The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles



For the Independent Journal.



MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



The last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to

introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the

convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our

undertaking.



The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and

aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no

other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of

America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with

that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to

rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for

self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to

depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as

no longer defensible.



What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were

an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to

principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to

the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be

found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is

derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the

denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice,

where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised, in

the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland,

which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms,

has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of

England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an

hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been

frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are

nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the

extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political

disquisitions.



If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which

different forms of government are established, we may define a republic

to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives

all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the

people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during

pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is

ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body

of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored

class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their

oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank

of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of

republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons

administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the

people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures

just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as

well as every other popular government that has been or can be well

organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican

character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union,

some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly

only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate

himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment

is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature.

According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest

offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both

within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years.

According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as

well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the

subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their

offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.



On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the

standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid

sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of

one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected

immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the

present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment

indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from

the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the

States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as

in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the

people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally

conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State

constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as

in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of

South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years;

which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland,

and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The

President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in

New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years,

and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election

is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional

provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in

Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The

President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his

continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their

places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.

The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of

legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example

of the State constitutions.



Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of

this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute

prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State

governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each

of the latter.



“But it was not sufficient,” say the adversaries of the proposed

Constitution, “for the convention to adhere to the republican form.

They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which

regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of

which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union

as a CONSOLIDATION of the States.” And it is asked by what authority

this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has

been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with

some precision.



Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the

objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its

force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in

question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized

to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed

to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.



First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it

may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be

established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be

drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to

the authority by which future changes in the government are to be

introduced.



On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the

Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the

people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose;

but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by

the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as

composing the distinct and independent States to which they

respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the

several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the

authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing

the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.



That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are

understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many

independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious

from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the

decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a

MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the

several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from

their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the

legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the

people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of

the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the

minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind

the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by

a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the

majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the

people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted.

Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign

body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own

voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if

established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.



The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of

government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive

its powers from the people of America; and the people will be

represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they

are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is

NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its

powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these

will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they

now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not

NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound

source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the

States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in

a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal

societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual

election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which

consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act

they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so

many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the

government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least

as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.



The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates

to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this,

that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing

the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the

individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual

capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls

under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so

completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly

in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must

be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political

capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on

this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this

blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the

government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its

ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate

it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.



But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its

powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation

to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves

in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an

indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are

objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one

nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national

legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is

vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures.

In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the

supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at

pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form

distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject,

within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the

general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this

relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL

one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only,

and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty

over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to

the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is

ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general

government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The

decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the

Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are

taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly

essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the

compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather

than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it

could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not

likely to be combated.



If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by

which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor

wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate

authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and

this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority

of every national society, to alter or abolish its established

government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence

of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that

would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the

convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring

more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a

majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not

by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the

FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole

number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of

the NATIONAL character.



The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a

national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its

foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the

ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and

partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not

federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national;

and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it

is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.