

one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved

him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with

your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be

noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with

one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others,

unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers

you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as

possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with

France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their

ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as

happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to

attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince

ought to favour one of the parties.



Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe

courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,

because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid

one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in

knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to

take the lesser evil.



A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour

the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his

citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and

agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not

be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken

away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but

the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things

and designs in any way to honour his city or state.



Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles

at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into

guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem,

and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of

courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty

of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.



 [1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or

 trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade

 in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most

 admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject

 (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called

 “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s

 “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working

 season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are

 artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing

 large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the

 individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent

 similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars”

 or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by

 an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of

 “rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the

 underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu”

 were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included

 individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or

 “clans” would be most appropriate.









CHAPTER XXII.

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES





The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they

are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the

first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is

by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and

faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to

recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are

otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error

which he made was in choosing them.



There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of

Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to

be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there

are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;

another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which

neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first

is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.

Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the

first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know

good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have

the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his

servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the

servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.



But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one

test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his

own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in

everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you

ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in

his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,

and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not

concerned.



On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study

him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with

him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he

cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,

many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him

dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,

are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,

the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.









CHAPTER XXIII.

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED





I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it

is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless

they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of

whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own

affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with

difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they

run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way

of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that

to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell

you the truth, respect for you abates.



Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the

wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking

the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,

and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and

listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With

these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry

himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more

freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of

these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be

steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either

overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions

that he falls into contempt.



I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of

affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,

said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.

This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the

above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his

designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in

carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at

once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being

pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he

does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he

wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.



 [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman

 Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after

 her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian

 politics.



A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he

wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every

one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to

be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning

the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any

consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be

felt.



And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression

of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good

advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived,

because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not

wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has

yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very

prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would

not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take

away his state from him.



But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more

than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to

unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,

and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through

them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always

prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.

Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they

come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the

prince from good counsels.









CHAPTER XXIV.

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES





The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince

to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and

fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the

actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an

hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men

and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more

by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good

they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost

defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will

be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and

adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and

with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a

prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.



And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in

Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and

others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in

regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in

the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the

people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known

how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that

have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.



Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who

was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the

greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a

warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles,

he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the

end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the

kingdom.



Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their

principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own

sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a

change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the

calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they

thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that

the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would

recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very

bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would

never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later

on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does,

it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no

avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable,

certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.









CHAPTER XXV.

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER





It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the

opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by

fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and

that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us

believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let

chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times

because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may

still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes

pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.

Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true

that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she

still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.



 [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the

 more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does

 three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s

 “Eastern Question.”



I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood

overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away

the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to

its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,

though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when

the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences

and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass

away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so

dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour

has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where

she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain

her.



And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and

which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open

country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been

defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either

this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it

would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say

concerning resistance to fortune in general.



But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be

seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change

of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from

causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the

prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I

believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions

according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not

accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in

affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely,

glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution,

another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience,

another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by

a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain

his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different

observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other

impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they

conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from

what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same

effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the

other does not.



Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs

himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a

way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if

times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course

of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to

know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot

deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having

always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it

is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time

to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined;

but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have

changed.



Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and

found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of

action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise

against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The

Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he

had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France;

nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his

accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the

Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the

former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand,

he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having

observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as

to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore

Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff

with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome

until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed,

as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded.

Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the

others would have raised a thousand fears.



I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they

all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience

the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go

cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have

deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.



I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind

steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are

successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider

that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a

woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and

ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by

the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She

is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they

are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.









CHAPTER XXVI.

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS





Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and

wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a

new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an

opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of

things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this

country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new

prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.



And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be

captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians

should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the

soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate

the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to

discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy

should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should

be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,

more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,

despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.



Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us

think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was

afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected

him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet

heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of

Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany,

and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she

entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs

and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and

willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.



Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope

than in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune,

favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and

which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be

difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the

men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet

they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the

present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier

than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.



 [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.

 In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.



With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is

necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in

them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness

is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those

men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how

extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:

the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth

water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your

greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do

everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory

which belongs to us.



And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians

have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious

house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many

campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted,

this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and

none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man

more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was

newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will

make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting

opportunities to bring such into use in every form.



Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.

Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how

superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But

when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs

entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are

capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there

having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by

valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for

so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years,

whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a

poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,

afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2]



 [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501;

 Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.



If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable

men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,

as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own

forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better

soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be

much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,

honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is

necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended

against foreigners by Italian valour.



