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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II
Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that
related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the President’s conduct towards the
law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events.
FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
The key issues and events we examined include the following:
The Campaign’s response to reports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016
presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian government’s apparent support for
candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that
were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia
was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately
sought information from Trump associate Roger Stone about any further planned WikiLeaks
releases. Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late
as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be
built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election, the President expressed concerns
to advisors that reports of Russia’s election interference might lead the public to question the
legitimacy of his election.
Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017,
incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other
administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
about Russia’s response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27,
the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White
House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President
requested Flynn’s resignation, the President told an outside advisor, “Now that we fired Flynn, the
Russia thing is over.” The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue.
Later that afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting
with Comey. Referring to the FBI’s investigation of Flynn, the President said, “I hope you can
see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this
go.” Shortly after requesting Flynn’s resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President
sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating
that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined
because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel’s Office attorney
thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered.
The President’s reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. In February 2017,
Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaign-
related investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. In early March, the President
told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions
announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed anger at the decision and told advisors
that he should have an Attorney General who would protect him. That weekend, the President
took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to “unrecuse.” Later in March, Comey publicly
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have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather
than carry out the order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House
officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to
have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were
accurate in stating that the President had directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed.
The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the
reports. In the same meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special
Counsel about the President’s effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes
of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered
happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle.
Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, and Stone. After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense
agreement with the President and began cooperating with the government, the President’s personal
counsel left a message for Flynn’s attorneys reminding them of the President’s warm feelings
towards Flynn, which he said “still remains,” and asking for a “heads up” if Flynn knew
“information that implicates the President.” When Flynn’s counsel reiterated that Flynn could no
longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President’s personal counsel
said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn’s actions reflected “hostility” towards
the President. During Manafort’s prosecution and when the jury in his criminal trial was
deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated
unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called
Manafort “a brave man” for refusing to “break” and said that “flipping” “almost ought to be
outlawed.” After Roger Stone publicly announced that he would not cooperate with prosecutors,
the President called Stone “very brave” and said he had “guts!” for not “testify[ing] against
Trump.”
Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President’s conduct towards Michael Cohen, a
former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized
the President’s involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of Cohen when
he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the
Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate
Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia
to advance the deal. In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project,
including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed
travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a “party line” that Cohen said was developed to
minimize the President’s connections to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony,
Cohen had extensive discussions with the President’s personal counsel, who, according to Cohen,
said that Cohen should “stay on message” and not contradict the President. After the FBI searched
Cohen’s home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not
“flip,” contacted him directly to tell him to “stay strong,” and privately passed messages of support
to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President’s personal counsel and believed that if
he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a “rat,” and
suggested that his family members had committed crimes.
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II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview
of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump
responded. We then turn to the key events that we investigated: the President’s conduct concerning
the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn; the President’s reaction to public confirmation of the FBI’s
Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Comey;
efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel’s
investigation; efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower
meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General
unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses.
We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on
elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has “jurisdiction . . . to investigate . . . federal
crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel’s
investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
witnesses.” 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal
obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and
analyzed them within an elements framework—while refraining from reaching ultimate
conclusions about whether crimes were committed, for the reasons explained above. This section
also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those
defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III, infra.
A.
The Campaign’s Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump
During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a possible connection between
the Trump Campaign and Russia.7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically
damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump
responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement
in Russia—even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late
as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information from Roger Stone about any
further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible
links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any
connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election
interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election.8
7 This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information
contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump’s response to those stories in context. Volume
I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media
during the campaign.
8 As discussed in Volume I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals
with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.
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National Convention about the Trump Campaign’s involvement in changing the Republican
platform’s stance on giving “weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces.”18
2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks’s Release of Hacked Emails
On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government
hackers had infiltrated the DNC’s computer and obtained access to documents.19
On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted
thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations.20 Soon thereafter,
Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails
and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump.21 On July 26, 2016, the New York
Times reported that U.S. “intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have ‘high
confidence’ that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the
Democratic National Committee.”22
Within the Trump Campaign, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks.23
Trump associate Roger Stone had predicted and discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks
would release the hacked material.24 Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the
possibility of upcoming releases with Stone. Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the
Trump Organization and special counsel to Trump, recalled hearing Stone tell Trump during the
summer of 2016 that Stone had just gotten off the phone with Julian Assange and that WikiLeaks
planned to release information soon.25 Cohen recalled that Trump responded, “oh good, alright,”
18 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP’s anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post,
Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6,
supra.
