Sign the request
The requesting workload signs the exact payload it wants executed.
Open source · v0.4.0 beta · B2A Security Gate
Tempus DDB sits between an AI agent and external effects. Agents sign requests, policy issues short-lived single-use permits, and mediated executors record tamper-evident receipts.
pip install tempus-ddb
Protocol
The requesting agent signs an intent. Policy returns an allowed or blocked decision. A separate executor verifies and consumes an allowed permit before acting.
The requesting workload signs the exact payload it wants executed.
Policy evidence, identity and scope determine an allowed or blocked decision.
The executor verifies the permit's binding, tenant and expiry before any effect.
Intent, authorization and outcome remain cryptographically linked for inspection.
Architecture
MCP proxies authorize and forward requests, trusting the backend. Tempus enforces a cryptographic single-use toll with dual-signed execution receipts and complete credential isolation.
Unlike RBAC proxies that simply forward calls, Tempus issues expiring, single-use signed permits bound to the exact intent hash.
The requesting AI agent never touches or sees downstream tokens. Dedicated executors hold secrets in their own isolated process.
Both Gate and Executor sign the outcome. Anyone can verify the entire trace mathematically offline without trusting application logs.
Implementation
Tempus provides out-of-the-box mediated adapters that keep downstream credentials strictly outside the agent's environment.
Audited GitHub issue and pull request creation with isolated GITHUB_TOKEN.
Generic HTTPS POST/PUT webhook dispatcher and Slack alert executor with isolated secrets.
Enforces the universal money contract for payouts, disbursements and charges.
Current limits
It does not include distributed permit consumption, independent external checkpoints or a live audit console.