The Same Subject Continued



(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)



For the Independent Journal.



JAY





To the People of the State of New York:



Queen Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch

Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then

forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I

shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire

and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It

will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the

animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences

betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and

trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection

and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED

TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.” “We most earnestly recommend to you

calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union

may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to

secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of

our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR

UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.”



It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at

home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more

to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within

ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.



The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general

the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit

by their experience without paying the price which it cost them.

Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an

island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages

divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly

embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their

true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the

same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their

mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series

of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were

useful and assisting to each other.



Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four

nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies

arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being “joined

in affection” and free from all apprehension of different “interests,”

envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and

the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general

interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and

pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always

be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant

apprehension of them.



The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot

reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal

footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so

at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human

contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of

those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one

part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the

effects of that superior policy and good management which would

probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which

their relative equality in strength and consideration would be

destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound

policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of

these confederacies for a long succession of years.



Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it

would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on

the scale of political importance much above the degree of her

neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and

with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not

to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and

would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to

secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her

to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not

only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a

disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates

distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily

changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether

expressed or implied.



The North is generally the region of strength, and many local

circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed

confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably

more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become

evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and

sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did

in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash

conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey

in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more

delicate neighbors.



They who well consider the history of similar divisions and

confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in

contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would

be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but

on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual

injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations

in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY

TO EACH OTHER.



From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly

mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be

formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination

and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary

to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign

enemies.



When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were

formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces

against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT

NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to

regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities

are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties

be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create

different interests, and of course different degrees of political

attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it

might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the

SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the

NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and

friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would

not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and

fulfilled with perfect good faith.



Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring

nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly

passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering

our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these

confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant

nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to

guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard

against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let

us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into

our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade

or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others

make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under

the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they

pretended to protect.



Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any

given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us

against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.