Metadata-Version: 2.4
Name: adpentest
Version: 3.5
Summary: Active Directory penetration testing framework with automatic Domain Controller detection
Author-email: Netanel Cyber <nsh531@gmail.com>
License: MIT
Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/netanelcyber/AdPentestAI-Python
Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/netanelcyber/AdPentestAI-Python.git
Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/netanelcyber/AdPentestAI-Python/issues
Project-URL: Documentation, https://github.com/netanelcyber/AdPentestAI-Python/blob/main/README.md
Keywords: active-directory,penetration-testing,ad-enumeration,kerberos,smb,ldap,security,offensive-security,red-team
Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
Classifier: Environment :: Console
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Information Technology
Classifier: Intended Audience :: System Administrators
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
Classifier: Natural Language :: English
Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
Classifier: Topic :: System :: Networking
Classifier: Topic :: System :: Systems Administration
Classifier: Topic :: Security
Requires-Python: >=3.10
Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
License-File: LICENSE
Requires-Dist: httpx<1,>=0.27
Requires-Dist: dnspython<3,>=2.4
Requires-Dist: ldap3<3,>=2.9
Requires-Dist: jinja2>=3.0
Requires-Dist: SQLAlchemy<3,>=2.0
Provides-Extra: kerberos
Requires-Dist: impacket<1,>=0.12; extra == "kerberos"
Provides-Extra: dev
Requires-Dist: pytest>=7.0; extra == "dev"
Requires-Dist: black>=23.0; extra == "dev"
Requires-Dist: flake8>=6.0; extra == "dev"
Requires-Dist: mypy>=1.0; extra == "dev"
Dynamic: license-file

# AdPentestAI-Python

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[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/adpentest)](https://pypi.org/project/adpentest/)

**Active Directory security-assessment framework**, including a read-only, one-command Active Directory inventory in v3.5. Existing workflows include Domain Controller detection, parallel tool execution, CVE validation, reporting and SQLite scan history.

**v3.5 inventory is a separate LDAP-only mode.** It makes real network requests in `--mode active` and supports anonymous blackbox enumeration as well as authenticated directory reads; it does not run exploit tools or prove that inaccessible entries do not exist.

> **For authorized penetration testing only.** Always get explicit written permission before testing any systems.

---

## Table of Contents

- [Quick Start](#quick-start)
- [Active Directory inventory (v3.5)](#active-directory-inventory-v35)
- [Features](#features)
- [Installation](#installation)
- [Usage](#usage)
- [CVE Scanners](#cve-scanners)
- [WAF Detection & Bypass](#waf-detection--bypass)
- [Scan History Database](#scan-history-database)
- [DC Detection Strategies](#dc-detection-strategies)
- [Tool Registry](#tool-registry)
- [Email Protocol Enumeration](#email-protocol-enumeration)
- [DNS Configuration](#dns-configuration)
- [Architecture](#architecture)
- [Contributing](#contributing)
- [License](#license)

---

## Quick Start

Install v3.5 from PyPI **after the release is published**:

```bash
python -m pip install --upgrade "adpentest==3.5"
```

For source-only validation before PyPI publication, check out the v3.5 release branch and run `python -m pip install -e .`.

```bash
# Preview LDAP inventory: no network calls
adpentest --ad-inventory --target dc.lab.example --mode dry-run

# REAL anonymous blackbox LDAP inventory, requires authorization and LDAPS
adpentest --ad-inventory --target dc.lab.example --ad-bind anonymous --mode active --scope-confirmed --ad-partitions all --ad-output blackbox-ad.json

# Existing broader pentest scan (separate command; may use additional tools)
adpentest --target lab.example --mode dry-run --scope-confirmed

# Existing reporting interfaces
adpentest --history
adpentest --cve-report
```

The `--ad-inventory` command requires a specific Domain Controller hostname or IP address, not an entire network. Without credentials, it collects **only anonymously readable** objects and can fail at RootDSE or a directory partition. See the coverage report; a result is not proof of a complete forest inventory.

