



LINUX
SECURITY
SUMMIT

CVEhound

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What?

- [CVEhound tool](#) to detect absence of patches in the kernel sources
 - Project started in December 2020
 - GPLv3 for python code, GPLv2 for CVE detection rules
- Doesn't look at kernel version
- Doesn't require .git
- Doesn't need build information

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- 223 CVEs described
- Filters
 - CONFIG_ options
 - .config analysis based on [undertaker project](#)
 - Files, subdirectories
 - CWE, exploit status, ...

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 - .config analysis based on [undertaker project](#)
 - Files, subdirectories
 - CWE, exploit status, ...
- CVE metadata from [linuxkernelcves.com](#)
- Reports generation for CI

Why?

Context

- Kernel vulnerabilities
 - > 3000 CVE records on [MITRE](#) and [NIST](#)
 - > 1800 CVE records on [linuxkernelcves.com](#)
 - > 700 CVE records and ~50 BDU records on [FSTEC BDU](#) (since 2014)
 - > 1400 [DWF/UVI](#) records (since 2021)
 - ...

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 - 4.4, 4.9, 4.19, 5.4, 5.10, 5.14
- Distributions
 - 3.10, 4.1, 4.18, 4.15, 5.3 ...
- Embedded devices, mobile phones,...

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 - 17452 CONFIG_ options in v5.14

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Tool use cases

- Certification Lab/Pentest Lab
 - Check all CVEs fixed for certification
 - Find unfixed CVEs to further check how they are mitigated with hardening options
- Users/System Administrators
 - Check kernels when you can't update it
 - Check sources before enabling kernel options
- Kernel developers
 - another tool to check yourself (reverts, wrong backports, early versions of patches)

How?

- [Detection rules](#)
 - [Coccinelle](#) patterns

```
// $ spatch rule.cocci .  
@@  
expression E;  
@@  
  
* copy_from_user(E, ...)  
  ... when != E  
* \(\strncmp\|strcmp\)(..., E, ...)
```

How?

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```
// drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_cdev.c
ret = copy_from_user(cmd, buf, len);
if (ret)
    return -EFAULT;

if (!strncmp(cmd, "start", len)) {
    if (rproc->state == RPROC_RUNNING ||
        rproc->state == RPROC_ATTACHED)
        return -EBUSY;
```

```
// net/core/pktgen.c
if (copy_from_user(f, &user_buffer[i], len))
    return -EFAULT;
i += len;

if (strcmp(f, "start_xmit") == 0) {
    pkt_dev->xmit_mode = M_START_XMIT;
} else if (strcmp(f, "netif_receive") == 0) {
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```
// drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
if (copy_from_user(new_ifname, wrqu->data.pointer, IFNAMSIZ))
    return -EFAULT;

if (0 == strcmp(rereg_priv->old_ifname, new_ifname))
    return ret;
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Generic

```
// $ spatch rule.cocci .
@@
expression E;
@@
pktgen_if_write(...)
{
    ... when any
    * copy_from_user(E, ...)
    ... when != E
    * strcmp(E, "start_xmit", ...)
    ...
}
```


How?

- [Detection rules](#)
 - [Coccinelle](#) patterns
- **Stats**
 - since December 2020
 - 42 days with new rules
 - ~5 rules a day
 - only 8 days with ≥ 10 rules

NUMBER OF CVE-YYYY RULES



RULES PER DAY




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 - Detects between [fixes, fix) commits
 - Not detects on v2.6.12-rc2, fixes^, master, stable/linux-d.dd.y, next/master

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
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- **Testing**
 - Detects between [fixes, fix) commits
 - Not detects on v2.6.12-rc2, fixes^, master, stable/linux-d.dd.y, next/master
- **How to write a rule**
 1. Find fix commit
 2. [Find fixes commit \(only for testing\)](#)
 3. Draft the rule (5-30 mins)
 4. Test the rule (7-20 mins)
 5. Refine the rule (repeat to 4)

NUMBER OF CVE-YYYY RULES



RULES PER DAY



Rule patterns (removed, added)