19 Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15,
2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by
CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research
on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016).
20 Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton
and internal deliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016).
21 Amber Phillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats’ emails to help Donald
Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016).
22 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.,
New York Times (July 26, 2016).
23 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at 1.
24 Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I, Section
III.D.1, supra.
25 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra. According to Cohen, after
WikiLeaks’s subsequent release of stolen DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the
effect of, “I guess Roger was right.” Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen’s role in the candidate’s and later
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and asked Stone to keep him in the loop.26 Manafort said that shortly after WikiLeaks’s July 22,
2016 release of hacked documents, he spoke to Trump and mentioned that Stone had predicted the
release and claimed to have access to WikiLeaks; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that
Manafort should stay in touch with Stone and keep Trump updated.27 Deputy campaign manager
Rick Gates said that Manafort was getting pressure about Stone’s having information and that
Manafort instructed Gates to call Stone and get status updates on upcoming releases.28 Around
the same time, Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport when Trump spoke by phone with
Stone at length, and shortly after the call ended, Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging
information would be coming.29 Stone’s connections to WikiLeaks were discussed within the
Campaign,30 and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a communications strategy
based on the possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.31
3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid
Candidate Trump
In the days that followed WikiLeaks’s July 22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the
Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump.
On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was “[c]razy” to suggest that Russia was “dealing with
Trump”32 and that “[f]or the record,” he had “ZERO investments in Russia.”33
In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized “this whole thing
with Russia” as “a total deflection” and stated that it was “farfetched” and “ridiculous.”34 Trump
said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would
give him “no pause” if Russia had Clinton’s emails.35 Trump added, “Russia, if you’re listening,
I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded
President’s activities, and his own criminal conduct, is described in Volume II, Section II.K, infra, and in
Volume I, Section IV.A.1, supra.
26 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8.
27 (b) (3)
. As explained in footnote 197 of Volume
(b)(3)-1
I, Section III.D.1.b, supra, this Office has included Manafort’s account of these events because it aligns
with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent.
28 Gates 10/25/18 302, at 4.
29 Gates 10/25/18 302, at 4.
30 Bannon 1/18/19 302, at 3.
31 Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2 (messaging strategy was being
formed in June/July timeframe based on claims by Assange on June 12, 2016, and information Stone
provided before the first WikiLeaks release on July 22, 2016).
32 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet.
33 @realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet.
34 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
35 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016).
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General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it
is not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI’s recent request concerning Flynn.306
2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia
Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI
On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the “Gang of Eight” congressional leaders about the
FBI’s investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S.
subjects of the investigation.307 Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing
at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn’s chief of staff, on March 12, 2017,
state, “POTUS in panic/chaos . . . Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related
to Russia.”308 The week after Comey’s briefing, the White House Counsel’s Office was in contact
with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have
received information about the status of the FBI investigation.309
On March 20, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify before HPSCI.310 In advance of
Comey’s testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Comey to provide
information about the ongoing FBI investigation.311 Dana Boente, who at that time was the Acting
Attorney General for the Russia investigation, authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the
Russia investigation and agreed that Comey should decline to comment on whether any particular
individuals, including the President, were being investigated.312
306 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14; see SC_AD_000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) (“POTUS wants
to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations] / Is investigation / No /
We know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There’s something hot”).
307 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 13-14; SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et
al.).
308 SC_AD_00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation
that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13.
309 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel’s Office was
briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of “4-5 targets.” Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15. The “targets”
were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as “Flynn (FBI was in—wrapping up)→DOJ looking for phone
records”; “Comey→Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)”; “Stone (can’t handicap)”; “Carter Page ($
game)”; and “Greek Guy” (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00198 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn
both said they believed these were targets of SSCI. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/12/17 302,
at 4. But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as “targets”; the notes on their face reference the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey; and the notes track the background materials prepared by the
FBI for Comey’s briefing to the Gang of 8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email,
Gauhar to Page et al.); see also Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had
told McGahn those individuals were the FBI’s targets).
