Metadata-Version: 2.5
Name: vibatchium
Version: 0.19.2
Summary: Patchright stealth + Vibium-style LLM-friendly CLI for agentic browser automation.
Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium
Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium/issues
Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium
Author: monodev-eth
License: Apache-2.0
License-File: LICENSE
Keywords: agent,ai,automation,browser,mcp,patchright,playwright,stealth
Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.14
Classifier: Topic :: Internet :: WWW/HTTP :: Browsers
Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Testing
Requires-Python: >=3.11
Requires-Dist: click<9.0,>=8.1.7
Requires-Dist: mcp<2.0,>=1.27.2
Requires-Dist: patchright!=1.61.1,<1.62,>=1.59.1
Provides-Extra: all
Requires-Dist: aiohttp<4.0,>=3.14.3; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: anthropic<1.0,>=0.40; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: curl-cffi<1.0,>=0.7; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: fastapi<2.0,>=0.110; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: keyring<26.0,>=24.0; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: pillow<13.0,>=10.0; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: pynacl<2.0,>=1.5; extra == 'all'
Requires-Dist: uvicorn[standard]<1.0,>=0.27; extra == 'all'
Provides-Extra: annotate
Requires-Dist: pillow<13.0,>=10.0; extra == 'annotate'
Provides-Extra: dev
Requires-Dist: pytest-asyncio>=0.23; extra == 'dev'
Requires-Dist: pytest-timeout>=2.3; extra == 'dev'
Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0; extra == 'dev'
Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.6.0; extra == 'dev'
Provides-Extra: fetch
Requires-Dist: curl-cffi<1.0,>=0.7; extra == 'fetch'
Provides-Extra: liveview
Requires-Dist: aiohttp<4.0,>=3.14.3; extra == 'liveview'
Provides-Extra: llm
Requires-Dist: anthropic<1.0,>=0.40; extra == 'llm'
Provides-Extra: nodriver
Requires-Dist: nodriver<1.0,>=0.50.0; extra == 'nodriver'
Provides-Extra: rest
Requires-Dist: fastapi<2.0,>=0.110; extra == 'rest'
Requires-Dist: uvicorn[standard]<1.0,>=0.27; extra == 'rest'
Provides-Extra: secrets
Requires-Dist: keyring<26.0,>=24.0; extra == 'secrets'
Requires-Dist: pynacl<2.0,>=1.5; extra == 'secrets'
Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

<!-- Absolute URL on purpose: PyPI renders this same README and cannot resolve
     repo-relative paths. Pinned to master so it survives tag churn. -->
<p align="center">
  <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium/master/assets/vb-logo.png" alt="vibatchium" width="180">
</p>

# vibatchium

<!-- mcp-name: io.github.trueoriginlabs/vibatchium -->

**Agent-piloted browser automation that clears Cloudflare.**
Patched Playwright + multi-session daemon + credential vault + vision clicking + prompt-injection safety. One MCP server, N parallel Chromes, persistent per-session profiles.
Plus two renderer-free lanes on a Chrome TLS fingerprint: **`vb search`** to find
URLs without a search API, **`vb fetch`** to read them — both with per-request
`--proxy`, because engines and walls both rate-limit per IP.

> **Where this fits.** Both Anthropic and Google now ship an agent that drives
> *your own* signed-in Chrome — Claude in Chrome and Chrome Auto Browse. If that
> is what you want, use them: they are free, first-party, and better integrated.
> They are also **supervised** — visible window, real time, and they hand control
> back to you at a login wall or a CAPTCHA. vibatchium is for the other half:
> **unattended, headless, N-at-a-time**, on a box with no human in front of it,
> against sites that fight automation. That is the whole of the wedge, and it is
> worth being precise about which side of it you are on.

```
pipx install vibatchium             # core: browse / extract / screenshot / N parallel sessions
# want the stealth HTTP lanes (vb fetch, vb search), the credential vault, VLM read, or the REST shim?
pipx install 'vibatchium[all]'      # everything; or pick extras: vibatchium[fetch], [secrets], [llm], [rest]
patchright install chrome
vb setup                    # register MCP + an auto-discoverable skill so agents reach for vb (idempotent)
```

Core install covers all browsing. `vb fetch` and `vb search` (the curl_cffi
TLS-fingerprint lane) are the `[fetch]` extra; `vb install` reports which optional lanes are available. On a **uv** venv
(no pip), add an extra with `uv pip install --python <venv>/bin/python curl_cffi`.

