Metadata-Version: 2.4
Name: sbclaude
Version: 0.0.1
Summary: Run Claude Code in a throwaway Docker container.
Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/issues
Project-URL: documentation, https://sbclaude.readthedocs.org
Project-URL: homepage, https://tatsh.github.io/sbclaude/
Project-URL: repository, https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude
Author-email: Andrew Udvare <audvare@gmail.com>
License-Expression: MIT
License-File: LICENSE.txt
Keywords: android,claude,docker,ghidra,reverse engineering,sandbox
Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.14
Classifier: Typing :: Typed
Requires-Python: <4.0,>=3.10
Requires-Dist: bascom>=0.1.3
Requires-Dist: click>=8.4.2
Requires-Dist: docker>=7.2.0
Requires-Dist: platformdirs>=4.11.0
Requires-Dist: tomlkit>=0.15.1
Requires-Dist: typing-extensions>=4.16.0
Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

# sbclaude

<!-- WISWA-GENERATED-README:START -->

[![Python versions](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/sbclaude.svg?color=blue&logo=python&logoColor=white)](https://www.python.org/)
[![PyPI - Version](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/sbclaude)](https://pypi.org/project/sbclaude/)
[![GitHub tag (with filter)](https://img.shields.io/github/v/tag/Tatsh/sbclaude)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/tags)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/github/license/Tatsh/sbclaude)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/blob/master/LICENSE.txt)
[![GitHub commits since latest release (by SemVer including pre-releases)](https://img.shields.io/github/commits-since/Tatsh/sbclaude/v0.0.1/master)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/compare/v0.0.1...master)
[![CodeQL](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/actions/workflows/codeql.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/actions/workflows/codeql.yml)
[![QA](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/actions/workflows/qa.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/actions/workflows/qa.yml)
[![Tests](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/actions/workflows/tests.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/actions/workflows/tests.yml)
[![Coverage Status](https://coveralls.io/repos/github/Tatsh/sbclaude/badge.svg?branch=master)](https://coveralls.io/github/Tatsh/sbclaude?branch=master)
[![Dependabot](https://img.shields.io/badge/Dependabot-enabled-blue?logo=dependabot)](https://github.com/dependabot)
[![Documentation Status](https://readthedocs.org/projects/sbclaude/badge/?version=latest)](https://sbclaude.readthedocs.org/?badge=latest)
[![mypy](https://www.mypy-lang.org/static/mypy_badge.svg)](https://mypy-lang.org/)
[![uv](https://img.shields.io/badge/uv-261230?logo=astral)](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/)
[![pytest](https://img.shields.io/badge/pytest-zz?logo=Pytest&labelColor=black&color=black)](https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/)
[![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
[![Downloads](https://static.pepy.tech/badge/sbclaude/month)](https://pepy.tech/project/sbclaude)
[![Stargazers](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Tatsh/sbclaude?logo=github&style=flat)](https://github.com/Tatsh/sbclaude/stargazers)
[![pre-commit.ci status](https://results.pre-commit.ci/badge/github/Tatsh/sbclaude/master.svg)](https://results.pre-commit.ci/latest/github/Tatsh/sbclaude/master)
[![Prettier](https://img.shields.io/badge/Prettier-black?logo=prettier)](https://prettier.io/)

[![@Tatsh](https://img.shields.io/badge/dynamic/json?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.api.bsky.app%2Fxrpc%2Fapp.bsky.actor.getProfile%2F%3Factor=did%3Aplc%3Auq42idtvuccnmtl57nsucz72&query=%24.followersCount&label=Follow+%40Tatsh&logo=bluesky&style=social)](https://bsky.app/profile/Tatsh.bsky.social)
[![Buy Me A Coffee](https://img.shields.io/badge/Buy%20Me%20a%20Coffee-Tatsh-black?logo=buymeacoffee)](https://buymeacoffee.com/Tatsh)
[![Libera.Chat](https://img.shields.io/badge/Libera.Chat-Tatsh-black?logo=liberadotchat)](irc://irc.libera.chat/Tatsh)
[![Mastodon Follow](https://img.shields.io/mastodon/follow/109370961877277568?domain=hostux.social&style=social)](https://hostux.social/@Tatsh)
[![Patreon](https://img.shields.io/badge/Patreon-Tatsh2-F96854?logo=patreon)](https://www.patreon.com/Tatsh2)

<!-- WISWA-GENERATED-README:STOP -->

`sbclaude` runs **Claude Code** inside a throwaway Docker container with the bash sandbox
and permission prompts **disabled**, against a configurable set of host bind mounts. The
container stores nothing of its own (`--rm`); everything lives on the host. You only ever
invoke `sbclaude` — it manages its own image and containers via the Docker SDK.