310 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017).
311 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1.
312 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16-17.
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was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump
was repeatedly briefed on the progress of those efforts.498 In addition, some witnesses said that
Trump was aware that Roger Stone was pursuing information about hacked documents from
WikiLeaks at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the
hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More
broadly, multiple witnesses described the President’s preoccupation with press coverage of the
Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his
election.500
Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the
press and the public for Comey’s termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the
President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ
recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had
decided to fire Comey before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the
President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department
of Justice’s recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would
resist the White House’s suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Comey’s
termination. The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the
President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does
not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both.
E.
The President’s Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel
Overview
The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting
the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had
failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President
ultimately did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts
of interest, but they responded that those claims were “ridiculous” and posed no obstacle to the
Special Counsel’s service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special
Counsel’s service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally
investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets
498 See Volume II, Section II.K.1, infra.
499 See Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra.
500 In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President’s intent in firing Comey was connected
to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI’s Russian-interference investigation. In
particular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump
Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia
investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York, ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign-finance
offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President. See Volume II, Section
II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was
considering the possibility that the FBI’s investigation would uncover these payments or that the President’s
intent in firing Comey was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light.
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time to issue a correction for a news story—indicates the President was not focused solely on a
press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings
arising from it.
c.
Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute
that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of
influencing McGahn’s account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President’s
conduct towards the investigation.
Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get
McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence
suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President
had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with
the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he was to
his memory of what had occurred. The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing
McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did
not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the
President’s intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the
prospect of the President’s meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn’s counsel and said that
McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President’s
counsel was well aware of McGahn’s resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account
of events despite the President’s request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the
Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for
telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President’s statements reflect his
understanding—and his displeasure—that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice
inquiry.
J.
The President’s Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, and Stone
Overview
In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other
actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel’s investigation, including Flynn,
Manafort, Stone, and as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint
defense agreement with the President, the President’s personal counsel stated that Flynn’s actions
would be viewed as reflecting “hostility” towards the President. During Manafort’s prosecution
and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort was being treated
unfairly and made it known that Manafort could receive a pardon. And the President commended
Stone for having the “guts” to say that he would not testify against the President.
Evidence
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn
As previously noted, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn’s
resignation on February 13, 2017. Following Flynn’s resignation, the President made positive
public comments about Flynn, describing him as a “wonderful man,” “a fine person,” and a “very
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Manafort.”887 In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was “very
brave” that Manafort did not “flip”:
If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is terrible. You flip and
you lie and you get—the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people
to flip. It’s rare that they can’t. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi—I don’t know
Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.888 Manafort, Corsi and Roger Stone. It’s
actually very brave.889
In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, “It was never
discussed, but I wouldn’t take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table?”890
3. Conduct Directed at Roger Stone
In the second half of 2018, the media reported that Roger Stone said he expected to be
charged with crimes in the Special Counsel investigation.891 In press interviews, Stone repeatedly
asserted that he would not testify against the President.892 On August 30, 2018, for example, Stone
said that he anticipated he would be “pressure[d] . . . to testify against the president” and he was
“not going to do it.”893
On November 20, 2018, the President submitted written answers to questions that had been
provided by the Special Counsel’s Office, and the President’s legal team announced that he had
done so.894 Several questions addressed the President’s communications with Stone during the
887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN
(Nov. 29, 2018).
888 “Corsi” is a reference to Jerome Corsi, an associate of Roger Stone who was involved in efforts
to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea
offer from the Special Counsel’s Office because he was “not going to sign a lie.” Sara Murray & Eli
Watkins, Roger Stone associate says he won’t agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018).
889 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says
pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That same day, the President
tweeted: “While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way,
at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Dems is viciously telling witnesses
to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!” @realDonaldTrump 11/28/18
(8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet.
890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump:
Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
891 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Ex-Trump advisor Roger Stone says he expects Mueller to charge him
with a crime, NBC (Aug. 30, 2018).