> Bleeding edge from `master`: `pipx install 'git+https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium#egg=vibatchium[all]'`

> **Coding agents (Codex / Cursor / Claude Code):** read [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) first — it has the one-call recipes (`explore`, `research`) and the env-discovery traps to skip.

```
vb explore https://example.com                      # one-call: text-first (screenshot only as a fallback)
vb research --target https://example.com \          # parallel fan-out, N intents
  --intent "pricing model" --intent "customers" --intent "tech stack"
```

**Status:** active development, alpha. **1,195 tests** green in CI (Linux, Python 3.11–3.13). Apache-2.0 (AGPL only via the opt-in `nodriver` extra).

<sub>Detector scores quoted below (bot.sannysoft, CreepJS, Cloudflare cold-launch) are **manual observations, not CI-asserted** — no test in the suite gates on them, and they are only as current as the last hand-run. The generated block under [Measured scores](#measured-scores) is the one to trust; it is empty until someone runs it.</sub>

## Updating

```bash
vb update                  # upgrade + bounce the daemon + refresh the agent skill
vb update --version 0.19.0   # or pin a specific version
```

`vb update` detects how vibatchium was installed (pipx, `uv tool install`,
a pip-less uv venv, or pip with a PEP-668 `--break-system-packages` fallback),
**stops the running daemon** so the next command loads the new code, and
**rewrites the agent skill / docs blocks** so a coding agent is actually told
about the verbs the new version ships (`--no-restart` / `--no-setup` opt out).
Manual equivalent:

```bash
pipx upgrade vibatchium    # or: uv tool upgrade vibatchium / pip install -U vibatchium
vb shutdown                # bounce the daemon — it serves old code until you do
vb setup                   # refresh the agent skill + docs
vb --version               # confirm
```

> The daemon-restart step is the one people miss: the long-running daemon keeps
> serving the **old** version until it's bounced. `vb update` does it for you;
> if you upgrade by hand, run `vb shutdown` (the next `vb` call auto-respawns the
> new version). Optional features upgrade via `pipx install 'vibatchium[all]' --force`.

### Running from a git checkout

`git pull` updates the **source**; whether it updates what `vb` actually runs
depends on the install, and two of the three ways it can fail are silent:

```bash
vb --version && git describe --tags   # do they agree? if not, the install COPIED
                                      # the source — reinstall editable:
                                      #   uv pip install -e '.[all]'
vb status                             # warns when the daemon predates the source
                                      # ("stale_code") — bounce with `vb shutdown`
```

A version-string compare cannot catch a checkout: `git pull` changes the code
without changing `__version__`. `vb status` compares the daemon's boot time
against the newest source file instead, and `vb update` bounces the daemon only
when it is provably behind — so it never drops live sessions for nothing.

### New cap buckets need a re-register

The MCP server's `--caps` list is frozen into your agent's config at first
registration, so a bucket added by a later release (0.19.0 added `search`) stays
invisible no matter how many times you upgrade. Re-running `vb setup` reports
the drift but deliberately won't overwrite a `--caps` you set by hand:

```bash
vb setup                              # reports any cap drift, changes nothing
vb setup --force --caps lean,search   # apply it — exposes `vb search` as a tool
```

Restart the agent session afterwards: the MCP tool list is read once, at start.

## Why vibatchium

Persistent logged-in profiles, credential vaults, CDP-attach, N named sessions —
[agent-browser][ab] and [playwright-mcp][pmcp] all ship those now, at download
volumes we won't match. A comparison table winning rows nobody contests was
noise; it's gone.

What's still ours: **stealth patches in core** (agent-browser's stealth issue has
been open since Jan 2026 and the PR attempting it was closed), **prompt-injection
scanning on by default** for page content (nobody else in this lane ships it —
though it does not yet cover the `fetch`/`search` lanes), **TOTP + IMAP 2FA**
so an unattended run survives a login challenge, and the combination that only
matters together — real stock Chrome + CDP stealth + headless + *unattended* + N
persistent logins, on your own machine.

If you don't need the stealth half, use one of the above. They're bigger, older
and better tested than we are.