There is a single image, `sbclaude`, built on demand. It bundles everyday coding tools
(Debian slim + git, ripgrep, Node 24/Yarn, a C toolchain, gh, glab, uv, jq), formatters and
linters kept at their latest upstream release (clang-format, jsonnet, jsonnetfmt, shellcheck), Qt 6
development (`qt6-base-dev` plus ninja), and a mobile reverse-engineering toolchain (a JDK,
frida, mitmproxy, dex2jar, baksmali/smali, and launchers for the host-mounted Ghidra,
Android SDK, jadx, and apktool).

## How it works

- The `claude` executable is **not installed** in the image. It is a self-contained
  native binary (Node is bundled in), so the host copy is bind-mounted read-only at
  run time — the image always tracks whatever version the host has. (Only glibc ≥ 2.17
  is needed, which is why the base is Debian, not Alpine/musl.)
- Your identity is **mirrored**: `UID/GID/USER/HOME` are passed in and an entrypoint
  recreates that user inside the container. This means:
  - mounted `~/.claude` files (incl. the `0600` `.credentials.json`) are owned correctly;
  - **paths resolve identically** — a host path you paste into a prompt
    (`/home/you/dev/foo`) is bind-mounted at that _same_ absolute path inside the box.
- `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is passed (hence the non-root user — that flag
  refuses root), and a **patched copy** of your `settings.json` is mounted over the
  in-container one with `sandbox.enabled=false`, `skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt=true`
  (no bypass dialog) and `tui="fullscreen"`. **Your real settings file is never modified.**
- The image **auto-builds on first use** and **rebuilds automatically** when the packaged
  Dockerfile/entrypoint change (tracked via a content-hash label).

## Install

```sh
uv tool install .         # or: pipx install .
# the image builds itself on first `sbclaude run`; or pre-build:
sbclaude build
```

## Usage

```sh
sbclaude                          # run claude; cwd is the project (writable)
sbclaude run -p ~/dev/foo         # explicit project dir (writable, becomes workdir)
sbclaude run -r /data -w ~/scratch   # extra read-only / read-write mounts
sbclaude run --re --x11           # Ghidra/Android mounts + GUI passthrough
sbclaude run -- --version         # everything after -- goes to claude
sbclaude ls                       # list running sbclaude containers
sbclaude stop [--all]             # stop this project's boxes (or all with --all)
sbclaude shell                    # root debug shell in this project's box
sbclaude build [--no-cache]       # (re)build the image
sbclaude delete-image             # remove the sbclaude image
sbclaude config                   # show the config file path
```

You can run **several boxes against the same project directory at once**. Each `run` gets a
unique container name — the project name plus a short random suffix — so there is no name
collision; override it with `-n`. `sbclaude ls` lists them all, `sbclaude stop` stops every box
for the current project, and `sbclaude shell` attaches to it (or asks you to pass `-n NAME` when
more than one is running).

### `run` flags

| Flag                | Effect                                                                           |
| ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `--re`              | enable `--ghidra` + `--android` together                                         |
| `--ghidra`          | mount host Ghidra (`/usr/share/ghidra`) read-only                                |
| `--android`         | mount Android SDK + `~/.android` + `/dev/kvm` (adb/emulator)                     |
| `--usb`             | expose `/dev/bus/usb` for adb over USB                                           |
| `--ios`             | mount the host `usbmuxd` socket so frida reaches an iOS device over USB          |
| `--x11`             | forward `DISPLAY` + `XAUTHORITY` for GUI apps (Ghidra GUI, jadx-gui, emulator)   |
| `--ssh`             | mount the host `~/.ssh` read-only and forward the ssh-agent, for SSH git remotes |
| `--gpg`             | mount the host GnuPG home + agent socket for signing commits                     |
| `--session-recover` | install `cc-session-recover` (auto-resume) into the project on start             |
| `--net bridge`      | isolate the box's network (default is `host` — `localhost` = your host)          |
| `-r/-w/-p/-n/-i`    | extra ro/rw mount, project, container name, image override                       |