## Active Directory inventory (v3.5)

### Active blackbox scan without credentials

Use this mode for **authorized blackbox assessments**, with no pre-existing AD account:

```powershell
python -m adpentest --ad-inventory `
  --target dc.lab.example `
  --ad-bind anonymous `
  --ad-tls ldaps `
  --ad-partitions all `
  --ad-page-size 500 `
  --mode active `
  --scope-confirmed `
  --ad-output blackbox-ad.json
```

This is **real LDAP communication** over TLS, not a simulation. The collector connects directly to the selected DC, reads RootDSE and attempts paged searches on the naming contexts that the server advertises. It **does not** perform network sweeps, enumerate services through SMB/Kerberos, brute-force accounts, attempt privilege escalation, or exploit vulnerabilities. An anonymous bind often cannot read users, groups or entire partitions in production AD.

### Authenticated read-only inventory

With a permitted read-only account, the same command collects all directory objects **visible to that account**, including users and other entity types:

```powershell
python -m adpentest --ad-inventory `
  --target dc.lab.example `
  --ad-user "auditor@lab.example" `
  --ad-bind simple `
  --mode active `
  --scope-confirmed `
  --ad-partitions all `
  --ad-output ad-inventory.json
```

A secure password prompt is used by default. For unattended execution, set a secret environment variable **outside your command history** and pass only its *name* with `--ad-password-env AD_AUDIT_PASSWORD`. NTLM binding is also supported using `--ad-bind ntlm` with a compatible `DOMAIN\user` identity. Do not put passwords in command-line options or in JSON output.

### Discovery, object types and completeness

- **Partitions:** `--ad-partitions all` uses the default domain naming context and additional contexts advertised by RootDSE, such as Configuration, Schema, DomainDnsZones and ForestDnsZones when present and readable. `--ad-partitions domain` limits the search to the default domain context. It does not automatically contact other domains or trusts.
- **Objects:** all LDAP entries matching `(objectClass=*)` within those contexts are eligible. Common categories include users, computers, managed service accounts, groups, organizational units, GPO containers, trusts, contacts, DNS nodes, AD CS enrollment services and other object types.
- **Paging:** paged LDAP queries default to 500 objects per page. `--ad-page-size` supports 1–1000, and `--ad-max-objects` supports a bounded maximum (100,000 by default); duplicate DNs are removed. The cap can make a result partial.
- **Encryption:** certificate-validated LDAPS on port 636 is the default. `--ad-tls starttls` upgrades port 389 before authentication. Use `--ad-ca-file corporate-ca.pem` for an internal CA; verification is not bypassed.
- **Data minimization:** the JSON includes DN, naming context, category and a small allowlist of identifying/configuration fields such as name, objectGUID, objectClass, sAMAccountName, UPN and account-control flags. Passwords, hashes, secrets and full ACLs are not requested.
- **Coverage:** each queried partition reports `complete`, `partial`/`truncated` or `error` as applicable. The overall output distinguishes `complete` from `partial`; counts describe **retrieved** objects, not the unseen contents of the forest.
- **Output:** by default `--ad-output -` writes JSON to stdout. A named output is a **new** file and is not overwritten automatically. Treat collected usernames and directory structure as sensitive inventory data.

Example (abridged, fabricated):

```json
{
  "status": "partial",
  "mode": "active",
  "method": "ldap-read-only-paged",
  "summary": {
    "object_count": 3,
    "by_category": {"users": 2, "groups": 1},
    "truncated": false,
    "partition_errors": 1
  },
  "partitions": [
    {"base_dn": "DC=lab,DC=example", "objects": 3, "duplicates_skipped": 0, "status": "complete"},
    {"base_dn": "CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=example", "objects": 0, "duplicates_skipped": 0, "status": "error", "error_type": "LDAPOperationResult"}
  ],
  "objects": []
}
```

The `objects` array is abbreviated above; a real report includes each retrieved entry. Exit codes are **0** for a complete or dry-run report, **1** for partial inventory and **2** for failed active execution or invalid CLI input.

Read [docs/AD_INVENTORY.md](docs/AD_INVENTORY.md) for a focused reference. **AD inventory JSON is not a CVE evidence manifest**: independently verified product, patch and prerequisite evidence is still required for confirmed CVE findings.