[ab]: https://github.com/vercel-labs/agent-browser
[pmcp]: https://github.com/microsoft/playwright-mcp

## Real Chrome vs fake Chrome

A wave of "headless browser for AI agents" tools rebuild the browser from scratch
(Rust + V8, no Blink/Skia) to hit tiny memory and sub-100ms page loads. The catch
is structural: **with no rendering engine, they can't produce a real device's
fingerprint — they synthesize one.** And synthetic fingerprints don't hold still.

vibatchium drives *real* Google Chrome, so its fingerprints are real — and, more
to the point, **stable**. The single test that separates the two is fingerprint
stability across navigations. Run the same canvas + WebGL probe on two pages in
one session:

| | vibatchium (real Chrome) | synthesized-fingerprint engines |
|---|---|---|
| canvas hash, page A → page B | **identical** | reseeded per navigation |
| WebGL `readPixels` | real, **deterministic** pixels | often `Math.random()` |
| WebGL renderer | a real ANGLE renderer¹ | stub / zeros |

<sub>¹ Chrome's own software renderer (SwiftShader) by default — still a coherent, deterministic Chrome value, not a stub. A hardware-GPU string (e.g. `ANGLE (Intel …)`) needs the opt-in `--gpu` flag.</sub>

A real device returns the same fingerprint every page load; a fingerprint keyed
off `Date.now()` does not — and *that inconsistency* is exactly what lie-detection
fingerprinters (CreepJS and friends) flag. Measured: vibatchium's canvas hash and
WebGL readback are byte-identical across navigations, and CreepJS reported **0 %
stealth-tampering** (no synthetic-environment signatures) when last run by hand.
That figure is not regression-tested — treat it as an observation, not a guarantee.

**This is not a claim of invisibility.** The moat is fingerprint *authenticity*,
not hiding that a browser is automated — vibatchium still reads as headless on the
headless-specific tells (see [Honest limits](#honest-limits)), and real-GPU WebGL
(`--gpu`) is opt-in. But real, consistent fingerprints pass the consistency tier
that synthetic ones fail *by construction* — and that tier is what stands between
you and a login wall.

## Multi-session in 10 lines

```
vb session new work
vb --session work start
vb --session work go https://github.com           # log in by hand once
vb session new banking
vb --session banking start
vb --session banking go https://bank.example.com
vb --session work click @e3 &                     # truly parallel —
vb --session banking fill @e5 hi &                # separate Chromes, no cookie bleed
wait
vb session list
```

Active-session resolution: `--session FLAG` → `$VIBATCHIUM_SESSION` env → `~/.config/vibatchium/active-session` → `default`. Cap via `VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8` (default 8).

### Multi-agent: shared sessions vs a private daemon

On **one** shared daemon, sessions give real fingerprint isolation (separate
Chromes, no cookie bleed) but share the host: the session count budget, the
memory, and the blast radius of an OOM or a daemon bounce. Two models, pick per
trust level:

- **Cooperating agents (your own fleet):** the shared daemon is right — just give
  each concurrent agent a **unique `--session` name** so stateful flows don't
  collide on `default`. `vb session lease` coordinates a shared name.
- **A private blast radius:** a **per-agent daemon** on its own socket + `HOME`
  — separate profiles/config/state, its own session budget, zero contact with
  the shared daemon. `vb daemon start --isolated` prints the `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR`/
  `HOME` to export for subsequent calls; `vb mcp --isolated` runs the MCP server
  on its own private daemon directly. `vb daemon reap` cleans up abandoned ones.
  (Same UID = same trust domain — this bounds *blast radius*, not a security
  boundary between distrusting tenants; for that, separate UIDs/containers.)

**Resource governance.** The session cap bounds process *count*, not bytes. On a
shared box, set `VIBATCHIUM_SESSION_RAM_FLOOR_MB` to refuse a new launch when free
memory is low (a portable admission belt). For a hard ceiling, run the daemon
under a cgroup — `systemd-run --user --scope -p MemoryMax=4G vb daemon start` puts
the daemon **and all its Chromes** in one cgroup sharing the limit: an *aggregate*
daemon-wide cap (not per-renderer), and a breach OOM-kills inside the scope, which
can include the daemon. It's the only non-racy memory bound, so size it for the
whole fan-out.

