PlannedSecurity · Content
Prompt-injection scanning of skill Markdown
The highest-signal gap: boost installs Markdown an agent then executes,
and nothing inspects that content. Scan skills for injection patterns —
"ignore previous instructions", data-exfiltration prompts,
embedded curl … | sh — with free rule engines
(semgrep custom rules, garak/llm-guard
patterns) at tap and install time.
Complexity M
Impact High
Wow ★★★★★
the core risk
PlannedSecurity · Integrity
Integrity verification — boost verify
The lockfile already records a sha256 per install via
util.sha256_dir, but nothing ever re-checks it. A
verify command (and a doctor gate) that
re-hashes installed skills and flags drift turns that stored digest into
actual tamper-detection — cheap, and built on machinery that already
exists.
Complexity S
Impact High
Wow ★★★★
reuses sha256_dir
PlannedSecurity · Provenance
Tap signing & provenance — Sigstore / minisign
A tap records its commit today but offers no cryptographic
proof the content came from its claimed publisher, so a hijacked mirror
can serve altered skills undetected. Verify a signature (Sigstore
keyless or minisign) before trusting a tap — free, and the
standard the wider ecosystem is converging on.
Complexity M
Impact Med
Wow ★★★★
keyless OIDC
PlannedSecurity · Registry
Typosquat & name-confusion detection
The classic package-manager attack: a skill named one edit-distance from
a popular one, or a familiar name that quietly resolves to an unexpected
owner/repo. Flag near-duplicate names and owner mismatches
at search and install time so a user can't fat-finger their way into a
malicious skill.
Complexity M
Impact Med
Wow ★★★★
edit-distance guard
PlannedSecurity · Supply chain
Update-diff before apply
boost update overwrites installed skills in place. Show a
content diff of what an upstream change alters — and require confirmation
for anything that touches executable-looking instructions — so a poisoned
update is visible instead of silent. The "review the diff" gate,
applied to skills.
Complexity M
Impact Med
Wow ★★★
no silent overwrites
PlannedSecurity · Secrets
Secret & PII scanning of installed skills
Point the round-2 secret scanners (gitleaks/trufflehog)
at third-party skill content, not just boost's own repo — catching
a skill that ships embedded credentials or, worse, one whose prompt
coaxes the agent into harvesting the user's. Same free tools, a different
and higher-stakes target.
Complexity S
Impact Med
Wow ★★★
installed content
PlannedSecurity · Integrity
Lockfile enforcement & commit pinning
Promote the recorded sha256 from a note to a rule: refuse to
load a skill whose content has drifted from the lockfile, and let users
pin a skill to an exact commit. The enforcement layer that makes the
verify digest binding rather than advisory.
Complexity S
Impact Med
Wow ★★★
pin to commit
PlannedSecurity · Policy
Capability manifest & least-privilege policy
Extend the existing policy.py so a skill declares the
capabilities it expects — network, shell, file scope — and the user's
policy allows or denies them. Turns install-time governance into
least-privilege for the instructions an agent is about to run, the
natural next step for a tool that already blocks installs by policy.
Complexity L
Impact Med
Wow ★★★★
builds on policy.py