---

### Confirmed CVE findings

The CVE report, HTML findings, and dashboard show only confirmed findings.
An open port, service banner, signing observation, or high correlation score
does not establish a specific CVE. All built-in heuristic scanners return
`assessment: "unverified"` until target-specific proof is available. Passive
correlations are retained under `passive_cve_scan.observations`; `matches`
contains no unverified candidates. Raw tool observations remain available.

Supply inventory collected from the target with `--cve-evidence FILE.json`.
The file is an array of proofs keyed by exact CVE and target. Each proof must
include this structure, replacing placeholders with observed facts:

```json
[
  {
    "cve": "CVE-2025-33073",
    "target": "192.0.2.10",
    "method": "vendor-version-and-patch-inventory",
    "checked_at": "<UTC timestamp of the inventory>",
    "vendor": "<exact vendor in the official record>",
    "product": "<exact product in the official record>",
    "version": "<observed product/build version>",
    "platform": "<platform if the official record restricts it>",
    "patch_state": "missing",
    "prerequisites_verified": true,
    "advisory_url": "<vendor advisory listed in the official record>",
    "evidence": {
      "product_version": {"source": "inventory.json", "sha256": "<SHA-256 of inventory.json bytes>", "value": "<same observed version>"},
      "patch_inventory": {"source": "inventory.json", "sha256": "<same file digest>", "value": {"complete": true, "installed": [], "missing": ["<applicable vendor patch>"]}},
      "prerequisites": {"source": "inventory.json", "sha256": "<same file digest>", "value": ["<CVE-specific condition verified on this target>"]}
    }
  }
]
```

Each `source` names a local collector export relative to the selected manifest's
directory. An export has `collection_method: "authenticated-inventory"`, the
same `cve`, `target`, `checked_at`, `vendor`, `product`, `platform`, and
`advisory_url` as its proof, plus an `evidence` object mapping the three kinds
to their actual values. For example:

```json
{
  "collection_method": "authenticated-inventory",
  "cve": "CVE-2025-33073",
  "target": "192.0.2.10",
  "checked_at": "<UTC timestamp of collection>",
  "vendor": "<vendor>", "product": "<product>", "platform": "<platform>",
  "advisory_url": "<official advisory URL>",
  "evidence": {
    "product_version": "<observed version>",
    "patch_inventory": {"complete": true, "installed": [], "missing": ["<applicable patch>"]},
    "prerequisites": ["<verified CVE-specific condition>"]
  }
}
```

The operator must select authentic exports from a trusted authenticated
collector, including the applicable vendor patch and prerequisite checks.
The verifier checks their bytes, binding, freshness, complete patch inventory,
and consistency; a file digest by itself does not prove the truth of a capture.
Absolute paths, traversal, and paths outside that directory are rejected.
Imported JSON cannot select an evidence manifest or authorize its own files.

The verifier fetches the official [CVE List](https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5)
record, requires `PUBLISHED`, checks CVE identity, advisory, product, platform,
and affected version range, recomputes SHA-256 over the fetched response bytes,
rejects unexpected redirects, and uses the record's severity. Reserved, rejected,
missing, mismatched, or unverifiable records do not qualify. Inventory and
record verification expire after 24 hours; metadata refreshes at least hourly
when used. Only exact versions and numeric `semver` ranges without status
changes are currently supported; custom/git/Maven ordering stays unverified. The inventory proof
confirms applicability and missing updates; it does not perform exploitation.
Existing historical rows are retained, and legacy `vulnerable=true` flags
without this proof are excluded from current reports.

To revalidate history or a saved report, explicitly supply the current local
manifest again. Missing local files, changed bytes, expired inventory, record
changes, and legacy confirmation schema 1 remain unverified. SQLite table
layouts and existing CLI arguments are preserved; JSON adds `result_table`
and confirmation policy schema 2. Default output remains JSON.

```bash
python -m adpentest --history --cve-evidence evidence/proofs.json
python -m adpentest --run-details RUN_ID --cve-evidence evidence/proofs.json --table
python -m adpentest --report-input prior-report.json --cve-evidence evidence/proofs.json --table --html-report report.html
```

The WebForms dashboard delegates verification to the same Python policy.
Administrators can set absolute `AdPentestPythonPath`,
`AdPentestWorkingDirectory`, and `AdPentestCveEvidencePath` in app settings.
The evidence path is also passed to new scans. Without a configured manifest
or a working verifier, no imported CVE is displayed as confirmed.

