The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State

Governments Considered



For the Independent Journal.



MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



Having shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal

government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be

considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the

portion of authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the

plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what

degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the

federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry

into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the

governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been

shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against

foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against

contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to

guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter

the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments

which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union

be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not

preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which

the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may

derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual

States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American

Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the

hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of

America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the

government of the individual States, that particular municipal

establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed

with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of

the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for

kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in

the New, in another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to

be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different

form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that

the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is

the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government

whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the

attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to

the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the

Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be,

Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the

States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice

of every good citizen must be,



Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is

necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be

endangered, is the question before us. Several important considerations

have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance

the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by

degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the

subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more

likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the

first scale. We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern

confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in

the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with

a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the

encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been

so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any

inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as

the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very

extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be

wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the

federal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a

considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The

Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted,

must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not

inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to

degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know

that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the

federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion,

of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our

attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were

pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case;

and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to

bind the members to the head, and to each other. In the feudal system,

we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want

of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and

the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the general

sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns

prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments.



Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination,

and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of

the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of

as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.

The State government will have the advantage of the Federal government,

whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the

one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side

will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the

predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and

faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. The

State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of

the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the

operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of

the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be

elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his

appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine

it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State

legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn

immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the

influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains

for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of

the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence

more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must

consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a

disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the

other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no

instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the

federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence

of its members. The number of individuals employed under the

Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number

employed under the particular States.



There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of

the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative,

executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the

justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of

justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three

millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular

acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond

all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every

description who will be employed in the administration of the federal

system. Compare the members of the three great departments of the

thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices

of peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the

single government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three

millions of people with the military and marine officers of any

establishment which is within the compass of probability, or, I may

add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the

advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to

have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs

also. And as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast,

and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over

the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in

this view also lies on the same side. I



t is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the

power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the

States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to,

except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then

be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections

of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate

authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and

according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is

extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the

organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be

clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.



Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue

should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the

whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of

State officers in the opposite scale.



Within every district to which a federal collector would be allotted,

there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers of

different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and

weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State. The powers

delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are

few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are

numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on

external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce;

with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be

connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all

the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the

lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,

improvement, and prosperity of the State. The operations of the federal

government will be most extensive and important in times of war and

danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security.

As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the

latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over

the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers

may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be

those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the

governments of the particular States. If the new Constitution be

examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change

which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to

the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The

regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to

be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are

entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets,

treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all

vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. The

proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a

more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to

taxation may be regarded as the most important; and yet the present

Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite

supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as the

future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and

the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been,

to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied

punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could their

compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with

success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from

countenancing an opinion, that the State governments would have lost

their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire

consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would

be to say at once, that the existence of the State governments is

incompatible with any system whatever that accomplishes the essential

purposes of the Union.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.