**Idle CPU.** Parked sessions can't burn cores either: the daemon SIGSTOPs a
launched session's renderer processes after `VIBATCHIUM_IDLE_FREEZE_AFTER` seconds
with no verb (default 90) and thaws them on the next call, so an idle WebGL /
animation page drops to zero CPU without a teardown (default on;
`VIBATCHIUM_IDLE_FREEZE=0` disables).

## Documentation

- [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) — coding-agent contract (Codex / Cursor / Claude Code)

## Server modes

| Mode | Surface | Auth |
|---|---|---|
| `vb mcp` | stdio JSON-RPC; defaults to the **lean** 86-verb profile (`--caps=full`/`all` for the full surface; `--caps=...` for a custom bucket set) | n/a (stdio) |
| `vb serve` | FastAPI on `127.0.0.1:8000`; every verb at `POST /v1/<verb>`; WebSocket live-view at `/v1/stream/<session>` | bearer token (`~/.cache/vibatchium/rest-token`, mode 0600) |

**REST capability gating**: `vb serve --caps=core,nav,input,vision` restricts the HTTP surface the same way `mcp --caps` does. Without it, REST grants local-code-equivalent access (eval + secret_* + file-writing verbs all exposed) — safe for localhost dev, **not** for hosted/multi-tenant.

## Stealth tiers — what clears what

Stealth is a ladder, not a boolean. Pick the lowest tier that clears your target
(higher tiers cost more setup / a visible browser / a manual login). vibatchium
does **not** claim cold-launch defeat of behavioral walls — those need a real
human-driven session, and attach-mode is the honest answer.

> **Architecture caveat.** Every tier below was measured on **x86-64 Linux**.
> Patchright has a known open arm64 / Apple-Silicon detection gap, so these
> results should not be assumed to carry to an ARM host. If you run there,
> measure before you rely on it.

| Tier | How | Clears | Doesn't clear |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Standard** (default) | headless cold launch, real `channel=chrome`, de-Headless'd UA | Cloudflare IUAM / managed challenge, `bot.sannysoft` 31/31, JS-runtime fingerprinting | aggressive Turnstile, DataDome/Kasada, anything behind a login |
| **Hardened** | retry `--headed`; `vb humanize on`; `--backend nodriver` (`pip install vibatchium[nodriver]`, AGPL) for the hardest Cloudflare gates | aggressive Cloudflare/Turnstile, GPU/screen tells that headless leaves | behavioral biometrics, DataDome/Kasada sensor-fusion |
| **Attach** | `vb attach` to a Chrome **you** launched and logged into | DataDome / Kasada / HUMAN behavioral walls, and any authenticated session — your real fingerprint + cookies | nothing here is automated cold; it needs the human login first |

### Measured scores

`vb evals run --update-readme` writes measured numbers into the block below, so
what we publish is generated rather than asserted. It is empty until someone
runs it — an empty block is honest; a number with no run behind it is not.

Run on x86-64 Linux, 25 Aug 2026, Chrome 150, `--gpu` (real render node).
Pass `--gpu` yourself: headless Chrome falls back to SwiftShader when the GPU
path doesn't take, and software GL is itself a detection signal, so numbers
measured without it are a floor rather than what a GPU-backed deployment gets.

<!-- vibatchium-evals -->
| Target | Backend | Humanize | GPU | Score | Status | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| sannysoft | patchright | off | real | 100 | OK | 17.78s |
| creepjs | patchright | off | real | 44 | OK | 7.88s |
| brotector | patchright | off | real | 10 | OK | 7.13s |
| sannysoft | nodriver | off | real | 100 | OK | 19.85s |
| creepjs | nodriver | off | real | 44 | OK | 9.72s |
| brotector | nodriver | off | real | 10 | OK | 7.73s |
<!-- /vibatchium-evals -->

**Read these honestly — two of the three are bad.**

- **sannysoft 100** is the floor everyone in this category clears; it is not a
  differentiator.
- **creepjs 44** is mediocre. CreepJS is an adversarial *lie-detector*: it
  cross-checks main-thread against worker-thread claims and grades confidence,
  so a middling score means our environment is coherent but not indistinguishable.
- **brotector 10** is poor, and we know exactly why. The signal firing is
  `UA_Override / HighEntropyValues.empty`, and **our own de-Headless fix causes
  it.** Measured on Chrome 150, headless, same profile, with and without the
  `--user-agent` flag we set to strip `HeadlessChrome`:

  | | `architecture` | `bitness` | `uaFullVersion` | UA string |
  |---|---|---|---|---|
  | without the flag | `x86` | `64` | `150.0.7871.114` | says **HeadlessChrome** |
  | with the flag | *empty* | *empty* | *empty* | says **Chrome** |