### Kerberos tickets and all-results tables

Install the optional cross-platform ticket client with
`python -m pip install -e '.[kerberos]'` from this checkout. `--obtain-tickets` requests a TGT
for the supplied account and normal TGS only for explicit `--ticket-spn`
values. Dry-run lists planned requests. Active requests require
`--scope-confirmed`, the realm/account/KDC, a private output directory, and a
password entered with a secure prompt or read from an explicitly named
environment variable. Passwords are never placed in command arguments.

```bash
python -m adpentest --obtain-tickets --ticket-domain lab.example --ticket-user researcher --ticket-kdc dc.lab.example --ticket-spn cifs/server.lab.example --table
python -m adpentest --obtain-tickets --ticket-domain lab.example --ticket-user researcher --ticket-kdc dc.lab.example --ticket-spn cifs/server.lab.example --ticket-output-dir private-tickets --mode active --scope-confirmed --table
python -m adpentest --ticket-inventory --ticket-cache FILE:private-tickets/example.ccache --table
```

Ticket inventory reads local FILE ccaches, including available and expired
tickets; other cache backends remain explicitly unsupported. Acquisition and
inventory may be combined with `--target` to include metadata in a scan's
JSON, HTML and SQLite tool results. Credential caches are saved separately
with mode 0600 in a 0700 directory on Unix; use a directory restricted to the
account by ACLs on Windows. Reports include client, service, ticket kind,
encryption type, status and expiry, without passwords, keys or ticket bytes.

`--table`, HTML and WebForms show all CVE candidates, SMB configuration
observations, tool outcomes and ticket metadata with their status. Unverified
CVEs have informational severity and do not affect CVE risk or active-CVE
counts. Successful Kerberos authentication does not establish a vulnerability.

## Features

### Core Capabilities

- **One-command AD inventory (v3.5)** — real paged LDAP searches, anonymous blackbox or authenticated read-only enumeration, grouped JSON results and explicit coverage limits
- **Auto DC Detection** — discovers Domain Controllers via DNS SRV records, LDAP RootDSE probes, port fingerprinting, and subnet sweep (legacy scan workflow)
- **Multi-threaded execution** — 16 parallel workers for tool execution, 32 workers for port/DNS/credential tasks (10-15x speedup)
- **35+ AD/SMB/Kerberos/ADCS/Email tools** — cross-platform binary tools + pure Python implementations
- **7 CVE scanners** — automated detection of critical AD vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.5-9.4)
- **WAF detection & bypass** — identifies WAF/CDN vendors and attempts bypass via HTTP spoofing, raw LDAP/Kerberos, TCP fragmentation
- **SQLite scan history** — persistent storage of all scan runs, tool results, and CVE findings
- **Auto-install** — missing tools installed automatically via apt/pip/git
- **Safety** — `dry-run` is the default mode; `--scope-confirmed` required for authorization

### Attack Vectors

| Category | Tools | Description |
|----------|-------|-------------|
| **AD Inventory (v3.5)** | `--ad-inventory` using `ldap3` | Read-only LDAP entry collection with optional anonymous blackbox bind; separate from exploitation |
| **Reconnaissance** | nmap, masscan, enum4linux-ng, rpcdump, bloodhound-python, ldapdomaindump | Network & AD enumeration |
| **SMB** | smbclient, smbmap, crackmapexec, impacket | Null sessions, share enum, signing detection, credential testing |
| **Kerberos** | GetUserSPNs, AS-REP roast, Kerberoast, kerbrute | SPN enum, ticket extraction, user enumeration |
| **ADCS** | certipy (find, shadow, ESC1, ESC3, ESC9) | Certificate template analysis & exploitation |
| **Email** | SMTP/POP3/IMAP enum & auth testing | User discovery, credential testing, Exchange detection |
| **Privilege Escalation** | ACL scanner, GPO abuse, delegation chain, auto privesc | Permission analysis & escalation paths |
| **Persistence** | Golden/silver ticket, DCshadow, skeleton key, DSRM, SID history | Domain persistence techniques |
| **Coercion & Relay** | PetitPotam, PrinterBug, NTLM relay | Authentication coercion attacks |
| **CVE Scanning** | 7 dedicated scanners | Certighost, ResetNightmare, NTLM bypass, RC4, RPC RCE |

