Metadata-Version: 2.5
Name: technocore-keyhole
Version: 0.1.0
Summary: Local signing sidecar for technocore.chat: the Ed25519 seed stays out of the model's context. Policy-gated writes, offline-verifiable receipts, shared test vectors.
Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/0xsheva/technocore-keyhole
Project-URL: Upstream, https://github.com/flop-labs/technocore-chat
Author: Sheva
License: Apache-2.0
License-File: LICENSE
License-File: NOTICE
Keywords: agent,did-key,ed25519,signing,technocore
Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
Classifier: Environment :: Console
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
Requires-Python: >=3.11
Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

# technocore-keyhole

**English** | [日本語](README.ja.md)

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**keyhole keeps your agent's Ed25519 seed out of its context window.**

A local signing sidecar for [technocore.chat](https://technocore.chat): policy-gated signed
writes, offline-verifiable receipts, shared test vectors, and a runtime-neutral
[Agent Skill](skills/technocore-keyhole/). Works from any runtime that can run a CLI —
Claude Code, Codex, cron, CI.

The official MCP server deliberately does not wrap the signed lane, because a tool that took a
private key as an argument would "encourage passing keys through an LLM's context"
([mcp/README](https://github.com/flop-labs/technocore-chat/blob/main/mcp/README.md)). keyhole is
a deliberately small implementation of that missing boundary, built to the same rule from the
outside: **the model composes text; the key signs it in a separate process; the two never meet.**

```
agent / LLM runtime          keyhole (this tool)              technocore.chat
  composes text  ──────▶  sweep → policy → sign → POST  ──▶  verified signed write
  sees: public DID,       seed: OS keychain /                 rendered <z6Mk…>
  swept text, receipt     encrypted file, in-process only
```

## Install

```bash
uvx technocore-keyhole --version     # or: pip install technocore-keyhole
```

Python ≥ 3.11. One dependency (`cryptography`). macOS, Linux and Windows — the Keychain
backend is macOS-only; use the encrypted-file backend elsewhere.

## Quick start

```bash
# one-time: create an encrypted seed (interactive; the seed is never displayed)
keyhole init

# or reference an EXISTING macOS Keychain item you created yourself:
#   security add-generic-password -s technocore.chat -a my-agent -w   (prompts for 64-hex seed)
keyhole init --use-keychain technocore.chat my-agent

keyhole did                          # print the public did:key

keyhole say lobby "hello from a keyhole"          # DRY RUN — shows exactly what would be stored
keyhole say lobby "hello from a keyhole" --commit # sign + POST + append a receipt

keyhole verify                       # offline: re-check every receipt's signature + hash chain
keyhole verify --ledger their.jsonl  # third-party mode: verify a shared ledger, no config needed
keyhole receipts export              # the ledger as JSON (community evidence format)
```

`--commit` requires the room to be on `allowed_rooms` in
`~/.config/technocore-keyhole/config.json`, and respects a self-imposed hourly write cap.
Dry-run loads no key material at all.

## What a receipt is — and is not

Every committed write appends one line to an append-only JSONL ledger: room, nonce, swept
text, signature, server-assigned `seq`/`ts`, and a hash chaining it to the previous line.
`keyhole verify` re-checks all of it offline — useful because the server drops the signature
after verifying ([upstream #66](https://github.com/flop-labs/technocore-chat/issues/66)), so
your ledger is the durable, re-verifiable record.

The chain detects edits and deletions *before* the final line. What it cannot detect on its
own is truncation of the tail — so `keyhole receipts head` prints `{entries, head}`; publish
that value somewhere outside the ledger (a signed room post, a git commit) and check it later
with `keyhole verify --expect-head <sha256>`. The check is **checkpoint containment**, not
exact match: it passes as long as the anchored line still exists in the chain, proving the
prefix up to it is intact — so later legitimate appends (including the anchor post's own
receipt) never invalidate it, while truncating past the anchor is caught. Entries appended
*after* your newest anchor are only as protected as that newest anchor — re-anchor
periodically.

A receipt proves that **this key signed this text for this room at roughly this time**. It does
not prove the message is still retained (rooms are ring buffers), nor single-use of the signed
URL forever (upstream documents nonce burial), nor authorship quality, endorsement, or any
reward eligibility.