  Passing an explicit UA makes Chrome stop deriving high-entropy client hints,
  so we trade a UA-string tell for a UA-CH-emptiness tell. It is not fixed: the
  obvious repair (`Emulation.setUserAgentOverride` with `userAgentMetadata`) is
  target-scoped and would reintroduce a main-vs-worker mismatch that is a
  *stronger* tell than either leak alone. Publishing this rather than dropping
  the target is the point — a suite that only reports its wins is marketing.
- **`nodriver` scores identically to `patchright` on all three.** The escalation
  tier buys nothing measurable *on static scoreboards*; its case rests on the
  automation-protocol axis these targets don't probe. An earlier run had
  `nodriver` slightly *ahead* on creepjs (50 vs 44) — but that run silently
  denied it the GPU while patchright got a real one, so it was scoring from
  behind. Once both arms get a real renderer the difference disappears.

> **What these do and don't cover.** These are *fingerprint scoreboards* —
> the static axis. Through 2026 the major anti-bot vendors moved to
> session-lifetime **behavioural** scoring, which none of these targets
> measure, and which we have **not** measured against any commercial vendor.
> Treat a good score here as evidence about environment coherence only.

For the behavioural axis itself, `vb oracle run` is a self-hosted probe: it drives a
page with `humanize` off then on and grades trajectory curvature, dwell, keystroke
cadence and scroll dynamics against a human-plausible band (`vb oracle record`
captures a real-operator baseline; literature defaults until you do). It measures
*our* model of human rather than a named vendor — but it turns "we humanize" into a
measured on/off delta, and it's honest about the one axis synthetic input can't
reach: CDP input emits no raw-pointer / coalesced events, which only attach-mode
against real hardware closes.

Escalation ladder when a wall trips: **headless → `--headed` → `humanize on` →
`--backend nodriver` → attach-mode after a manual login.** Patchright's CDP-layer
patches apply in *all* tiers, including attach (`connect_over_cdp`).

> The `fetch` verb is an orthogonal fast-path, not a tier: once you're past a
> wall in the browser, `vb fetch` reuses that session's cookies+proxy to hit
> JSON/API endpoints at TLS-fingerprint-correct speed — but it runs no JS, so it
> can't *clear* a JS challenge itself.

## Search — find the URL, not just read it

Reading a walled page is only half a research loop; the other half is discovery,
and search engines are anti-bot walled like everything else. `vb search` runs the
SERP over the same curl_cffi lane — **no browser, no session, no API key, and no
per-session call budget to run out of mid-run.**

```
vb search "playwright stealth detection" -n 5
vb search "cdp leak" --site github.com -n 20
vb search "postmortem" --urls | xargs -I{} vb fetch --no-cookies {}
```

Engines are tried as a ladder (`ddg → ddg-lite → bing`) until one answers,
because reachability moves: the endpoint serving results now may rate-limit
(HTTP 202) on the next call. `--json` returns an `attempts` array naming every
engine that declined and why, and a `reason` separating *all engines are walled*
from *the web has nothing* — different problems, different fixes, and the CLI
exits non-zero only for the first.

It never reuses session cookies (a SERP needs no login, and attaching one
deanonymises the request), which is why it gets its own `search` cap instead of
riding on `fetch`. No date filter is exposed on purpose: DuckDuckGo's mislabels
article dates badly enough to corrupt a timeline. Engines rate-limit per IP — see
proxies, below.