---

## Installation

### From PyPI

After publication of the 3.5 release:

```bash
python -m pip install --upgrade "adpentest==3.5"
python -m adpentest --ad-inventory --help
```

For testing a GitHub branch before publication, install that checkout with `python -m pip install -e .`.

### From Source

```bash
git clone https://github.com/netanelcyber/AdPentestAI-Python.git
cd AdPentestAI-Python
pip install -e .
```

### Dependencies

| Package | Version | Purpose |
|---------|---------|---------|
| `httpx` | >= 0.27 | HTTP client for EWS/web enumeration |
| `dnspython` | >= 2.4 | DNS resolution with SRV record support |
| `ldap3` | >= 2.9 | LDAP inventory (read-only), RootDSE and LDAP operations |
| `jinja2` | >= 3.0 | Report templates |
| `SQLAlchemy` | >= 2.0, < 3 | Diagnostic ORM persistence |

Standard library modules used: `smtplib`, `poplib`, `imaplib`, `socket`, `concurrent.futures`, `subprocess`, `sqlite3`, `json`.

---

## Usage

### Basic Scans

```bash
# Dry-run (check tools, detect DCs, preview commands — no actual execution)
adpentest --target 10.0.0.1 --mode dry-run --scope-confirmed

# Active scan with auto DC detection
adpentest --target corp.local --mode active --scope-confirmed

# Custom timeout and no auto-install of missing tools
adpentest --target 192.168.1.10 --mode active --scope-confirmed --timeout 600 --no-auto-install

# Custom DNS servers
adpentest --target corp.local --mode active --scope-confirmed --dns-server 1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8

# Connect via VPN before scanning
adpentest --target 10.10.10.1 --mode active --scope-confirmed --vpn lab.ovpn
```

### Scan History & Reports

```bash
# Show all past scan runs
adpentest --history

# Show last 5 runs
adpentest --history --history-limit 5

# Show all vulnerable CVE findings across all runs
adpentest --cve-report

# Show details for a specific run
adpentest --run-details run-8824073e5124-20260904055457

# Use custom database path
adpentest --history --db-path /path/to/custom.db
```

### HTML Pentest Report Generation

Generate an executive-ready, standalone, and interactive HTML penetration test report (<100KB):

```bash
# Generate report during active scan
adpentest --target corp.local --mode active --scope-confirmed --html-report report.html

# Generate report from an existing JSON output file
python -m adpentest.report_generator scan_results.json report.html
```

- **0.0 - 10.0 Executive Risk Score** with CVSS & severity metrics gauge
- **Interactive Dark / Light mode** toggle & print-optimized layout
- **Target architecture & Domain Controller detection** breakdown
- **Categorized security findings** with remediation advice
- **Collapsible tool execution logs** with timing and duration metrics


### Lab Setup

```bash
# Interactive lab setup orchestrator
adpentest --setup-labs
```

### Output Format

All scan output is JSON:

```json
{
  "status": "completed",
  "run_id": "run-abc123-20260901120000",
  "db_path": "~/.adpentest/scan_history.db",
  "dc_detection": {
    "dc_count": 2,
    "detected_domain": "corp.local",
    "domain_controllers": [...]
  },
  "execution": {
    "result_count": 35,
    "completed": 28,
    "failed": 7
  }
}
```

See [`examples/sample-dry-run-output.json`](examples/sample-dry-run-output.json) for a complete example.