892 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Ex-Trump advisor Roger Stone says he expects Mueller to charge him
with a crime, NBC (Aug. 30, 2018).
893 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Ex-Trump advisor Roger Stone says he expects Mueller to charge him
with a crime, NBC (Aug. 30, 2018).
89411/20/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office (transmitting written
responses of Donald J. Trump); Jordan Fabian, Trump submits written answers to Mueller, Hill (Nov. 20,
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campaign, including “Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware,
with anyone else associated with the campaign?” and “Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about
contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases
of information?”895 In his written answers, the President stated: “I spoke by telephone with Roger
Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no recollection of the specifics of any
conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1, 2016 and November 8, 2016. I do not recall
discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone having discussed
WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign, although I was aware that WikiLeaks
was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at the time.”896
As described in Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra, and Volume II, Section II.A, supra,
several witnesses said that candidate Trump was told during the campaign that Stone had access
to WikiLeaks and could provide information about planned releases of damaging material related
to Hillary Clinton before those releases occurred. Cohen recalled a conversation in which Roger
Stone told Trump that WikiLeaks planned to release information soon, and Manafort recalled that
Trump had asked him to stay in touch with Stone about WikiLeaks. Witnesses also said that
Stone’s connection to WikiLeaks was common knowledge within the Campaign.
As described above, in an interview on November 28, 2018, one week after submitting his
written answers, the President criticized “flipping” and said that Stone (along with Manafort and
Corsi) was “very brave” in indicating he would not cooperate with prosecutors.897 On December
2, 2018, Stone told the press that there was “no circumstance” under which he would “testify
against the president.”898 He also said he had had no discussions about a pardon.899 On December
3, 2018, the President tweeted, “‘I will never testify against Trump.’ This statement was recently
made by Roger Stone, essentially stating that he will not be forced by a rogue and out of control
2018) (quoting the President’s personal counsel as saying the President’s answers cover “issues regarding
the Russia-related topics of the inquiry”).
895 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel (providing written
questions).
896 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 13-14 (Response to Question II, Part
(g)).
897 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump:
Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018).
898 George Stephanopoulos, ‘This Week’ Transcript 12-2-18: James Baker, Colin Powell, Rep.
Adam Schiff and Roger Stone, ABC (Dec. 2, 2018).
899 George Stephanopoulos, ‘This Week’ Transcript 12-2-18: James Baker, Colin Powell, Rep.
Adam Schiff and Roger Stone, ABC (Dec. 2, 2018).
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prosecutor to make up lies and stories about ‘President Trump.’ Nice to know that some people
still have ‘guts!’”900
On January 24, 2019, a grand jury indicted Stone on charges of obstruction, witness
tampering, and making false statements.901 One of the counts charged Stone with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for testifying falsely in Congress that he had never told anyone involved in the
Trump Campaign about discussions he was having during the campaign with an individual who
acted as an intermediary between him and Assange.902 After making an initial court appearance
on January 25, 2019, Stone told reporters, “There is no circumstance whatsoever under which I
will bear false witness against the president, nor will I make up lies to ease the pressure on myself.
. . . I will not testify against the President, because I would have to bear false witness.”903
That evening, Stone appeared on Fox News and indicated he had knowledge of the
President’s answers to this Office’s written questions. When asked if he had spoken to the
President about the allegation that he had lied to Congress, Stone said, “I have not” and added,
“When the President answered the written interrogatories, he correctly and honestly said Roger
Stone and I never discussed this and we never did.”904
The next day, January 26, 2019, the President tweeted, “If Roger Stone was indicted for
lying to Congress, what about the lying done by Comey . . . and soooo many others?”905 On
January 31, 2019, the President criticized the execution of the search and arrest warrants for Stone,
saying “I think that was a very sad thing for this country” and “I like Roger.”906 On February 3,
2019, the President said in an interview, “Roger is somebody that I’ve always liked.”907 When
asked whether he would pardon Stone, the President said, “I have not thought about it. It looks
like he’s defending himself very well. But you have to get rid of the Russia witch hunt because it
is indeed.”908
900 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.
901 Indictment, United States v. Roger Jason Stone, Jr., 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2019), Doc. 1
(Stone Indictment).
