The Same Subject Continued



(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the

Common Defense Considered)



From the New York Packet.



Tuesday, December 25, 1787.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



It has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind

proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military

force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that

have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion,

unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons

upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the

latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a

presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of

federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any

exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of

the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what

ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless

we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government

will be worse administered than those of the State government, there

seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or

opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general

rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government will

commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its

administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this

rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes,

that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic

merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by

general principles and maxims.



Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to

induce a probability that the general government will be better

administered than the particular governments; the principal of which

reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present

a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through

the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men,

and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is

reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with

peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater

knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and

that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and

more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary

prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently

contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a

part of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify

a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress,

dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of

considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we

come to survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the

edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to

remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an

opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in

such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people,

there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws

of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will

stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the

laws of the particular members.



The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of

punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the

government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power,

can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy,

be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the

LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the

resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily

suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in

that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a

match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be

just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of

individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a

single member.



I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the

less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more

the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the

ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed

to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the

more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the

further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible

chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart,

the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect

and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit.

A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little

influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out

of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the

people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the

affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather

than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal

concern; and will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion

to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it

circulates through those channels and currents in which the passions of

mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent

and perilous expedients of compulsion.



One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the

one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using

force, than that species of league contend for by most of its

opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the States

in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in

such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force;

that frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of

the very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen,

they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.



The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the

federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will

enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the

execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to

destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the

sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal

government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its

authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition

to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important

consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support

the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in

this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and

LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of

the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative,

executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity

of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the

respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the

national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its

laws.[1] Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the

consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground

to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the

Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.

If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any

inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly

possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best

government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and

precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the

adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the

national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or

to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of

ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a

conduct?



PUBLIUS.



 [1] The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend

 to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its

 proper place, be fully detected.









THE FEDERALIST.