The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy



For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those

points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of

opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of

men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to

our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.



There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous

spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has

already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of

Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in

that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the

foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies

in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming,

with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten

their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have

all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the

creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally

indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving

us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This

would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in

their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of

clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did

not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by

facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.



If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our

prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,

at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign

countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets.

This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to

appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of

people—increasing in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively

addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain

so—to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would

be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct

communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its

products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another

country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable

of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of

commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of

this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with

the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most

valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When

these questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have

received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has

been said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the

system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us

through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers

and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of

our markets. But would not her navigation be materially injured by the

loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade?

Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the

Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the mere

circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so

circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations,

by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by

transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch

of the British commerce?



A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will

justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a

state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of

the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities

of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present

system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the

markets of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive

the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British

government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in

exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a

correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be

inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.



A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations

toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a

federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union

under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period

not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with

those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable

weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.

This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the

West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the

reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the

fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest

magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most

commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the

usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of

military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived

that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great

advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon

our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the

Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America,

and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this

part of the world as our interest may dictate.



But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that

the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and

would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly

placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would

be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each

other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple

or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often

as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be

respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation,

despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being

neutral.



Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and

resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle

all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This

situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by

inducing an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an

extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the

offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little

arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and

unchangeable course of nature.



But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might

operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,

availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the

conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common

interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our

becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our

navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine

us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content

ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the

profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and

persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the

genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself

an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost,

and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom,

might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.



There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are

rights of the Union—I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the

Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the

Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the

future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful

partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The

disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment.

France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view

them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course,

would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which

experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch of

traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their

own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to

exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?



This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.

All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously

participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of

mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of

seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the

principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a

universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be

indispensable.



To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various

ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the

quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and

support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources

of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or

partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single

part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated

America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential

establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance

certain kinds of naval stores—tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood

for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting

texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy

might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of

signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national

economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater

plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn

from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external

or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more

than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of

a navy.



An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance

the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions,

not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for

exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part

will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from

a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial

enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the

productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a

bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of

another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for

exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be

conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a

given value than with a small number of materials of the same value;

arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctations of

markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods,

and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can

scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter

predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would

be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The

speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these

observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the

commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable

than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.



It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united

or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them

which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,

interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the

course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial,

as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of

government.



There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed,

of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into

the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a

newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation

invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the

system of American affairs. The world may politically, as well as

geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set

of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by

her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees,

extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have

successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long

maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the

World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit.

Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed

to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted

that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in

America—that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in

our atmosphere.[1] Facts have too long supported these arrogant

pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor

of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.

Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another victim to

his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European

greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and

indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system,

superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and

able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new

world!



PUBLIUS.



 [1] “Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains.”









THE FEDERALIST.