==========================
Django 6.0.9 release notes
==========================

*October 6, 2026*

Django 6.0.9 fixes one security issue with severity "low", three security
issues with severity "moderate", and provides a fix for an insufficient
security mitigation in 6.0.8. It also fixes one data loss issue in 4.0.

CVE-2026-77050: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``get_supported_language_variant()``
=================================================================================================

:func:`~django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant` was subject to
a potential denial-of-service attack when processing many distinct, very long
language codes. Language codes were used as keys in an in-memory cache before
their length was limited, potentially consuming excessive process memory.

To mitigate this vulnerability, language codes longer than 500 characters are
now rejected or truncated before the cached lookup.

This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-84429: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in HTTP header parsing
================================================================================

``django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters()`` was subject to a potential
denial-of-service attack due to quadratic time complexity when parsing a value
with many separators inside a quoted parameter. An unauthenticated request
could reach this parsing through headers such as ``Accept`` or
``Content-Type``, for instance via the content negotiation performed by
``HttpRequest.accepts()``. The per-call length limit does not bound the
combined size of repeated headers.

The undocumented ``django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters()`` function now
uses Python's :class:`email.message.Message` for parsing. As a result, parsing
of some malformed or unusual header values may differ, for example,
:rfc:`2231` values with a missing encoding are now decoded.

This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
policy <severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-87890: Potential request forgery via spatial lookup byte values
========================================================================

Spatial lookups accepted raster values provided as ``bytes`` without requiring
them to be explicitly wrapped in :class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster`.
Although these values were opened through GDAL's in-memory virtual filesystem,
they could contain a VRT document referencing an external raster source. This
could cause GDAL to issue network requests as the Django process user while
preparing the lookup.

This issue could be exploited by applications that passed attacker-controlled
bytes directly to a spatial lookup. It was overlooked in the fix for
CVE-2026-15307.

To mitigate this issue, raster values provided as ``bytes`` must now be wrapped
in :class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster` before being used in spatial
lookups. Byte values representing valid hexadecimal geometries remain accepted.

This is a backward incompatible change. As a reminder, all untrusted user input
should be validated before use.

This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
policy <severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-87975: Privilege abuse in model formsets with editable primary keys
============================================================================

Model formsets incorrectly allowed forged ``POST`` data to either delete
instances outside the limiting queryset or create instances via :ref:`edit-only
<model-formsets-edit-only>` formsets when the model's primary key could be set
through the form, such as with: a ``OneToOneField`` (or parent link used as the
primary key of an inline formset's model), or a natural or UUID primary key
included in the form's fields. Models using the default ``BigAutoField``
primary key were not affected.

This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
policy <severity-levels>`.

Bugfixes
========

* Fixed a class of bugs in Django 6.0.8 that allowed bypassing the depth
  limiter for deeply nested geometry collections (:cve:`2026-15830`). The new
  algorithm treats WKB and WKT inputs more consistently and also fixes a rare
  case where a valid geometry could have been rejected.

* Fixed a data loss issue in Django 4.0 where :ref:`network rasters
  <gdal-raster-network>` were deleted by GeoDjango when closed.
