# MindRoom Security Review - Initial Findings Report

> **Audit note (2026-03-18):** This is a summary/index page.
> Some references to individual review docs may be stale as the detailed reviews have been updated independently.
> Cross-reference with individual SECURITY_REVIEW_*.md files for current status.

## Executive Summary
Initial security review of the MindRoom codebase has identified several critical security issues that must be addressed before open-source release. The most critical issues involve default passwords and authentication configurations.

---

## Status Update (2025-09-12)

Completed:
- Removed insecure defaults in tracked configs (Matrix/Compose); templates generate strong secrets by default
- Admin endpoints authenticated, allowlisted, and rate‑limited; audit logging added
- Provisioner auth uses constant‑time comparison; route limits applied
- Request size limiter (1 MiB), CORS restrictions, security headers, trusted host enforcement
- Per‑instance Kubernetes NetworkPolicy; backend RBAC scoped to namespace with RoleBinding
- Multi‑tenancy: added account_id + RLS for webhook_events and payments; handlers validate ownership; tests added

Remaining (high priority):
- Verify etcd encryption at rest (K8s Secrets already implemented with file mounts)
- Monitoring and incident response: alerts for failed auth/admin actions; incident playbook; security@ and security.txt
- Internal TLS: evaluate mTLS/service mesh for in‑cluster traffic
- Extend rate limits to additional user/webhook endpoints where appropriate

## Resolved Critical Findings

### Default Passwords in Tracked Configurations
**Status: FIXED**

- Matrix Helm values default to empty and templates generate strong secrets
- Compose requires explicit Postgres/Redis passwords; no default fallbacks

---

## High Priority Findings

### 2. API Key Authentication Weakness
**Severity: HIGH**

- **Location**: `saas-platform/platform-backend/src/backend/routes/provisioner.py:52`
- **Issue**: Provisioner API uses simple string comparison for authentication
- **Concerns**:
  - No rate limiting on authentication attempts
  - API key might be logged or exposed in error messages
  - No key rotation mechanism
- **Recommendation**: Implement proper API key management with hashing, rate limiting, and rotation

### 3. Admin Privilege Check Implementation
**Severity: MEDIUM-HIGH**

- **Location**: `saas-platform/platform-backend/src/backend/deps.py:147`
- **Issue**: Admin verification relies on database flag without additional checks
- **Concerns**:
  - No audit logging for admin privilege checks
  - Cache could potentially be poisoned
  - No two-factor authentication for admin access
- **Recommendation**: Add audit logging, implement 2FA for admin operations

---

## Positive Security Findings

### Well-Implemented Security Controls

1. **RLS Policies**: Supabase RLS policies appear comprehensive and properly isolate tenant data
   - Users cannot access other customers' accounts
   - Subscription and instance data properly isolated
   - Admin access properly gated through `is_admin()` function

2. **Authentication on API Endpoints**: All sensitive endpoints properly require authentication
   - User endpoints use `Depends(verify_user)`
   - Admin endpoints use `Depends(verify_admin)`
   - Health check properly public without authentication

3. **JWT Token Handling**: Uses Supabase's built-in JWT validation
   - Tokens validated through Supabase auth service
   - TTL cache implemented to reduce auth overhead

4. **Service Role Key Protection**: Service role bypasses RLS as designed
   - Only used server-side
   - Not exposed to frontend

---

## Medium Priority Findings

### 4. Secrets Management
**Status: RESOLVED**
**Severity: LOW**

- ✅ K8s Secrets properly implemented: mounted as files at `/etc/secrets` with 0400 permissions
- ✅ Application reads via `_get_secret()` function with file/env fallback
- ✅ Rotation scripts created and documented
- ⚠️ Verify etcd encryption at rest (low priority - usually enabled by cloud providers)
- **Optional Enhancement**: Consider HashiCorp Vault or External Secrets Operator for advanced features

### 5. Input Validation Gaps
**Severity: MEDIUM**

- No explicit input validation on several API endpoints
- File paths not validated for directory traversal
- **Recommendation**: Implement comprehensive input validation using Pydantic models

### 6. Rate Limiting
**Severity: PARTIAL → IMPROVED**

- Admin and provisioner routes are rate‑limited; SSO endpoints covered
- Recommendation: evaluate user and webhook endpoints for appropriate limits

---

## Low Priority Findings

### 7. Error Information Disclosure
**Severity: LOW**

- Some error messages might leak information about system internals
- Stack traces could be exposed in production
- **Recommendation**: Implement proper error handling with sanitized messages

### 8. CORS Configuration
**Severity: LOW → PASS**

- CORS restricted; in production, localhost origins are filtered

---

## Security Checklist Completion Status

### Completed Reviews:
- ✅ API endpoint authentication verification
- ✅ Default credentials check
- ✅ RLS policy audit
- ✅ Hardcoded secrets scan
- ✅ Created comprehensive security checklist (82 items)

### Pending Reviews:
- ⏳ JWT implementation details
- ⏳ Dependency vulnerability scanning
- ⏳ Kubernetes security configuration
- ⏳ Frontend security (XSS, CSP)
- ⏳ Network security and TLS configuration

---

## Immediate Action Items

1. **Near‑term**:
   - Secrets lifecycle: env → K8s Secrets/External Secrets; confirm etcd encryption
   - Monitoring/alerts for failed auth/admin actions; incident playbook
   - Extend rate limits and validate error handling/log sanitization

2. **Before Public Release**:
   - Complete checklist
   - Enable automated dependency/image scanning and pin critical images
   - Conduct penetration test and address findings

---

## Recommendations for Security Process

1. **Set up Security Infrastructure**:
   - Create security@mindroom.chat email
   - Implement security.txt file
   - Set up vulnerability disclosure policy

2. **Implement Security Testing**:
   - Add security tests to CI/CD pipeline
   - Regular dependency scanning
   - Automated secret scanning (trufflehog, gitleaks)

3. **Security Training**:
   - Document security best practices
   - Create incident response playbook
   - Regular security reviews

---

## Tools for Ongoing Security

```bash
# Python security scanning
pip install pip-audit bandit safety
pip-audit
bandit -r ./src
safety check

# Node.js security scanning
npm audit
pnpm audit

# Secret scanning
pip install truffleHog3
trufflehog filesystem .

# Docker scanning
docker scout cves <image>

# Kubernetes security
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubesec scan deployment.yaml
```

---

## Conclusion

The MindRoom platform has a solid foundation with proper authentication and data isolation through RLS policies. However, critical issues with default passwords must be addressed immediately. The comprehensive security checklist provided should guide the complete security review process.

**Risk Assessment**: Currently **HIGH RISK** for public release due to default passwords. After addressing critical issues, risk level would drop to **MEDIUM-LOW**.

---

*Report Generated: [Current Date]*
*Next Review: Before Beta Release*
