Other Defects of the Present Confederation



For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the

principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and

fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the

enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto

disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To

form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is

absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent

and malignity of the disease.



The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the

total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now

composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to

their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or

divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There

is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against

delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the

federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact

between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the

face of that part of the second article, by which it is declared, “that

each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not

EXPRESSLY delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” There

is, doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this

kind does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of

embracing that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of

contravening or explaining away a provision, which has been of late a

repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new

Constitution; and the want of which, in that plan, has been the subject

of much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are

unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be

obliged to conclude, that the United States afford the extraordinary

spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of

constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will

appear, from the specimens which have been cited, that the American

Confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated from every other

institution of a similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled

phenomenon in the political world.



The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another

capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind

declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty

from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant

departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a

tacit power of coercion from the like considerations. The want of a

guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does

not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a constitutional

sanction to its laws.



Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in

repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the

existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may

rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the

people, while the national government could legally do nothing more

than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful

faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no

succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends

and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which

Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind

are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the

issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a

Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism,

established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New

Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?



The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an

objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as

involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the

members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the

principal advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from

a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no

impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the

people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain

undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be

effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this

kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the

stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the

precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the

government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense

for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of

the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or

representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the

national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of

rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in

the community.



The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the

common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the

Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national

exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared

from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with

a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to

contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national

wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer

by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of

lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively

proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to

being a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United

Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if

we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the

aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value

of the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of

either of the three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover

that there is no comparison between the proportion of either of these

two objects and that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the

like parallel were to be run between several of the American States, it

would furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North

Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey,

and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of those

States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their

comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. The

position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the

counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted with the State of

New York will doubt that the active wealth of King’s County bears a

much greater proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to

be if we should take either the total value of the lands or the total

number of the people as a criterion!



The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.

Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of

the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information

they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these

circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to

admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly

conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries.

The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of

national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which

the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt,

therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a

confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring

inequality and extreme oppression.



This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the

eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a

compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States

would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle which

distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was

calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while

those of others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of

the weight they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil

inseparable from the principle of quotas and requisitions.



There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by

authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its

own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of

consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its

level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by

each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be

regulated by an attention to his resources. The rich may be

extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression may always

be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such

impositions. If inequalities should arise in some States from duties on

particular objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced

by proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other

objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it

is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established

everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would neither

be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so

odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring

from quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.



It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they

contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe

their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end

proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this

object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, “in political

arithmetic, two and two do not always make four.”



If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is

eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they

are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete

barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of

this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing

them.



Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of

indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of

the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which

principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of

apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the people,

may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness

of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other.

And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of

simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every

country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a

country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the

difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of

an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In

a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the

government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment

of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with

fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.