The agent gets a preview
A send, reply or delete returns the preview and an inert request id. The agent cannot turn that id into an action.
request req_7f3a · inertSecurity
GigaMail hands an AI agent access to a mailbox. This page lists every protection that is in place today, the limits we know about, and what we plan to build next. It grows with each release.
An agent can ask to send a message. It never receives anything it could use to approve its own request.
A send, reply or delete returns the preview and an inert request id. The agent cannot turn that id into an action.
request req_7f3a · inertConsole, command line, Telegram or a Windows notification, confirmed with Windows Hello or Touch ID.
Held · awaiting approvalThe arguments you reviewed, never a replacement. Every write lands in an append-only action log.
Approved by you · sentTen tools wait behind this gate: sending and replying, moving and deleting messages, deleting folders, creating and deleting calendar events, creating Zoom meetings, uploading and deleting Drive files. The MCP map lists all 31 tools with their risk class.
An approved request runs with the account, recipients, folder and attachments frozen when it was created. Attachments are bound to their SHA-256 and size: a file swapped on disk after your approval stops the send.
If the approval store cannot be read, nothing runs: the answer is a named refusal, not an error someone might later silence. On a machine with no way to verify a person, approval is refused rather than replaced by a yes/no question.
| Channel | How it works | How strong |
|---|---|---|
| Windows Hello / Touch ID | Asked at every approval, on the device. A program can open the prompt; only the person at the machine can satisfy it. On by default on Windows and macOS. | STRONGEST |
| Local PIN on Linux | Typed in an interactive terminal, stored only as a hash, locked for 15 minutes after 3 wrong attempts. An agent running the command from a script gets no prompt. | WEAKER |
| Telegram | Opt-in. A tap from the chat you registered behind the OS prompt. It works from any device signed into your Telegram account, including a desktop client left open. | WEAKEST |
Rejecting never needs any of these: saying no is always safe. If you enable Telegram approval, do not keep Telegram signed in on the machine the agent uses.
The one way a mail leaves without a click: a rule you create in the app, for senders and documents you choose. Semi-auto still asks each time; auto runs inside the scope you signed.
A rule is created and resumed only behind Windows Hello or Touch ID, from the app or the command line. No MCP tool can create or change a rule, so a mail cannot switch on autopilot. Pausing needs no prompt.
Specific senders or one folder, only the documents attached to the rule, a daily cap, a pause between replies to the same sender, and a mandatory expiry. Never “everything”.
Recipient, subject and thread come from the incoming message. The reply goes to the sender that matched the rule, never to an address written in the mail or in the draft.
No automatic reply to mail that fails sender authentication (DMARC), to automatic mail, mailing lists, no-reply senders, spam, or mail with executable or archive attachments. The first message from a new sender goes through you. A burst of matches pauses the rule.
Every automatic send is written to the action log with the rule that let it through, and you get the same notification as for an approval.
Index, archive, credentials, memory and configuration live on your machine. GigaMail runs no servers and receives nothing. What the agent reads is handled by that agent, under its provider's policy.
Accounts are added by you, in the app or in your own shell. There is no tool an agent could use to add an account or read a password, a token or a key.
Every tool names the account it works on. An agent asking for one mailbox cannot read or write another.
The agent can quote only the documents you added as knowledge files. Paths outside that list are refused, links and shortcuts included.
The masker replaces tax codes, VAT numbers, IBANs and phone numbers before a mail goes to the agent for a draft, and puts them back in the draft. Rules and checksums, no AI. The same filter for MCP agents is planned.
Message content is treated as untrusted data. An instruction hidden in a mail cannot add an account, read a secret or approve a send.
Text a person cannot see (hidden blocks, zero-size fonts, white on white, invisible characters) is left out and flagged. The agent gets the visible text, never the raw HTML. A mail that cannot be checked is withheld, not guessed.
An executable attachment is not downloaded for an agent, is marked with a warning, and is replaced by a note in the archive. The desktop app never opens one; you can still save it yourself.
Text written by an agent is shown without loading images or previews, in the app and on Telegram. A link that carries data cannot be fetched without a click.
Anti-injection tests run on every change, and a red-team run feeds hostile emails to a real agent with every tool enabled, behind a guard that records destructive actions instead of running them.
Every message passes through one sanitizer and is shown in a sandbox where no script runs. Links open only as web or mail addresses.
The app talks only to its own backend on your machine, with a random token per installation.
Built from the tagged source. Windows installer and app are signed; the macOS app is signed and notarized. Linux packages are not signed. SHA-256 digests are on the release page.
Mail server certificates are checked by default. A server with a self-signed certificate is accepted only for the account where you allowed it, behind Windows Hello or Touch ID.
| What | Why | Status |
|---|---|---|
| The masker for MCP agents | Today sensitive fields are hidden only when the desktop app asks the agent for a draft. The same filter will apply to agents connected over MCP. | PLANNED |
| Telegram approval from the phone only | Today a tap from any signed-in Telegram client approves. Approval will move to a Telegram Mini App that asks for the phone's biometrics, so desktop and web clients cannot approve. | PLANNED |
| Stricter hidden-text reading | Inherited styles, more colour forms and font sizes, and complex style rules that can only hide text. | NEXT RELEASE |
| Release | What was wrong | What changed |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.1 | The mail server's certificate was not verified on IMAP connections. | Certificate and host name are verified by default; a rejected certificate stops the connection. |
| 0.4.0 | An approved attachment could be swapped on disk before sending. | Attachments are bound to their SHA-256 and size; a mismatch stops the send. |
| 0.1.4 | An agent with a shell could run the approval command itself. | Approving requires Windows Hello or Touch ID, from every path. |
| 0.1.1 | The agent received a confirmation token and could approve its own request. | Approval moved outside the agent's reach; it receives only an inert request id. |
Some of these were reported by people reading the code. They are credited in the full security policy.
Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting, or write to founder@adecubed.com with “GigaMail security” in the subject. You get an acknowledgement within 72 hours and an assessment within 7 days. There is no bounty programme: there is a public thank-you in the release notes, unless you prefer to stay anonymous.