## Configuration

All options live under a `[tool.sbclaude]` table. They are read from the global file at
`~/.config/sbclaude/config.toml` (path from `platformdirs`) and, for `run`, overlaid with the
target project's `pyproject.toml` `[tool.sbclaude]` table — project values win, so a repo can
pin its own defaults. All keys optional:

```toml
[tool.sbclaude]
gpg = true       # mount the GnuPG home + agent for signing
network = "host" # default; "bridge" to isolate the box's network
re = true        # enable the Ghidra + Android mounts together
ssh = true       # mount ~/.ssh read-only + forward the ssh-agent for SSH git remotes
x11 = true       # forward X11 for GUI apps
# image = "custom:latest"         # force a different image
# debian_mirror = "http://ftp.us.debian.org/debian" # apt mirror for image builds
# memory = "8g"                   # override the auto host-RAM cap ("0" disables)
# cpus = "4"                      # cap CPUs (uncapped by default)
# recover = true                  # install cc-session-recover into every project (off by default)
pass_env = ["AWS_REGION"]                          # forward host vars (AWS_PROFILE is default)
ro = ["~/dev*", "~/ghidra_scripts", "~/Downloads"] # read-only mounts (globs + ~ ok)
rw = []                                            # the project dir is always rw automatically

[tool.sbclaude.env] # inject fixed vars (e.g. Amazon Bedrock)
CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK = "1"
```

The toggle keys `re`, `ghidra`, `android`, `usb`, `ios`, `x11`, `ssh`, and `gpg` mirror the
matching `run` flags and default to `false`; setting one is the same as always passing that
flag.

**Debian mirror** — when `deb.debian.org` is slow, point image builds at a faster archive
mirror with `debian_mirror` (or `--debian-mirror` on `build`/`run`). Only the image's main
archive URI is rewritten; `debian-security` keeps pointing at `deb.debian.org`.

`ro`/`rw` accept **globs** (`~/dev*` → every matching dir) and `~`; non-matching or
missing paths are dropped. Every path is mounted at its real absolute path, so a host
path you paste into a prompt resolves inside the box. The project (cwd or `-p`) is always
read-write and overlays any read-only parent (e.g. `~/dev` ro + `~/dev/proj` rw → `proj`
is writable).

**Environment variables** — inject with the `[tool.sbclaude.env]` table, forward host values
by name with `pass_env`, or per-run with `-e KEY=VALUE` (precedence: managed defaults <
`[tool.sbclaude.env]` < `pass_env` < `-e`). `AWS_PROFILE` is forwarded by default. This is how
you point the box at a different backend such as **Amazon Bedrock**
(`CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK=1` + your `AWS_*` vars; mount `~/.aws` via `ro` if you use
profiles).

**uv project environment** — by default the box sets `UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT` to a
container-local path (`/tmp/sbclaude-uv-<project>`), so `uv sync`/`uv run` build the
virtualenv there instead of writing `.venv` into your bind-mounted project. A host-built
`.venv` hard-codes the host interpreter path and would not resolve in the box anyway; the
container is throwaway, so the redirected env is rebuilt per run. Override it by setting
your own `UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT` (via `[env]` or `-e`), or disable the behaviour entirely
with `manage_uv_env = false`. There is no clean equivalent for Node — `node_modules` is
fixed to the package root by Node's resolver (only Yarn Berry's `YARN_NODE_LINKER=pnp`
removes it, at the cost of changing module resolution), and `node_modules` built on the
box's Linux is usually reusable on a Linux host anyway, so it is left untouched.

**Alternate config dir** — if `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` is set on the host, sbclaude mounts that
directory (its `.claude.json`, `settings.json`, history) and points claude at it inside the
box instead of `~/.claude`.

## Session recovery

[cc-session-recover](https://github.com/softcane/cc-session-recover) lets Claude Code pick a
long-running task back up after a quota or rate-limit pause. It is **off by default** — enable
it per run with `--session-recover`, or for every run with `recover = true` in the config. When
enabled, the container entrypoint runs the tool's `install-into-project.sh` against the project
before launching claude, which sets up its `SessionStart` and `Stop` hooks and a `HANDOFF.md`.