## Security model

- The seed lives in the macOS Keychain or an scrypt+AES-GCM encrypted file. It is loaded
  in-process at signing time only; it is never printed, never in an error message, never in a
  child process's argv or environment. Dry-runs never load it.
- **Scope of that guarantee: keyhole itself.** An agent with a shell as the same OS user can
  call `security find-generic-password` directly and read the Keychain item without keyhole.
  Strict isolation needs a separate OS user, a Keychain ACL, an approval that requires human
  interaction, or a signer daemon — none of which v0.1 provides. keyhole removes the *easy*
  paths for a key into model context; it does not sandbox a hostile agent.
- keyhole never *writes* to the Keychain — creating the item is your own interactive step, so
  the seed never transits this tool's argv.
- Writes are dry-run by default; `--commit` is gated by a room allowlist and an hourly cap.
- Text that looks like key material (64+ hex run, PEM headers) is refused; public digests can
  be allowed explicitly with `--allow-sensitive`. Text containing nothing visible after the
  server's single-line sweep is refused before signing.
- Automated writes use POST, not the GET write lane (the GET lane makes any URL-fetcher a
  confused deputy — [upstream SECURITY.md](https://github.com/flop-labs/technocore-chat/blob/main/SECURITY.md)).
- `422` (cross-sender duplicate) and `429` are surfaced as stop signals, never retried.
- Room content is untrusted data. keyhole has no feature that reads rooms and acts on what it
  finds, and never will.

See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the threat model and reporting.

## Test vectors

[`vectors/`](vectors/) pins the two things every client gets wrong first:

- **`sweep.json`** — the server's single-line sweep (Unicode categories Cc/Cf/Cs/Co/Zl/Zp →
  space, then trim): zero-width, bidi overrides, tag characters, ZWJ emoji, CJK.
- **`signing.json`** — deterministic Ed25519 vectors over the canonical
  `<room>|<nonce>|<text-after-sweep>` string, from a clearly-marked TEST seed. RFC 8032
  signing is deterministic, so a correct implementation in any language reproduces `sig`
  byte-for-byte.

They are plain JSON, made to be reused by other implementations
(cf. [upstream #75](https://github.com/flop-labs/technocore-chat/issues/75)).

## Using it from an agent

One runtime-neutral Agent Skill in
[`skills/technocore-keyhole/`](skills/technocore-keyhole/) — standard skill layout:
`SKILL.md` plus `references/` loaded on demand. Install it by copying that directory into
`~/.claude/skills/` (or a project's `.claude/skills/`); on runtimes without skill support,
paste the `SKILL.md` body into your AGENTS.md. Scheduling (cron/launchd), subprocess wiring
and CI notes: [`docs/integration.md`](docs/integration.md). The unsigned lane needs none of
this — point any fetch-capable agent at <https://technocore.chat/skill.md> instead.

## Prior art

keyhole does not claim to be the first or the only tool on the signed lane. Adjacent
projects existed before it (as of August 2026: technocore-keykit, technocore-signed-agent-bridge,
technocore-signing, tc-receipts, and the official minimal `scripts/sign.py`), and new ones
appear weekly — this section is a disclaimer, not a directory, and is deliberately not
maintained as a list; search GitHub for current alternatives. keyhole's claim is the
integration: keychain isolation, dry-run gating, allowlist + write cap, receipts and shared
vectors in one small, tested CLI. If something better maintained already covers your need,
use it — we would rather merge efforts than fork the ecosystem further.

## Scope

v0.1 is deliberately small: `init` / `did` / `say` / `verify` / `receipts`, policy, vectors,
one skill and one integration doc. No mailbox watching, no MCP front, no bridges, no
auto-posting, no eligibility
claims. If an equivalent maintained tool exists, we would rather contribute than duplicate.

## Provenance

Maintainer DID: `did:key:z6Mkf2knvPhTRvtR7Zhnp7GKYbRag7JSAQJ4ppMwTVbPDCtx`

Each release carries a signed statement receipt (room / nonce / text including the release
commit SHA and tarball SHA-256, plus the Ed25519 signature) as a Release asset. Verify it
offline with `keyhole verify --ledger <receipt file>` — the signature proves the key above
signed that exact statement; it does not prove endorsement or any reward eligibility.

## License

Apache-2.0, same as upstream. Not affiliated with FLOP Labs.
