Isolation · runc · notes-legacy, repetition 24
The barrier is structural. The rules only observe.
The target’s network namespace has loopback and a dummy device that discards every packet — no interface that leads anywhere. nftables redirects what it sends to a sink and records every attempt in the kernel. A missing rule costs observation; it opens nothing.
host
Kymograph proxy + driver
one upstream: the bridge’s socket file. Follows no URL from the traffic.
unix socket
⇄
⇄
ingress bridge
binds a Unix socket by path
no TCP or UDP listener · every capability dropped · connects only to 127.0.0.1:8931
loopback
⇄
⇄
target · started last
notes-legacy
netns: lo, dummy0 · nothing else
nft redirect
+ mark →
+ mark →
sink · --network none
writes down what arrives
reads each datagram’s mark (SO_RCVMARK); never holds the kernel’s counters
sandbox_step — the proof, in order
the target’s container exists only after every condition held-
{{s.mark}}
{{s.title}} {{s.evidence}}{{s.state}}
sandbox_failed · exit 5. The probe’s UDP datagram over IPv6 never reached the sink. A probe that only expected its attempts to fail would have reported a blind sandbox as a tight one. No server process exists.
Confinement, read back from inside
- unprivileged useruid 65534
- every capability set emptyCapEff 0 · CapBnd 0
- no way to gain oneNoNewPrivs 1
- seccomp filterSeccomp 2
- root file systemread-only
- files seen = manifest content4 · sha256:e0c41f…9a12
- kernel counters, as the targetunreadable · unwritable
runc shares the host’s kernel: it keeps a server off the network, not off the kernel.
What the server tried to reach
the kernel’s record is authoritative · the sink is held against it by membershipegress_summary
sink ≡ kernel
udp counted / received
2 / 2
udp_loss
0 · limit 0
account_differences
1
One lost datagram would make the run incomplete: what it carried was not observed, and any tolerance above none would be one a server could aim under.