---

## CVE Scanners

The framework includes 7 built-in CVE scanners that run as part of every scan. All scanners are **safe and read-only** — they use port probes, anonymous LDAP queries, and raw protocol checks only.

| CVE | Name | CVSS | Description |
|-----|------|------|-------------|
| CVE-2026-59270 | Spring LDAP | 9.4 | Hardcoded credentials in Spring Security embedded LDAP (UnboundIdContainer) |
| CVE-2026-54121 | Certighost | 8.8 | AD CS enrollment bypass — certificate enrollment for arbitrary computer accounts |
| CVE-2025-54918 | NTLM LDAP Bypass | 8.1 | NTLM authentication bypass on DC LDAP — privilege escalation to SYSTEM |
| CVE-2026-33826 | AD RPC RCE | 8.0 | Windows AD RPC remote code execution via improper input validation |
| CVE-2026-27912 | ResetNightmare | 8.0 | Kerberos kpasswd password reset bypass via UPN collision — full domain takeover |
| CVE-2026-24294 | NTLM Reflection | 7.8 | NTLM reflection via SMB port multiplexing (Server 2025 / Win 11 24H2) |
| CVE-2026-20833 | Kerberos RC4 | 7.5 | KDC accepts RC4-HMAC encryption — enables Kerberoasting attacks |

### What Each Scanner Checks

**CVE-2026-59270** — Attempts LDAP bind with known hardcoded credentials (`uid=admin,ou=system` / `secret`) on ports 389, 636, 53389, 33389, 10389, 8389. Reports exposed entry count.

**CVE-2026-54121** — Queries AD CS Enrollment Services and certificate templates via LDAP. Identifies templates with `ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag or risky enrollment configurations.

**CVE-2025-54918** — Checks if LDAP accepts NTLM/GSS-SPNEGO authentication without enforced signing. Extracts DC functional level and domain context.

**CVE-2026-33826** — Probes RPC endpoint mapper (port 135), confirms AD DC via LDAP, checks for exposed RPC-related ports (135, 593, 445, 139).

**CVE-2026-27912** — Checks if kpasswd (port 464) and Kerberos (port 88) are open. Queries `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota` to assess exploitation feasibility.

**CVE-2026-24294** — Sends SMB2 Negotiate to detect protocol version and signing mode. Checks for alternative SMB ports (8445, 9445, etc.) indicating port multiplexing.

**CVE-2026-20833** — Sends raw Kerberos AS-REQ with RC4 (etype 23), AES256 (etype 18), and AES128 (etype 17) to detect which encryption types the KDC accepts.

---

## WAF Detection & Bypass

When scanning targets behind WAF/CDN services, the framework automatically:

1. **Detects WAF vendor** — checks HTTP headers and body content for signatures of 17+ WAF vendors (Incapsula/Imperva, Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, Azure Front Door, Sucuri, etc.)
2. **Attempts bypass** via 5 technique layers:
   - **HTTP bypass** — header spoofing (X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, CF-Connecting-IP), User-Agent rotation, path obfuscation, verb tampering
   - **Raw LDAP** — BER-encoded LDAPv3 anonymous bind directly to port 389
   - **Raw Kerberos** — AS-REQ with TCP framing to port 88
   - **TCP fragmentation** — 1 byte per TCP segment with TCP_NODELAY
   - **Email/HTTP** — OWA, EWS NTLM handshake, Autodiscover, ActiveSync, MAPI probing

If raw LDAP or Kerberos bypasses the WAF, the framework extracts domain info and adjusts DC detection confidence accordingly.

---

## Scan History Database

All scan data is automatically stored in SQLite at `~/.adpentest/scan_history.db`.

### Database Schema

**`scan_runs`** — One row per scan execution:
- `run_id`, `target`, `mode`, `started_at`, `finished_at`, `status`
- `dc_count`, `live_hosts`, `tools_executed`, `tools_succeeded`, `tools_failed`
- `cves_checked`, `cves_vulnerable`

**`tool_results`** — One row per tool execution:
- `tool`, `host`, `is_dc`, `fqdn`, `status`, `duration_sec`, `output`, `error`

**`cve_findings`** — One row per CVE check:
- `cve_id`, `target`, `cvss`, `severity`, `vulnerable`, `impact`, `details_json`

