tcp: fix a signed-integer-overflow bug in tcp_add_backlog()

Lu Wei · gregkh · commit 4f23cb2be530 · 2022-11-03T23:57:52.000+09:00
[ Upstream commit ec791d8 ] The type of sk_rcvbuf and sk_sndbuf in struct sock is int, and in tcp_add_backlog(), the variable limit is caculated by adding sk_rcvbuf, sk_sndbuf and 64 * 1024, it may exceed the max value of int and overflow. This patch reduces the limit budget by halving the sndbuf to solve this issue since ACK packets are much smaller than the payload. Fixes: c9c3321 ("tcp: add tcp_add_backlog()") Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1873,11 +1873,13 @@ bool tcp_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	__skb_push(skb, hdrlen);
 
 no_coalesce:
+	limit = (u32)READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf) + (u32)(READ_ONCE(sk->sk_sndbuf) >> 1);
+
 	/* Only socket owner can try to collapse/prune rx queues
 	 * to reduce memory overhead, so add a little headroom here.
 	 * Few sockets backlog are possibly concurrently non empty.
 	 */
-	limit = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf) + READ_ONCE(sk->sk_sndbuf) + 64*1024;
+	limit += 64 * 1024;
 
 	if (unlikely(sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, limit))) {
 		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
