mcp-kymograph
masked when written · never stored in the clear
Recordings contain sensitive data

Treat a recording like the traffic it came from

A recording is a verbatim log of everything a client and a server said to each other, customer data included. Credentials are masked at the moment the event is written — never stored in the clear and hidden at display time. The output directory is git-ignored; a fleet refuses an --out-dir git could commit.

events.jsonl · message #9 · client_to_server · tools/call sync_notesas written
{"type": "message", "seq": 9, "direction": "client_to_server", "transport": "stdio", "size_bytes": 412, "body": {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 3, "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "sync_notes", "arguments": {"api_key": "***", "since": "2026-10-01", "auth": {"token": "***", "scheme": "Bearer"}}, "_meta": {"progressToken": "***HANDLE-a1b2c3d4e5f6***"}}}, "redactions": ["params.arguments.api_key", "params.arguments.auth.token"], "handles": ["params._meta.progressToken"]} {"type": "message", "seq": 10, "direction": "server_to_client", … "body": {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/progress", "params": {"progressToken": "***HANDLE-a1b2c3d4e5f6***", "progress": 1, "total": 3}}}

Blanked

Everything that looks like a credential: keys whose name carries auth, cookie, sessionid, api_key, token…; Bearer … in text; every --mask-key NAME you add. The value is gone; its place in the message is listed in redactions.

Handle pseudonym

Two fields exist only to tie messages together: params.progressToken and params._meta.progressToken. They get a stable stand-in from the run’s keyed HMAC: the same value reads the same way throughout one recording and differently in the next. The relation survives, the value does not. Over HTTP, SSE event ids join this set.

A session id grants access to the session. It is closer to a bearer token than to a correlation id, so Mcp-Session-Id is blanked, not pseudonymised — the recording keeps only an ordinal (session 1, 2, …).

run_finished.server_redactions

values the masker took out of server traffic
DirectionWhereCounted? client → serverparams.arguments.api_keyno — the client sending its own credential is ordinary server → clientresult.content[0].text (Bearer …)yes — a server handing a credential to a model is worth a look server → client · HTTPSet-Cookie headeryes — headers are a map through the same masker
"server_redactions": 2

Where masking reaches

  • message bodies, both directionsmask_json
  • intervention steps — before and after values, in their placesame rules
  • the server command in run_startedmask_argv
  • HTTP headers and query strings, as mapsproposed
  • WWW-Authenticate — the one header parsed first, so resource_metadata, scope and error stay legibleproposed

A token never goes on argv, where it would reach run_started behind nothing but mask_argv: a file, or the name of an environment variable.