Sabline 8.7.1

EchoLeak, replayed in Sabline

EchoLeak, CVE-2025-32711, 2025-06-11. Also called CVE-2025-32711, the zero-click Microsoft 365 Copilot leak. (The name in use.) Verdict: OUT OF SCOPE - prompt injection where no code ran - listed so the boundary is visible, not counted as a gap.

Note

This is the shape of the attack, not a claim that Sabline would have prevented the real event. The real one happened in a language, a package manager, a build system or an agent framework that Sabline neither runs nor bounds. What this page shows is narrower and checkable: the same shape written in Sabline, the command, what the runtime printed, and the one line of budget that did the work - or, where nothing here addresses the shape, that.

What happened #

Aim Labs reported a zero-click vulnerability in Microsoft 365 Copilot, assigned CVE-2025-32711 with a CVSS score of 9.3. An email worded to read as a normal request to the recipient (bypassing Microsoft's XPIA classifier), needing no action from the victim, was pulled in by Copilot's retrieval when the user later asked Copilot a question; its hidden instructions made Copilot put sensitive data from the user's context into an image link, fetched automatically through a Microsoft Teams URL allowed by the content security policy, sending the data to the attacker's server. The researchers call the underlying pattern an "LLM scope violation". Microsoft fixed it server-side and states there was no exploitation in the wild.

Sources #

The entry, its program and its recorded run are in incidents/echoleak-m365-copilot/. Every incident, with its verdict, is in the catalogue.