The tool is **vendored into the image as a git clone** (not the npm package) at
`/opt/cc-session-recover`, with [PR #2](https://github.com/softcane/cc-session-recover/pull/2)
(safer watcher argument handling and the opt-in `CC_REMIND_MODE` prompt-injection limit) applied
on top. Two further patches keep the installer tidy: it no longer copies `settings.example.json`
into the project, and its own `.gitignore` handling is disabled. The installer writes into the
project's `.claude/` (hooks and `settings.local.json`, merged with `jq`) and a `HANDOFF.md`;
because the project is bind-mounted read-write, **those files land in your real repository and
persist**, which is why this is opt-in. Afterwards the entrypoint appends the recovery artifacts
(`HANDOFF.md`, `auto-continue.md`, `session-recover.js`, `session-recover.yaml`,
`standing-instructions.md`, `statusline-quota-cache.sh`, and the three hook scripts) to the
project's `.gitignore`, each only when absent. If the install
fails, the box aborts rather than starting a session that silently lacks recovery.

## MCP servers

MCP server configs live in your mounted `~/.claude.json`, so they carry into the box — but
the server **command must be runnable inside the container**. A host Python _venv_ won't
work: its `bin/python` symlinks to a host-only interpreter (e.g. `/usr/bin/python3.13`),
which doesn't exist in the box → `ENOENT`. The image ships **Python 3 in a virtualenv at
`/opt/venv` (with the `mcp` SDK and `pre-commit` pre-installed) and `uv`**, so point the
command at one of:

- `uv run /abs/path/to/server.py` — best: reads the script's PEP 723 deps, works on the
  host too. Example: `claude mcp add ghidra -- uv run ~/dev/ghidra-mcp/bridge_mcp_ghidra.py`.
- `/opt/venv/bin/python3 /abs/path/to/server.py` — the container's venv Python (has `mcp`
  pre-installed); container-only. `/opt/venv/bin` is first on `PATH`, so a bare `python3`
  resolves here too.

A server that talks to a process on the host (e.g. a Ghidra GUI on `localhost`) works out
of the box because the box defaults to host networking; pass `--net bridge` only if you
want to isolate it.

## Git over SSH and commit signing

Pushing over SSH and signing commits need the host's private keys, which are **not** mounted
by default (the box is a fully-autonomous, no-prompt agent — see [Hardening](#hardening)).
Opt in per run, or globally with `ssh = true` and `gpg = true` under `[tool.sbclaude]`:

- `--ssh` bind-mounts `~/.ssh` **read-only**, so SSH remotes authenticate with the host's
  keys and `known_hosts`. Read-only means newly-learnt host keys are not written back. It also
  forwards the host's **ssh-agent**: `$SSH_AUTH_SOCK` is bind-mounted at its own path and set
  in the box, so keys that are passphrase-protected or held in a hardware token still work —
  the host agent does the signing and the secret never enters the container. Without this a
  box holding only encrypted key files would stall on a passphrase prompt nothing can answer.
  Symlinks inside `~/.ssh` are followed too: a `config` (or key) linked into a dotfiles
  repository has its target mounted read-only at the same path, so the link does not dangle
  and every `Host` alias keeps working.
- `--gpg` bind-mounts the host **GnuPG home** (read-write — `gpg` needs to write lock files
  and the trustdb) and overlays the host's live **gpg-agent socket** at `~/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent`.
  The host agent performs the signing and owns the secret keys, so a cached passphrase carries
  over and any pinentry prompt appears on the host. The image ships `gnupg` and
  `openssh-client`; your mounted `~/.gitconfig` (with `user.signingkey`/`commit.gpgsign`) does
  the rest.

```sh
sbclaude run --ssh --gpg -p ~/dev/foo   # inside: git push, git commit -S both work
```

Your `~/.gitconfig` is always mounted read-only, along with every file it pulls in via an
`[include] path = ...` directive (resolved with `git config --includes`), so a split config
carries into the box intact.

## RE toolchain (`--re`)

Mounted from the host (your exact versions): **Ghidra** (`analyzeHeadless`, `ghidraRun`),
**Android SDK** (`adb`, `emulator`, `sdkmanager`, `avdmanager`), **jadx**, **apktool**,
plus `~/.android` (adb keys + AVDs) and `/dev/kvm` for emulator acceleration.