## Proxies — per-request egress on both stealth lanes

Egress is the axis most people get wrong, so it gets stated precisely rather than
implied. Both curl_cffi lanes take `--proxy scheme://[user:pass@]host:port`:

```
vb fetch --no-cookies https://api.example/v1 --proxy http://user:pass@gw:12323
vb search "site reliability postmortem" -n 20 --proxy http://user:pass@gw:12323
vb --session work proxy set http://user:pass@gw:12323    # or per-session, for the browser
```

Measured, not asserted — same box, same command, only `--proxy` differing:

| | egress IP |
|---|---|
| direct | `115.70.50.70` |
| `--proxy` (authenticated gateway) | `212.69.0.85` |

Four things worth knowing:

- **Unset means direct, and that is enforced.** The daemon hands libcurl an
  explicit empty proxy, which is the only value that stops it reading
  `HTTP(S)_PROXY` / `ALL_PROXY` out of the environment it was spawned with. A
  long-lived daemon inherits whatever shell first started it, so without this a
  stray `HTTPS_PROXY` would silently reroute every request while the response
  claimed direct egress. (It did, until 0.19.0 — see the changelog.)
- **It matters most for `search`.** Engines rate-limit *per IP*, so a wide
  research fan-out from one address is the fastest way to push every query onto
  the last rung of the engine ladder. The response reports `proxied: true|false`
  so you can tell which IP a thin result set came from.
- **The proxy address is SSRF-guarded** like the target URL, with
  `--allow-internal` to opt in to a proxy on your own LAN. An unguarded proxy
  reaches internal services and returns their response bodies, not just
  connection errors.
- **A bad proxy is an error, never a fallback.** Silently egressing from the host
  IP when you asked for a specific one is worse than failing, because the whole
  point of asking was that the host IP must not be used. Proxy URLs are redacted
  from the verb log; responses carry the boolean, never the URL.

With a browser session, `vb proxy set` also wires the **WebRTC leak guard** — a
tunnelled HTTP request still leaks the real IP via STUN without it.

## Attach mode — the practical Cloudflare workaround

For DataDome / Kasada / hardened auth that walls cold-launch automation:

```
google-chrome --remote-debugging-port=9222 \
              --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled \
              --user-data-dir=/tmp/cdp-profile &
# log into the walled site by hand
vb attach http://localhost:9222
vb go https://target.example.com        # now reads as your real browser
```

Patchright's CDP-layer stealth still applies over `connect_over_cdp` — attach mode gets the same protocol-level patches as cold launch, plus your real-browser fingerprint and any cookies from the manual login.

> **Launch flags are yours on this tier.** On cold launch the backend supplies
> `--disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled` for you. Attach connects to a
> Chrome that is *already running*, so nothing vibatchium does can add a launch
> flag after the fact — if you started Chrome without it, that tell is present
> for the whole session. Include it in the command above.

> **`--remote-debugging-port` is an open door.** It grants full browser control
> to any process on the machine, and a page you visit can probe localhost to
> discover it. Use it on a machine you trust, and close Chrome when you're done.

## Security model

vibatchium is built to drive *real* logins from an untrusted agent loop, so the
threat model is "a credential must never reach the model, a screenshot, or a log":

- **Encrypted vault.** Passwords and TOTP secrets live in an XSalsa20-Poly1305
  vault keyed from the OS keyring or `VIBATCHIUM_SECRETS_KEY`. A resolved secret
  never appears in logs, HAR captures, the observe cache, or any agent-visible
  response field (grep-tested in CI).
- **Secrets are never rendered in the clear.** `fill --use-secret` masks the field
  *in the page* (`-webkit-text-security`), applied before the value is written, so
  every path that turns the viewport into bytes — the `screenshot` verb, the 5 fps
  live-view stream, and VLM `vision_*` calls that ship the frame to a model —
  captures dots, not the value. The mask **fails closed** (no write if it can't be
  confirmed), covers password fields so a show-password toggle can't unmask, and
  the accessibility snapshot returned by `map` / `diff_map` strips masked values so
  the secret can't leak into the model's context as text either.
- **Live-view is authenticated.** The WebSocket requires a per-server token and
  rejects foreign-`Origin` connections (the CSWSH class), and *driving* the page is
  a separate token from watch-only — a read-only link can be shared without handing
  over the keyboard. Binds `127.0.0.1` by default (`--insecure-public` to override).
- **Scraped content is marked untrusted.** MCP verbs that return page-derived text
  carry `openWorldHint`, so a host can taint the output against prompt injection
  instead of treating a scraped page as instructions; pure probes are `readOnlyHint`
  and mutating verbs (`stop`, `secret_delete`, `storage_restore`) are
  `destructiveHint`.
- **REST shim.** Without `--caps`, the bearer token grants every verb including
  `eval`, `secret_*`, and file-writing verbs — local-code-equivalent, so always
  pass `--caps=...` in hosted mode. All vibatchium-written files are `0600`;
  directories `0700`.