And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very

formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which

a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be

relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry,

and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in

close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the

Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are

overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this

latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at

the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by

German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the

Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in

under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack,

while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed

up, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore,

knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one,

which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not

create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are

the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new

prince.



This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for

letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the

love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have

suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for

revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.

What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?

What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To

all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your

illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with

which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard

our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be

verified that saying of Petrarch:



Virtu contro al Furore

    Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:

Che l’antico valore

    Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.



Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,

    And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:

For the old Roman valour is not dead,

    Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.



Edward Dacre, 1640.









DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING

VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE

DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI



BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI





The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to

clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been

raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of

Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola,

whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against

Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring

that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his

Romagnian duchy.



These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and

their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too

powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek

to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon

this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to

which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,

Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the

tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo

Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and

courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which

might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they

decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the

Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another,

promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite

with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported

throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke,

among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a

revolution.



Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by

certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held

for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The

castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there;

so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being

carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from

being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping

upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being

effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being

encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the

Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance.



Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose

the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any

town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and

they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in

destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and

that they ought not to wait for another opportunity.



But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli

and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo

Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the

duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola,

because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone

over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door.

But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided

to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to

him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance.

This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France

for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into

cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.



Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached

Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the

aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the

duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with

offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did

not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he

wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough

for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the

principality.



And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to

him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a

standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every

care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such

preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in

separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there

came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found

himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open

war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to

outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of

reconciliation.



And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in

which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand

ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed

an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come

personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the

other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and

other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and

not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his

permission.



This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,

again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his

state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the

fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by

the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends.

But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed

his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of

November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to

Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the

Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of

Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but

nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that

if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were

ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To

this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with

Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was

very willing to proceed against Sinigalia.



It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the

fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give

it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to

come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being

invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no

suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French

men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred

lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena

about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost

cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for

him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance

would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the

reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the

arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very

stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not

offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by

Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he

agreed to wait.



Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on

30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most

trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor

d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as

Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should

arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting

certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they

reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they

came to the duke’s quarters, where they should be seized.



The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which

there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to

assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from

Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day

of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of

about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the

infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.



Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of

the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who

goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases

of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia

is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot

and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs

a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards

Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes

for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river

which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank

of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge

which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that

leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before

this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which

the bank of the river forms one side.



The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and

to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant

from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men

of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band,

which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty

horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters

having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and

when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass

over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and

the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through

which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town.



Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a

few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a

cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his

approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the

man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that

when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet

the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He

recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his

nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of

their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came

before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him

with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were

commissioned to look after them.



But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band

in Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square

before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and

drilling them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care

of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that

Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined

Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of

their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke;

and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come

himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice,

came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and

Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others.



So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s

quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made

them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that

the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms.

Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of

the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment

of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves,

and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and

Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the

country and saved themselves.



But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men

of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not

repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have

completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced,

the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a

room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in

keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of

the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the

blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the

Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome

that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of

Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th

January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the

same way.









THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA



WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI



And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI



CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328





It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who

have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them,

who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in

their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and

obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way.

They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have

had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to

be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate

who these persons may have been because they are well known to

everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to

those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly

beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to

the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because

she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in

their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio

Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is

measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was

born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished

in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to

be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such

indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar

to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his

actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.



The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families

of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in

estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a

son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca,

and for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He

had an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but

Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again

went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the

house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens,

any person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning,

shortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio

was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather

herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the

leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard

something resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards

it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the

leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and

partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it

to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is

customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When

he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised

or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves

what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no

children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for

it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They

baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As

the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of

wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those

lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended

to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his

canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with

this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio

was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached

the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of

Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left

off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms,

delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in

running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he

far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at

any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of

wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with

vexation and sorrow.



There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family,

named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches,

bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had

often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a

Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman

resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most

mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the

top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he

had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street

in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far

excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal

authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer

Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being

informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt

a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one

day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of

a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in

the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the

services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased

Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he

stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer

Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable,

nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and

take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and

in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was

driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear

that he would not be able to hold him much longer.



Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to

the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was

astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that

virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true

gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and

could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and

tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others,

and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what

enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful

modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to

others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his

equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved,

not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio

had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia

by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist

the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces.

Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this

expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and

his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all

Lombardy.



Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he

left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many

friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary

for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son

thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to

be his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died

Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that

goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to

the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the

father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and

tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and

created a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the

former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring

tyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli

Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of

Messer Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him

that Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and

holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity;

therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of

his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but

afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able

to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples

and have him driven out of Lucca.



