The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)



From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.



HAMILTON OR MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that

where annual elections end, tyranny begins. “ If it be true, as has

often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally

founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established,

they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not

extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is

the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will

subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural

connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period

within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily

for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single

point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient

latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various

situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of

magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances

it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and

if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why

not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods

established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous

branches of the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding

any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil

magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are

half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are

annual. In South Carolina they are biennial as is proposed in the

federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the

longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show,

that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a

greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either

the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these

respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are

different from both. In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I

can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The

important distinction so well understood in America, between a

Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the

government, and a law established by the government and alterable by

the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed

in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has

resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the

form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of

political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear

most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the

authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well

with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative

provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually

changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of

the government. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed

the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced

septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act,

continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they

were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous practices

has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government,

of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them

to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is

exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either

existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to

that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other

security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security

would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some

simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the

danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for

uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion

of time, applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the

doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier

against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the

advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of

departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity

can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the

federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount

Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of

America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably

fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be,

where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to

alterations by the ordinary power of the government? The second

question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful.

The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will appear

from several very obvious considerations. No man can be a competent

legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound

judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is

to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of

information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as

public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at least

thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires

the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such

cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge

requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of

legislative service established in most of the States for the more

numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be

put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater

proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one

year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very

statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought

to be given to it. In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates

to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with

which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general

affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very

diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every

class of people. The great theatre of the United States presents a very

different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary

in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread

throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by t

e local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be

correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils to

which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of

every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even

of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members

from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by

uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports,

the usages, and the regulatious of the different States? How can the

trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some

knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How

can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be

not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating

to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations

for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many

internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each

other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and

suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the

representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will

require a proportional degree of information with regard to them. It is

true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much

diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of

the government and the primeval formation of a federal code.

Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier

and fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and

accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union

will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among

the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of

different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual

knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general

assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements,

the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed,

both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single

State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who

are to transact it. A branch of knowledge which belongs to the

acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been

mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he

ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United

States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws

of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of

nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal

legislation, is submitted to the federal government.



And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to

participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the

necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs,

those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the

ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular

legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge

may, no doubt, be acquired in a man’s closet; but some of it also can

only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it

will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject

during the period of actual service in the legislature.



There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which

are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the

representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements

rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious

objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year,

than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this

subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They

are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered

by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The

election of the representatives by the people would not be governed by

the same principle. A few of the members, as happens in all such

assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent

reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly

masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail

themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new

members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members the

more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for

them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will

subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is an

inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections

even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one

legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be

investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due

effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means,

the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding

it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious

encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining

irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be

annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly

in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be,

the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members;

and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for

simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a

portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate

member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an

event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a

seat. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming,

that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public

as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.