Installed in the image: **Temurin JDK 21** (Ghidra 12 needs it), **build-essential** +
binutils, **frida** + frida-tools (pinned to the host version), **mitmproxy**,
**dex2jar**, **baksmali/smali**, CLI **audio tools** (ffmpeg, sox, flac, vorbis-tools,
opus-tools, lame, mpg123, wavpack, shntool, plus **vgmstream-cli** for game audio), CLI
**image tools** (ImageMagick, zbar, **deark**, **pngdefry** for `-iphone` PNGs),
**czkawka-cli** (duplicate/similar finder), and the X11/GL/audio libs the mounted GUI
binaries need.

```sh
sbclaude run --re --x11 -p ~/dev/some-apk-re
#   inside: jadx -d work/jadx-out base/classes*.dex
#           apktool d base -o work/axml-decoded
#           analyzeHeadless ~/dev/x-re proj -import lib/arm64-v8a/foo.so
#           adb devices ; emulator -avd ford-x86_64-api35 -writable-system &
#           frida -U -f com.x.y -l hook.js
```

`--x11` mounts `/tmp/.X11-unix` + your session xauth cookie and sets `DISPLAY`/
`XAUTHORITY`. Java/Swing (Ghidra) renders through XWayland (`:0`). If a GUI fails with a
cookie error, run on the host: `xhost +SI:localuser:$USER`.

`--ios` targets an **iOS** device attached to the host. The host runs `usbmuxd` (it owns
the USB device), and frida's usbmux backend reaches the device through that daemon's
socket — so instead of claiming raw USB (which would clash with the host `usbmuxd`),
`--ios` bind-mounts `/var/run/usbmuxd` plus the host's `/var/lib/lockdown` pairing
records. Combine with `--re` so frida is present:

```sh
sbclaude run --re --ios -p ~/dev/some-ios-re
#   inside: frida-ls-devices            # the host's device shows up over usbmux
#           frida -U -f com.x.y -l hook.js
```

The host needs `usbmuxd` running and the device already paired (trusted). If frida sees
no device, confirm `idevice_id -l` works on the host first.

## Hardening

This deliberately removes Claude's _own_ sandbox and permission prompts, so the box leans
on Docker for confinement instead. Every run is hardened by default (defense-in-depth —
it limits blast radius, it is not a guarantee):

- **Build time:** minimal Debian slim, `--no-install-recommends` + cleaned apt lists, no
  secrets baked in (the `claude` binary and all auth are bind-mounted), OCI provenance
  labels, and **all setuid/setgid bits stripped** from the image.
- **Run time:** `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, `--cap-drop ALL` plus only the six
  caps the root entrypoint needs to create the mapped user, drop to it via gosu, and let
  `tini` (PID 1) forward signals such as `SIGWINCH` to the non-root child
  (`CHOWN`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`, `FOWNER`, `KILL`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`), a `--pids-limit`, a non-root
  mapped user, and the default seccomp/AppArmor profiles (never disabled). The claude
  process itself ends up with an **empty effective capability set**.
- **Can't lock the host:** `--pids-limit` stops fork bombs, and `--memory` with an equal
  `--memory-swap` bounds RAM with no extra swap, so a runaway box is OOM-killed instead of
  thrashing the host into a freeze. The default cap is derived from host RAM (reserving the
  larger of 2 GiB or an eighth for the host); set `memory` to override or `"0"` to disable,
  and `cpus` to cap CPU (uncapped by default — saturation slows but does not lock). These
  are enforced by **cgroups**, i.e. the systemd cgroup driver on a systemd host — a separate
  `systemd-run` wrapper is unnecessary (and would not bound the container, which runs under
  the Docker daemon's cgroup, not the CLI's).

Disable per run with `--no-harden`, globally with `harden = false` in config (this also
drops the resource caps), and add your own Docker flags (e.g. `--read-only`) via
`docker_args = [...]`.

Still: the containerized Claude can run any command and read/write every mounted path
without asking, with unrestricted network. Keep writable mounts minimal (the config
defaults to read-only for everything but the project) and don't mount secrets you don't
want a fully-autonomous agent to touch. This is why `--ssh` and `--gpg` are opt-in: they
expose your private SSH and GPG key material (the GnuPG home read-write) to that agent.
Forwarding an agent socket does not hand over the secret itself, but it does let the box ask
the host agent to sign with any key it holds, for as long as the box runs.