## Honest limits

- **5+ concurrent sessions = 1-2GB RAM.** Each persistent-context Chrome is ~200-400MB. Bump cap with `VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8`.
- **Vision spend cap is process-wide.** N fan-out agents share one daily/lifetime budget.
- **Init scripts don't work on patchright backend.** `chrome.runtime` stays `undefined` — accepted trade for stealth wins.
- **Login walls (X, LinkedIn) require attach mode.** Cold-launch fan-out can't defeat sites requiring authenticated sessions.
- **Synthetic input has a CDP coordinate signature.** Every `click`/`type`/`hover`/`scroll` rides Playwright over CDP `Input.dispatchMouseEvent`/`dispatchKeyEvent` (`pageX==screenX`, no `CoalescedEvents`). Patchright patches the JS-context leaks, not the Input domain, and `humanize on` improves trajectory/timing realism but does **not** change the per-event signature. Behavioral walls that fingerprint it (DataDome/Kasada/HUMAN) want **attach-mode against a real headful Chrome you drive** — OS-level synthetic input (CDP-Patches) is headful + active-tab only and doesn't fit a headless, N-parallel daemon.
- **`fetch` is a static-fingerprint lane, not a browser.** The curl_cffi `fetch` verb matches Chrome's JA3/HTTP2 but runs no JavaScript — it clears TLS-fingerprint gates, not DataDome/Kasada/Turnstile JS challenges. Fall back to `go` for those.
- **Single daemon = single point of failure.** No HA built in.
- **Behavioural detection now targets the humanizer directly.** Cloudflare's 2026
  bot-detection work names mathematically ideal Bézier cursor paths and superhuman
  click precision as tells. `humanize` improves on nothing-at-all, but it is a
  pointer-trajectory model, not a physiological one — and it is **off by default**,
  which on a behaviourally-scored site is the louder of the two states.
- **One burned profile can taint every account that shares it.** Vendors now link
  device telemetry across sessions *and* accounts. Use one profile per account,
  never share a profile between identities, and don't reuse a profile that has
  already been challenged.

- **The `fetch` and `search` lanes are outside prompt-injection scanning.** The
  scanner covers page-content verbs (`text`, `html`, `extract`, `map`, …). SERP
  titles and fetched bodies are third-party text going straight into an agent's
  context and are *not* scanned today. Treat them as untrusted input.

## Authorized use

vibatchium is built to drive sessions **you own**, with **your** credentials, on
**your** machine — your accounts, your employer's, or a client's with their
written permission. It is a tool for automating access you already have.

That boundary is not a formality, though the law around it moved in 2026. A US
district court had granted a preliminary injunction against an AI agent that
accessed password-protected pages *through the user's own logged-in account*,
holding that the user's permission is not the platform's authorization. On
4 August 2026 the Ninth Circuit **vacated** that injunction and remanded
(*Amazon.com Services, LLC v. Perplexity AI, Inc.*, No. 26-1444, published),
concluding that the operator had not "accessed" the plaintiff's computers under
the CFAA at all — "it was the user who accessed [them], with the help of
[the] AI agent." The California CDAFA claim failed for the same reason.

Read that narrowly. It decides **who** accessed a computer, not whether evading
a technical block is access "without authorization"; the panel never reached
circumvention. A vacated preliminary injunction on remand is not a merits
ruling, and it leaves contract, terms-of-service, trespass and copyright
theories entirely untouched. What it does support is the shape of the tool:
the browser runs on your machine, under your login, and the reasoning leaned on
exactly that — no operator computer ever touched the other side's servers.

Scraping a site's public pages, evading a wall you have no account behind, or
automating an account whose terms forbid it remain decisions you are making, and
the consequences are yours.

Check the terms of the site you are automating. If you are acting for someone
else, get it in writing.

## License

Apache-2.0 core. Every default-install extra is permissive too — the `fetch` lane's curl_cffi is **MIT**. The only copyleft option is the opt-in `nodriver` backend (AGPL-3.0) — consult licensing before integrating it commercially. Nothing GPL/AGPL ships in the base install or `[all]`.
