Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the

Progress of Population Demands Considered



MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am

to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members

will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population

may demand. It has been admitted, that this objection, if well

supported, would have great weight. The following observations will

show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can

only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy

which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld. 1. Those

who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal

Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State

constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of

the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the

first instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to

the short term of three years. Within every successive term of ten

years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal

objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust, from time to

time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of

inhabitants, under the single exception that each State shall have one

representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of

representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the

whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand

inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the several States, we

shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this

subject, that others correspond pretty much on this point with the

federal Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of

them is resolvable into a mere directory provision. 2. As far as

experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of

representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace

with that of the constituents, and it appears that the former have been

as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for

them. 3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which

insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of

their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter.

The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a

representation of citizens, the other of the States: in the former,

consequently, the larger States will have most weight; in the latter,

the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. From this

circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States

will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of

that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates. And

it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the

whole votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives

or people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a

reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will

be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition which,

notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent

it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely

prompted by common interest, but justified by equity and the principles

of the Constitution. It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would

be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their

concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional views

of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has

probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends

of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties

which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate

inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be

admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.

Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two

houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money

bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater

number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and

speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people,

will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative

firmness of the two houses. This advantage must be increased by the

consciousness, felt by the same side of being supported in its demands

by right, by reason, and by the Constitution; and the consciousness, on

the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these solemn

considerations. It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation

between the smallest and largest States, there are several, which,

though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former

are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, to

second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it

is by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate,

would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of

representatives. It will not be looking too far to add, that the

senators from all the new States may be gained over to the just views

of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be

overlooked. As these States will, for a great length of time, advance

in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in

frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of

inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the House

of Representatives, will have nothing to do but to make

reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other;

and the senators from all the most growing States will be bound to

contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will feel in

the former. These considerations seem to afford ample security on this

subject, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have

been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should

all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States,

or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a

constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger

States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their

just purposes. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but

they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of

government. They, in a word, hold the purse that powerful instrument by

which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant

and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere

of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it

seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other

branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be

regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any

constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for

obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect

every just and salutary measure. But will not the House of

Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the

government in its proper functions, and will they not therefore be

unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of

the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches

were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the

other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect

that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and

conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the

interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the

government. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the

eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect

of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To

those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British

House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever

the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility

on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve

every department of the state in the general confusion, has neither

been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness that

can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will not be more

than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by

constitutional and patriotic principles. In this review of the

Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the

circumstances of economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might

have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of

representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have been as

rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown

by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the

difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in

engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as

the people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be

permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very

serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the

greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who

will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more

numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the

greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the

next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion

of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is

precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and

address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the

ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in

person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to

rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his

single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a

representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of

the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people.



Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of

sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in

supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain

limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.

Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER

SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL

INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they

will counteract their own views by every addition to their

representatives. The countenance of the government may become more

democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The

machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret,

will be the springs by which its motions are directed. As connected

with the objection against the number of representatives, may properly

be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made

competent for legislative business. It has been said that more than a

majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular

cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.

That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot

be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular

interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial

measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences

in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good

might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued,

the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It

would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be

transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to

particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to

screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in

particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it

would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a

practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is

required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and

regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public

convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which

has yet been displayed among us.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.