The Mode of Electing the President



From the New York Packet.



Friday, March 14, 1788.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is

almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has

escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest

mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these,

who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election

of the President is pretty well guarded.[1] I venture somewhat further,

and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it

is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the

advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.



It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the

choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided.

This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to

any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the

special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.



It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by

men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and

acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a

judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were

proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by

their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to

possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated

investigations.



It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as

possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded

in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency

in the administration of the government as the President of the United

States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the

system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this

mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of

electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any

extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was

himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the

electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State

in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will

expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be

communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be

convened at one time, in one place.



Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle

should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly

adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected

to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from

the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our

councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a

creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the

convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most

provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment

of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might

be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have

referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of

America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and

sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from

eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be

suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator,

representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit

under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus

without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the

election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias.

Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken

notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to

the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace

so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor

would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would

be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives,

which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet

be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.



Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive

should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the

people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty

to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration

of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by

making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives,

deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important

choice.



All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the

convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a

number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and

representatives of such State in the national government, who shall

assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President.

Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the

national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority

of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority

of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it

might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is

provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives

shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest

number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for

the office.



The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of

President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an

eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for

low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to

elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will

require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him

in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable

a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful

candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United

States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant

probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for

ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable

recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate

the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have

in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the

political heresy of the poet who says:



“For forms of government let fools contest

That which is best administered is best,”



yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is

its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.



The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the

President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect

to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in

respect to the latter.



The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been

objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged,

that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to

elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But

two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this

respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a

definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President

should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State

from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the

Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he

came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is,

that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the

President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which

recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great

if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is

remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection

which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have

a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in

the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in

casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to

exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.



PUBLIUS.



 [1] _Vide Federal Farmer_.









THE FEDERALIST.