The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of

Representatives)



From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.



HAMILTON OR MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



The second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will

be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its

constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of

the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the

United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of

their interests, without taking into view at the same time the

circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other

legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a

brief explanation of these peculiarities. It is a sound and important

principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the

interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can

extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which

the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a

variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the

compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to

a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent

of information required in the exercise of a particular authority,

recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that

authority. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those

which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local

knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia. A proper regulation

of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked;

but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation

of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very

sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils. Taxation will

consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the

regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to

this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more

diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary.

But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few

intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide the

largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that

there will be no peculiar local interests in either, which will not be

within the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides

this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by

representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a

sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and must

continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many

cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legislature, than to

review the different laws, and reduce them in one general act. A

skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him,

might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union,

without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected that

whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases

requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects

will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be

given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the

State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other

State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising

within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a

degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the

several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the

labors of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of

members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great

advantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each State

will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and

a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in

all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members,

of the State legislature, where all the local information and interests

of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed

by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States. The

observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force

to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of

discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout

each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but

little in different parts of the same State. The attentive reader will

discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of a

moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict

what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive

information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time

that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as

it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult,

not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single

State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by

itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little

diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge

requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and

affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a

knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in

every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a

single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the

different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws,

and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal

legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to

have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from

each State, may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State,

every representative will have much information to acquire concerning

all the other States.



The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative

situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect.

The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly,

will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are little

more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress

in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to

the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all of them be the

fruits of a more advanced population, and will require, on the part of

each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention

has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be

accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the

government. The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind

so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and

which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,

corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The

number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland

cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of

these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and

fifty-eight.



Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four

persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three

persons.[1] It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who

do not even reside among the people at large, can add any thing either

to the security of the people against the government, or to the

knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative

councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more

frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive

magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.

They might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something

more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation.

We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not

extend the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not

reside among their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them,

and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all

these concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be

the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions

that is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the

rights and explain the situation OF TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED

AND SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of

executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of

legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree

diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a

valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these

circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable,

in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature

concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the

weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of

Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest

assurance, that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS

will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the

interests which will be confided to it.



PUBLIUS.



 [1] Burgh’s _Political Disquisitions_.









THE FEDERALIST.