The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,

who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became

their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca,

with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting

their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought

into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of

the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio

cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies

and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few

days in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon

with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and

Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed

Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the

portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling

the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione

entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer

Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The

governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the

wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found

that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those

who fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the

headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most

hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.



As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party

that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they

determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a

large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence

they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into

Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and

with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved

against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the

enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between

Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to

Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight

skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence.

Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed

coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing

worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army

in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the

Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain

had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and

allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also

showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the

camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the

more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in

the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently,

deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered

their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a

few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the

certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio

had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre

of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the

army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant

men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he

moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his

lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had

come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre

squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the

wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings

of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained

out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were

separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach

each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men

were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most

efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines

were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or

to give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much

difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the

centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to

attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat

was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten

thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party

in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom

were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and

Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did

not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco,

the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the

first onset.



This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that

Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it

appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of

power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only

waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the

death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in

Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge.

On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were

driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming

to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him

a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his

son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take

Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio,

fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was

entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing

to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive,

in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions.

Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once

set out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the

business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the

Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo

della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard

of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn

back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should

close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what

had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand

the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had

arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private

circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised

a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded

that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse

might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered

his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked

Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away

with his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in

poverty.



But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,

and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people

that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having

obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the

recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of

Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded

a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed

a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course

of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained

at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a

short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the

pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and

wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the

lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed

by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any

longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord

of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico,

Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had

corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected

prince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of

the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and

Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at

the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in

Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the

people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in

great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him,

and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time

the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had

driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick.

Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread

of the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were

constrained to accept him as their lord.



Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian

affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian

Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio

for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his

country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these

exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi,

and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines.

Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all

Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to

gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer

Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces

of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he

divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied

with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he

could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without

those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he

surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer

Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven

out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the

King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the

Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home,

they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to

defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized

Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country.

Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely

reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to

return to Lucca.



There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so

powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance

him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not

received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited

other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They

found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set

upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and

killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano

di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion,

intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms;

and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him

what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater

intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the

news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in

command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home.

Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he

posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As

it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to

him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf,

for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to

pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their

former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to

their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged

Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure

to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to

hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to

him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of

showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and

Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown

into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered

San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace,

as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to

leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce,

which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and

desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded

with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the

conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble,

turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should

not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he,

under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by

their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of

them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had

in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that

none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he

raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom

he had killed or hunted out of the state.



Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his

position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of

increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he

could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence,

which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends

with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both

parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it

always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the

Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each

of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each

desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many

threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the

Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city;

both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they

believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than

the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave

promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and

to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the

appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself

direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and

both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a

signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other

Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans

of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the

hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the

palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them

many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to

the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and

quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great

valour.



About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness

of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon.

The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders

and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put

an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should

call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of

the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he

could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not

only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome.

Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the

emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be

safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo

Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six

hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest

distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such

respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order

was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from

the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the

source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders,

and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico.

Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This

dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in

a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its

front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desires

shall be.”



During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio

should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could

tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be

difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were

Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face

danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia,

and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and

after driving out some of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and

killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this

greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on

in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return,

knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with

their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so

they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the

supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian

territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his

army; and having heard where the Florentines’ lay, he decided not to

encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of

Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the

Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design,

victory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had

thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he

had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops,

yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be

overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and

Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the

exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places

narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still

narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that

twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was

Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had

been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to

the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them

wishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of

neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons,

and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able

to maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to

fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and

there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force

before they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this

trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which

possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate

friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with

him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle

the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put

to death.



Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the

Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away

from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his

army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they

reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill

on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the

castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching

from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of

Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the

hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his

infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a

path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four

hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never

expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they

aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the

Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise

when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they

upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case

of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed

with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own,

although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting

reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The

cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were

unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the

narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought

to be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were

engaged with the enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without

having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate

position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout

resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both

flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their

friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a

decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand

infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred

horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole

force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried

out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack,

but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their

unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the

rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man

seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very

sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini

dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all

Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on

the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the

Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out

the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not

content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both

sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,

about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the

spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding

horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in

commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to

corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city

gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the

participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci

and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great

anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys

to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and

he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph

cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to

receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and

he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.



Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the

pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave

his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a

conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,

one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland

should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this

conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of

Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy

paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few

are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy

Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.