902 Stone Indictment ¶¶ 35, 43. Stone had testified before Congress on September 26, 2017, and
was asked, “Did you discuss your conversations with the intermediary with anyone involved in the Trump
campaign?” Stone responded, “I did not.” Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. House of Representatives, Interview of Roger J. Stone, Jr. (Sept. 26, 2017), at 102.
903 Devlin Barrett et al., Longtime Trump adviser Roger Stone indicted by special counsel in Russia
investigation, Washington Post (Jan. 25, 2019).
904 Former Trump 2016 Presidential Campaign Aide Roger Stone Interviewed on Fox News, CQ
Newsmaker Transcripts, at 5 (Jan. 25, 2019).
905 @realDonaldTrump 1/26/19 (8:42 a.m. ET) Tweet.
906 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From Trump’s Interview With The New York Times, New York
Times (Feb. 1, 2019).
907 Face the Nation interview with President Trump, CBS (Feb. 3, 2019).
908 Face the Nation interview with President Trump, CBS (Feb. 3, 2019).
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Analysis
In analyzing the President’s conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, and Stone, the following
evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
a.
Obstructive act. The President’s actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel’s
investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular
witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing,
delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement.
With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging
him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to
cooperate with the government. When Flynn’s attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense
agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the
government, the President’s personal counsel initially reminded Flynn’s counsel of the President’s
warm feelings towards Flynn and said “that still remains.” But when Flynn’s counsel reiterated
that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President’s
personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn’s hostility
towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn’s
decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues,
however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about
the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn’s counsel.
With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President’s actions had the potential to
influence Manafort’s decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his
personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort,
while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to “flip” and cooperate with
the government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort’s D.C. case was
considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he “felt badly” for Manafort and
stated, “I think a lot of it is very unfair.” And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the
President said, “I do want to see people treated fairly. That’s what it’s all about.” Later that day,
after Manafort’s bail was revoked, the President called it a “tough sentence” that was “Very
unfair!” Two days later, the President’s personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the
Special Counsel’s investigation could receive a pardon “if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors
. . . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly”—using language that paralleled
how the President had already described the treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined
with the President’s commendation of Manafort for being a “brave man” who “refused to ‘break’,”
suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with
the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators.
The President’s public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury
deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for
example, the President called the prosecution a “terrible situation” and a “hoax” that “continues to
stain our country” and referred to Manafort as a “Reagan/Dole darling” who was “serving solitary
confinement” even though he was “convicted of nothing.” Those statements were widely picked
up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and
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are presumed to follow those instructions, the President’s statements during the trial generated
substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements
or learned about them from others. And the President’s statements during jury deliberations that
Manafort “happens to be a very good person” and that “it’s very sad what they’ve done to Paul
Manafort” had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President
made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort.
Finally, there is evidence that the President’s actions towards Stone had the potential to
affect a decision about cooperating with the government. After Stone publicly announced that he
would never provide evidence against the President’s interests, the President called Stone “very
brave” and said he had “guts!” for not “testify[ing] against Trump.”
b.
Nexus to an official proceeding. The President’s actions towards Flynn, Manafort,
and Stone appear to have been connected to pending or anticipated official proceedings involving
each individual. The President’s conduct towards Flynn and Stone principally occurred when both
were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel’s Office and press reports speculated
about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel’s investigation. And the President’s
conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The
President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort’s criminal
trial. And the President’s comments about the prospect of Manafort “flipping” occurred when it
was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings.
c.
Intent. Evidence concerning the President’s intent related to Flynn as a potential
witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence
establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel’s communications
with Flynn’s counsel stating that Flynn’s decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement
and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting “hostility” towards the
President. And regardless of what the President’s personal counsel communicated, the President
continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
agreement, stating that Flynn had “led a very strong life” and the President “fe[lt] very badly”
about what had happened to him.
Evidence concerning the President’s conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President
intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was
convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after
Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the
President said that Manafort was “a brave man” for refusing to “break” and that “flipping” “almost
ought to be outlawed.” At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did
not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort “a good man” and said he had a “wonderful family.”