CVE-2020-28097

```
@err exists@
position p;
@@

vgacon_scrollback_init@p(...)
{
    ... when any
    CONFIG_VGACON_SOFT_SCROLLBACK_SIZE
    ... when any
}

@script:python@
p << err.p;
@@
cocclib.report.print_report(p[0],
    'ERROR: CVE-2020-28097')
```

CVE-2020-26088

```
@err exists@
identifier sock;
position p;
@@

rawsock_create(...)
{
    ... when != if (!\ (ns_capable\|capable\
        (... , CAP_NET_RAW)) return -EPERM;
    sock->ops =@p &rawsock_raw_ops;
    ...
}

@script:python@
p << err.p;
@@
cocclib.report.print_report(p[0],
    "ERROR: CVE-2020-26088")
```

Rule patterns (added alt., changed)

CVE-2020-27068

```
@enum_status_code@
@@
enum n180211_attrs {
    ...,
    NL80211_ATTR_STATUS_CODE,
    ...
};
@fix@
@@
struct nla_policy n180211_policy[...] = {
    ...,
    [NL80211_ATTR_STATUS_CODE] = { ... },
    ...
};
@err depends on enum_status_code && !fix@
position p;
@@
struct nla_policy n180211_policy@p[...] = { ... };
```

CVE-2020-12912

```
@err@
position p;
@@

amd_energy_is_visible(...)
{
    return 0444;@p
}
```

Rule patterns (fix != bug)

CVE-2020-28941

```
@close exists@
@@
spk_ttyio_ldisc_close(...) {
    ...
    kfree(speakup_tty->disc_data);
    ...
}
@err depends on close exists@
@@
spk_ttyio_ldisc_open(...) {
    ... when != mutex_lock(...);
    speakup_tty = tty;
    ...
    speakup_tty->disc_data = ldisc_data;
    ... when != mutex_unlock(...);
}
```

CVE-2018-20855

```
@struct_fields@
@@
struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp {
    __u32 bfreg_index;
    ...
    __u32 reserved;
    ...
};
@err depends on struct_fields exists@
@@
create_qp_common(...) {
    ...
    struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp;
    ... when != memset(&resp, 0, ...)
    create_user_qp(..., &resp, ...)
    ...
}
```

Rule patterns (non-C Id, .S)

CVE-2021-3411

```
@initialize:python@
@@
int3 = False
with open(vmlinux_lds, 'rt') as f:
    if re.search(':text\s*=\s*\0xcccc', f.read()):
        int3 = True
@err exists@
expression E;
@@
can_optimize(...) {
    ...
    if (E.opcode.bytes[0] ==
    \{INT3_INSN_OPCODE\|BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION\})
        return 0;
    ...
}
@script:python@
p << err.p;
@@
if int3:
    coccilib.report.print_report(p[0], 'ERROR: CVE-2021-3411')
```

CVE-2017-1000255

```
// Fallback mode with regular expressions.
// grep -rePoz <regex1> && grep -rePoz <regex2>

tm_enabled\((struct\s+task_struct\s+\*[w]+\)\s+\{

EXC_COMMON_BEGIN\((program_check_common\)\s+EXCEPTIO
N_PROLOG_COMMON\(\0x700,\s+PACA_EXGEN\)
```

Future Work

- KernelCI integration
- Support #ifdefs
 - More precise CONFIG_* analysis
- Add option to check only specific drivers enabled by CONFIG_* option
- Lightweight mode based on .git analysis
 - Check for Fixes and Fix commits
 - Based on commits titles and commits metadata
 - Reverts, multiple commits fixing one CVE, ...
 - Useful primarily for kernel developers
- Infer detection rules from commits



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SUMMIT

Just patch/patch -R!

- Old kernels?
 - Let's try LTS patches
- What it means if a patch doesn't apply/revert?
 - Already patched kernel with new changes on top of it?
 - Old non-vulnerable kernel?
 - There is no suitable backport of a patch to test?
 - Multiple patches fixing one CVE?
- What it means if a patch applies?
 - Fix != Error
 - Check patches that introduce errors?
- ...