This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio

Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering

their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put

him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their

families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and

Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and

energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines

their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of

Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided

to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty

thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid

every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should

attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to

march on the latter—a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more

likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed

that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.



In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army

and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from

thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army

which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree

alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would

deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to

think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects

of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand

foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to

Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand

infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the

Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and

Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain.

Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they

divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the

direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or

attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they

would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his

own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they

would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy,

an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to

take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of

the river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide

expanse of land between them and the river.



The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to

decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,

having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the

latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet

the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the

saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the

Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of

cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was

fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines

with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing

them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one

thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the

Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their

arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the

river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more

difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having

broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of

the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so

fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the

difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved

higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and

the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by

the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light

armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with

tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,

alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and

trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of

Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp

and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither

would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back

into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land

in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they

could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this

obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio

shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had

before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each

other that the many should be overcome by the few. At length

Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his

men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many

killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up

a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded

these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and

one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This

cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and

thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these

tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s

reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into

the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any

decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his

inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the

defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that

when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work

of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the

Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder

of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with

lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the

enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine

captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in

crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower

down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. But

here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of

Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines

were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them

escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains

were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with

Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine

commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter

was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the

Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men,

whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men.



But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his

life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus

ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry

into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but

death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle

the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued

and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on

their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the

watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day;

he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be

the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio

stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the

Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of

which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it

was the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with

high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must

prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and

addressed him as follows:



“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the

midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my

successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left

thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,

because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and

Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the

Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these

peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least

more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but

one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who

insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me

with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time

to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have

never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a

boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should

feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been

born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and

capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been

witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all

his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love,

and increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And

in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy

father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained,

I have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect

my mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father.

Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am

deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure.

Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest

contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are

of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be

sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under

a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with

factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs

recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended

Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly

destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than

they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the

princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far

distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou

hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory

of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought

thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist

thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering

under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And

whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that

war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every

inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring

thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this

world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own

strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for

fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be

well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this

way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this

thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I

have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that

I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.”



After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia,

and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending

Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his

successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him,

and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he

was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he

was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to

Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the

abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa,

and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This

latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the

great-grandson of Pagolo.



From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a

man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time,

but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the

ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious

presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke

with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red,

and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or

snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends,

but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false

with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he

desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory

that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was

bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He

was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear

nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees

that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully

sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look

for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not

angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that

he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on

the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a

partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom

Castruccio had said: “You would not have given more than a penny.”

“That is true,” answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A

ducat is much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had

spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman

are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that

they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by

spittle that I may catch a whale”; and this was not only heard by

Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it

was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be

a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our

saints.” Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of

a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him:

“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest

into such places.” A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo

and was told: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which

gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio said to one who professed

to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who always run after those

who will give them the best to eat,” and was answered: “We are rather

like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest

need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much

disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for

cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear

anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since

every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one

what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a

banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon

another.” To a person who was boasting that he had read many things,

Castruccio said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many

things.” Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming

intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was

acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being

blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be

taken in by a woman, he said: “She has not taken me in, I have taken

her.” Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered:

“Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and being told that it was true,

he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.”

Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of

Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a

chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers

and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some

saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much

disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to spit in order to

offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willing I

will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of his

gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of

his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was

usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by

day will not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a

favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea

threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by

Castruccio, said: “Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast

thy ears in thy feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had

asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one,

seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled

blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous

words, he said to him: “When you have another request to make, send

someone else to make it.” Having been wearied by a similar man with a

long oration who wound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you by

speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, because I have not

listened to a word you said.” He used to say of one who had been a

beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was

dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he

took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he

said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is

unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco

Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give you if

you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A

helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been

instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done

wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived

themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly

those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying

that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused

when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise

that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first

to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with

only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to

be buried when he died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards,

for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.” On

being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order

to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared

strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione

della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat

to preserve his health, and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat

when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his

gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: “I

pray God that you will let him feed you also.” Seeing that someone had

written upon his house in Latin the words: “May God preserve this house

from the wicked,” he said, “The owner must never go in.” Passing

through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door,

and remarked: “That house will fly through the door.” He was having a

discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the

property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them,

and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. “Is this

king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, and was told

that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you suggest that

I should be afraid of a good man?”



I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and

weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his

high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a

prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune,

so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune;

therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be

seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they

were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in

his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of

Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his

age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had

Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia

or Rome.







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