And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the
President did not respond directly and instead said he had “great respect for what [Manafort]’s
done, in terms of what he’s gone through.” The President added that “some of the charges they
threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.” In light of the
President’s counsel’s previous statements that the investigations “might get cleaned up with some
presidential pardons” and that a pardon would be possible if the President “come[s] to the
conclusion that you have been treated unfairly,” the evidence supports the inference that the
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President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make
cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.
We also examined the evidence of the President’s intent in making public statements about
Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports
a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated
widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal
would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel’s investigation. By publicly stating on the second
day of deliberations that Manafort “happens to be a very good person” and that “it’s very sad what
they’ve done to Paul Manafort” right after calling the Special Counsel’s investigation a “rigged
witch hunt,” the President’s statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to
engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the President
intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the President’s comments, including
that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to
influence public opinion. The President’s comments also could have been intended to continue
sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President
made his comments about Manafort being “a very good person” immediately after declining to
answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort.
With regard to the President’s conduct towards Stone, there is evidence that the President
intended to reinforce Stone’s public statements that he would not cooperate with the government
when the President likely understood that Stone could potentially provide evidence that would be
adverse to the President. By late November 2018, the President had provided written answers to
the Special Counsel’s Office in which the President said he did not recall “the specifics of any call
[he] had” with Stone during the campaign period and did not recall discussing WikiLeaks with
Stone. Witnesses have stated, however, that candidate Trump discussed WikiLeaks with Stone,
that Trump knew that Manafort and Gates had asked Stone to find out what other damaging
information about Clinton WikiLeaks possessed, and that Stone’s claimed connection to
WikiLeaks was common knowledge within the Campaign. It is possible that, by the time the
President submitted his written answers two years after the relevant events had occurred, he no
longer had clear recollections of his discussions with Stone or his knowledge of Stone’s asserted
communications with WikiLeaks. But the President’s conduct could also be viewed as reflecting
his awareness that Stone could provide evidence that would run counter to the President’s denials
and would link the President to Stone’s efforts to reach out to WikiLeaks. On November 28, 2018,
eight days after the President submitted his written answers to the Special Counsel, the President
criticized “flipping” and said that Stone was “very brave” for not cooperating with prosecutors.
Five days later, on December 3, 2018, the President applauded Stone for having the “guts” not to
testify against him. These statements, as well as those complimenting Stone and Manafort while
disparaging Michael Cohen once Cohen chose to cooperate, support the inference that the
President intended to communicate a message that witnesses could be rewarded for refusing to
provide testimony adverse to the President and disparaged if they chose to cooperate.
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the decision.1057 The Office also again asked for the timing of the President’s discussions with
Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify “what period of the campaign” he
was involved in discussions concerning the project.1058 In response, the President’s personal
counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that “the President
has fully answered the questions at issue.”1059
In the weeks following Cohen’s plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office,
the President repeatedly implied that Cohen’s family members were guilty of crimes. On
December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted,
“‘Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.’ You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE,
unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long
prison term? He makes up stories to get a GREAT & ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and
get his wife and father-in-law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and
should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence.”1060 A few minutes later, the President
appeared to contrast Cohen’s conduct with Roger Stone’s, tweeting: “‘I will never testify against
Trump.’ This statement was recently made by Roger Stone, essentially stating that he will not be
forced by a rogue and out of control prosecutor to make up lies and stories about ‘President
Trump.’ Nice to know that some people still have ‘guts!’”1061
On December 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.1062 The next
day, the President sent a series of tweets that said:
I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law. . . . Those charges were just agreed to by
him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he
did—including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. As a lawyer,
Michael has great liability to me!1063
On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, “Remember, Michael Cohen only became a ‘Rat’
after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable & unheard of until the Witch Hunt
was illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY’S OFFICE! Why didn’t they break
into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked’s office?”1064
In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a
congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen’s
1057 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel.
1058 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel.
1059 2/6/19 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office.
1060 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and 10:29 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added).
1061 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.
1062 Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript.
1063 @realDonaldTrump 12/13/18 (8:17 a.m. ET, 8:25 a.m. ET, and 8:39 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis
added).
1064 @realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (9:39 a.m. ET) Tweet.
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