### Querying Directly

```bash
# Open the database
sqlite3 ~/.adpentest/scan_history.db

# All vulnerable findings
SELECT cve_id, target, cvss, severity, impact FROM cve_findings WHERE vulnerable=1 ORDER BY cvss DESC;

# Scan history summary
SELECT run_id, target, mode, status, tools_executed, cves_vulnerable, started_at FROM scan_runs ORDER BY started_at DESC;

# Tool success rate
SELECT tool, COUNT(*) as runs, SUM(CASE WHEN status='completed' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) as ok FROM tool_results GROUP BY tool ORDER BY runs DESC;
```

---

## DC Detection Strategies

The framework uses a multi-strategy pipeline to discover Domain Controllers:

| Strategy | Method | Confidence |
|----------|--------|------------|
| DNS SRV | Queries `_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domain>` | High (0.9) |
| LDAP RootDSE | Anonymous bind to extract domain/forest info | High (0.9) |
| Port fingerprint | Checks Kerberos (88), LDAP (389/636), GC (3268/3269) | Medium (0.7) |
| Subnet sweep | Kerberos port 88 scan on /24 → /23 → /22 | Medium (0.6) |

When WAF is detected blocking ports, the bypass engine runs automatically. If raw LDAP/Kerberos bypasses succeed, confidence is adjusted to 0.7 ("waf-bypassed"); otherwise 0.1 ("waf-blocked").

---

## Tool Registry

### Available Tools (35+)

**Binary tools:** nmap, masscan, enum4linux-ng, rpcdump, smbclient, bloodhound-python, certipy, ldapdomaindump, kerbrute, crackmapexec, smbmap, impacket (secretsdump, psexec)

**Windows-native:** powershell_ldap_enum, powershell_smb_enum, powershell_ad_recon

**Kerberos:** GetUserSPNs, AS_REP_roast, kerberoast

**ADCS:** certipy_shadow, certipy_esc1, certipy_esc3, certipy_esc9

**Email:** smtp_enum, smtp_auth_test, pop3_auth_test, imap_auth_test, email_server_discovery

**Exploitation:** ntlm_null_session, auto_privesc, golden_ticket, silver_ticket, delegation_abuse, trust_enumeration, trust_abuse, petitpotam, printerbug, ntlm_relay, acl_scanner, acl_exploit, gpo_abuse, delegation_chain, sid_history, dsrm_backdoor, dcshadow, golden_gmsa, skeleton_key

**CVE scanners:** cve_2026_59270, cve_2026_54121, cve_2025_54918, cve_2026_33826, cve_2026_27912, cve_2026_24294, cve_2026_20833

---

### SMB protocol version testing

The built-in `smb_version_test` tool negotiates SMB 2.0.2, 2.1, 3.0, 3.0.2,
and 3.1.1 on TCP 445 and independently checks SMBv1. It uses the current Python
interpreter and is included in the careful active tool set. Dry-run only
previews its command; active execution sends negotiation requests without
authenticating or accessing shares.

The API is also available independently of the full scan workflow:

```python
from adpentest.core import test_smb_versions

result = test_smb_versions("192.0.2.10", timeout=5.0)
```

Existing result keys are retained. Support and security fields use `true` for
an observed positive, `false` for an explicit negative, and `null` when the
probe is inconclusive. Each entry in `dialect_results` retains its negotiation
error and status code. `max_dialect` is the highest successfully observed
dialect; partial failures return `completed-with-errors`. Signing and encryption
fields describe that dialect. Encryption capability does not establish share
encryption enforcement, and SMBv1 support does not confirm a specific CVE.

Wire formats follow Microsoft's [SMB2 NEGOTIATE request](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-smb2/e14db7ff-763a-4263-8b10-0c3944f52fc5)
and [response](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-smb2/63abf97c-0d09-47e2-88d6-6bfa552949a5)
specifications, including SMB 3.1.1 preauthentication and encryption contexts.

## Email Protocol Enumeration

Pure Python email enumeration using standard library (no external dependencies):

- **SMTP VRFY** — discover valid usernames via VRFY command
- **SMTP RCPT TO** — validate recipients via RCPT TO
- **Credential testing** — automatic fallback chain: SMTP → POP3 → IMAP
- **Exchange detection** — OWA, EWS NTLM handshake (extracts domain/DC/forest from NTLM challenge), Autodiscover, ActiveSync, MAPI
- **Parallel testing** — 32 concurrent workers for credential testing

Ports scanned: 25, 465, 587 (SMTP), 110, 995 (POP3), 143, 993 (IMAP).

