Concerning the Militia



From the Daily Advertiser.



Thursday, January 10, 1788



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in

times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties

of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal

peace of the Confederacy.



It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity

in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended

with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into

service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the

duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and

concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army;

and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency

in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness.

This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the

regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority.

It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the

convention proposes to empower the Union “to provide for organizing,

arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of

them as may be employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING

TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE

AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE

PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS.”



Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the

plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been

expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this

particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be

the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be

under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is

constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies

are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the

body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as

far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such

unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid

of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in

support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the

employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of

the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an

army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its

existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.



In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia

to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is

nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the

POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty,

whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his

only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which

have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much

calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair

dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath,

that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and

unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient

even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as

much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd

to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute

its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of

the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of

those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws

necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would

involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of

landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating

to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of

power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute

of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from

it, in its application to the authority of the federal government over

the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there

be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of

authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when

necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of

sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between

charity and judgment?



By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are

even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands

of the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be

formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered

subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the

regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government, is

impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the

same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the

Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member

of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia

establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following

discourse:



“The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as

futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried

into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a

business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a

week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great

body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be

under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and

evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of

perfection which would entitle them to the character of a

well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a

serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual

deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount which,

calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far

short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the

States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and

industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the

experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be

endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the

people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in

order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to

assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.



“But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be

abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the

utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as

possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The

attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the

formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as

will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus

circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body

of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the defense

of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for

military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige

the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be

formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body

of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the

use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of

their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can

be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against

it, if it should exist.”



Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution

should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from

the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and

perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is

a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.



There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of

danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to

treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a

mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a

disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the

serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of

common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our

brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can

there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their

countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings,

sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension

can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for

the militia, and to command its services when necessary, while the

particular States are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE

OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the

militia upon any conceivable establishment under the federal

government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment

of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt

that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating

influence over the militia.



In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is

apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance,

which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind

nothing but frightful and distorted shapes—



“Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire;”



discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming

everything it touches into a monster.



A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable

suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for

the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to

Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of

Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch

are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d’ors and ducats. At one

moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of

the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged

from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican

contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be

transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of

the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate

imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or

absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths?



If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of

despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army,

whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake

a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the

chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course,

but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as

so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of

power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused

and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to

dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by

exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their intended

usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton and

disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon

themselves universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this

sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning

people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or

distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers

actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe

that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their

designs.



In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper

that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another,

to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence

of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the

first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is,

indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of

affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be

no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a

neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of

selfpreservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.