---

## DNS Configuration

### Priority Order

1. **CLI arguments** (`--dns-server`, `--dns-timeout`) — highest priority
2. **Environment variables** (`DNS_SERVERS`, `DNS_TIMEOUT`)
3. **System default DNS** — auto-detected
4. **Public DNS fallback** — Google (8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4), Cloudflare (1.1.1.1, 1.0.0.1)

```bash
# CLI
adpentest --target corp.local --mode active --scope-confirmed --dns-server 192.168.1.1,8.8.8.8 --dns-timeout 5.0

# Environment
export DNS_SERVERS=192.168.1.1,1.1.1.1
export DNS_TIMEOUT=5.0
adpentest --target corp.local --mode active --scope-confirmed
```

---

## Architecture

### Package architecture

The legacy scanner workflow remains in `adpentest/core.py`. The v3.5 inventory collector is isolated in `adpentest/ad_inventory.py`, reached via the `adpentest` package CLI in `adpentest/__init__.py`; it does not import or execute the legacy tool registry. The package also includes separately routed offline and diagnostic modules.

### Execution Pipeline

The new inventory mode has a smaller, standalone execution path:

```
--ad-inventory --target dc.lab.example --mode active --scope-confirmed
  -> validate scope and TLS settings
  -> bind to selected LDAP server (anonymous or authenticated)
  -> read RootDSE naming contexts
  -> paged read-only searches and object classification
  -> coverage-aware JSON report
```

The existing broader pentest workflow still uses:

```
Input: --target 10.0.0.1 --mode active --scope-confirmed
  │
  ├── Scope validation (dry-run vs active)
  ├── Tool discovery (scan $PATH)
  ├── SQLite run initialization
  │
  ├── DC Detection (multi-strategy)
  │   ├── DNS SRV queries
  │   ├── LDAP RootDSE probe
  │   ├── Port fingerprint (+ WAF detect/bypass)
  │   └── Subnet sweep (/24 → /23 → /22)
  │
  ├── Domain discovery + FQDN resolution
  ├── Email server discovery (MX + port scan)
  │
  ├── Parallel Tool Execution (ThreadPoolExecutor, 16 workers)
  │   ├── AD tools against DCs (prioritized)
  │   ├── CVE scanners against all targets
  │   └── Results → SQLite (tool_results + cve_findings)
  │
  └── Output: JSON + SQLite database
```

### Threading Model

| Pool | Workers | Purpose |
|------|---------|---------|
| Tool execution | 16 | AD diagnostic tools in parallel |
| Port scanning | 32 | Concurrent TCP port checks |
| DNS resolution | 32 | Concurrent DNS queries |
| Credential testing | 32 | SMTP/POP3/IMAP auth testing |

---

## Contributing

Contributions are welcome! See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for setup instructions and [CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) for community guidelines.

Check the [open issues](https://github.com/netanelcyber/AdPentestAI-Python/issues) for tasks labeled `good-first-issue` or `help-wanted`.

### Adding a New CVE Scanner

1. Add scanner function `scan_cve_YYYY_NNNNN(target, timeout)` returning a dict with `cve`, `cvss`, `severity`, `vulnerable`, `impact`, `remediation`
2. Add tool name `cve_YYYY_NNNNN_short_name` to `AD_TOOLS` set
3. Add to `PIP_PACKAGES` (empty list for pure Python)
4. Add to `EXECUTABLES` (python3/python/python.exe)
5. Add `build_ad_command` handler

### Adding a New Tool

1. Add tool name to `AD_TOOLS` set
2. Add package mapping to `PIP_PACKAGES`/`APT_PACKAGES`/`WINGET_PACKAGES`
3. Add executable names to `EXECUTABLES` dict
4. Implement command building in `build_ad_command()`

---

## License

[MIT](LICENSE)

---

**Disclaimer:** This tool is designed for authorized penetration testing and security research only. Users are responsible for obtaining proper authorization before testing any systems. The authors assume no liability for misuse.
