Metadata-Version: 2.4
Name: avow
Version: 0.2.0
Summary: The trust kernel: one signed, offline-verifiable receipt envelope (avow) with a scoring face (assay) and an effect-gate face (writ).
Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/hseshadr/assay
Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/hseshadr/assay
Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/hseshadr/assay/issues
Author-email: Harish Seshadri <harish.seshadri@gmail.com>
License: MIT
License-File: LICENSE
Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
Classifier: Topic :: Scientific/Engineering :: Artificial Intelligence
Requires-Python: >=3.13
Requires-Dist: pydantic-settings>=2.11
Requires-Dist: pydantic>=2.11
Requires-Dist: pynacl>=1.6
Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4
Provides-Extra: assay
Requires-Dist: numpy>=2.5; extra == 'assay'
Requires-Dist: scikit-learn>=1.9; extra == 'assay'
Requires-Dist: scipy>=1.18; extra == 'assay'
Provides-Extra: cli
Requires-Dist: numpy>=2.5; extra == 'cli'
Requires-Dist: scikit-learn>=1.9; extra == 'cli'
Requires-Dist: scipy>=1.18; extra == 'cli'
Requires-Dist: typer>=0.27; extra == 'cli'
Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

# avow

**Proof of what your software decided — a receipt that is tamper-evident: edit it and it stops verifying.**

---

Your card gets declined at a checkout.

You call the bank and ask why. Someone reads a reason off a screen: the fraud system
scored the transaction as risky, so it blocked it.

But that reason is just a row in a database. Rows can be changed. Nobody — not you, not
the bank's own auditor, not a regulator — can tell whether that number is what the
software actually produced at the moment it blocked your card, or whether somebody
adjusted it afterwards, once you complained.

That is the gap `avow` closes.

## What it does

When your software makes a decision, avow has it write a **receipt**: a small record of
exactly what was decided, sealed with cryptography at the moment of the decision.

Think of a store receipt — except this one cannot be reprinted or altered. You can hand
it to anyone. They can check it on their own laptop, offline, with no access to your
database, and get one of two answers:

- **valid** — this is exactly what the software decided, byte for byte
- **invalid** — someone changed it

There is no "close enough". Change one digit anywhere in it and the check fails.

## Before you install

Two things that will otherwise trip you up:

- **Python 3.13 or newer is required.** On 3.12 or older `pip install avow` fails while
  resolving, with a message that does not mention the Python version. Check with
  `python --version` first.
- **The package is `avow`; the command is `assay`.** You `pip install avow` and
  `import avow`, but the command line the CLI extra installs is called `assay`. There is
  no `avow` command. (`avow` is the envelope everything is built on; `assay` is the
  scoring face that ships the CLI.)

## See it catch a tampered record

```bash
python --version   # must be 3.13+
pip install avow
```

```python
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict

from avow import generate_signing_key, public_key_hex, sign_payload, verify_signature


class FraudCheck(BaseModel):
    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True, extra="forbid")
    transaction_id: str
    decision: str
    risk_score: float
    model_version: str


key = generate_signing_key()        # the bank's private signing key
trusted_key = public_key_hex(key)   # published once; this is what checkers pin

receipt = sign_payload(
    FraudCheck(
        transaction_id="txn-9471",
        decision="blocked",
        risk_score=0.83,
        model_version="fraud-v4",
    ),
    key,
)

verify_signature(receipt, expected_public_key=trusted_key)
print("original receipt ..... VALID")

# Someone edits the stored record to make the block look better justified.
tampered = receipt.model_copy(
    update={"payload": receipt.payload.model_copy(update={"risk_score": 0.99})}
)

try:
    verify_signature(tampered, expected_public_key=trusted_key)
    print("edited receipt ....... VALID  <- this must never happen")
except Exception as exc:
    print(f"edited receipt ....... REJECTED ({type(exc).__name__})")
```

```
original receipt ..... VALID
edited receipt ....... REJECTED (ReplayMismatch)
```

Nudging `0.83` to `0.99` — a change that would be invisible in a database — makes the
receipt fail to verify. That is the whole idea.

## What a receipt proves, and what it does not

This is the part most signing libraries gloss over, so read it before you rely on avow.

A receipt proves **integrity**: the contents have not changed since they were signed.

It does **not**, on its own, prove **authenticity** — that *your* system is the one that
signed it.

Here is why, concretely. The signer's public key travels inside the receipt, but
*outside* the portion that is actually signed. So an attacker can write any payload they
like, sign it with a key they generated themselves, and drop their own public key into
the receipt. That forgery is internally consistent: its hash and its signature agree with
each other perfectly.

The only thing that stops it is **pinning** — deciding in advance which public key you
trust, obtaining it through a separate channel (the `.pub` file from `keygen`, your
config, your secret manager), and passing that key to the verifier:

```python
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict

from avow import generate_signing_key, public_key_hex, sign_payload, verify_signature


class FraudCheck(BaseModel):
    model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True, extra="forbid")
    transaction_id: str
    decision: str
    risk_score: float
    model_version: str


bank = generate_signing_key()
trusted_key = public_key_hex(bank)      # what you pin, out-of-band

attacker = generate_signing_key()       # a key anyone can make in one line
forged = sign_payload(
    FraudCheck(
        transaction_id="txn-9471",
        decision="approved",            # a total fabrication
        risk_score=0.01,
        model_version="fraud-v4",
    ),
    attacker,
)

# The forgery is internally consistent: its hash and signature agree with each other.
print(f"forged receipt is self-consistent: {forged.payload_hash[:16]}... signed OK by attacker")

try:
    verify_signature(forged, expected_public_key=trusted_key)
    print("forged receipt ....... VALID  <- this must never happen")
except Exception as exc:
    print(f"forged receipt ....... REJECTED ({type(exc).__name__}: {exc.code})")

# The ONLY reason it was rejected is that we pinned the bank's key.
print(f"key inside forgery matches bank? {forged.public_key == trusted_key}")
```

```
forged receipt is self-consistent: sha256:441280ee2... signed OK by attacker
forged receipt ....... REJECTED (SignerMismatch: avow.signer_mismatch)
key inside forgery matches bank? False
```

**Never trust the key embedded in the receipt.** It rides along for convenience; it is
not the trust anchor. `verify_signature` *requires* you to pass the key you already
trust, precisely so this mistake is hard to make by accident.

Note the code: **`avow.signer_mismatch`**, not `avow.signature_invalid`. Those are two
different events and they are coded apart, because you may want to react differently:

| Code | Class | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| `avow.signer_mismatch` | `SignerMismatch` | Signed by a key you do not trust — a **provenance** failure. The signature is never even checked. |
| `avow.signature_invalid` | `SignatureBytesInvalid` | The signer matched, but the bytes fail the curve check — a **tamper** failure. |

Both subclass `SignatureInvalid`, so `except SignatureInvalid:` still catches either one
if you do not care which. You never have to match on the message text.

## Three things you can sign

Avow ships as one installable package with three importable pieces. The first is the
core; the other two are ready-made shapes built on it.

### 1. Anything — `avow`, the envelope

Shown above. You define what a decision looks like, avow seals and checks it. It never
looks inside your data, so the same sign-and-verify code works for any record.

### 2. A measurement that refuses to overstate — `assay`

A number like "our model is 89% accurate" is only meaningful if enough examples stood
behind it. Measure 12 cases and you can get any number you like; it is noise.

`assay` computes the score **and** its error bar, and when the sample is too thin it
returns nothing at all rather than inventing a figure. Both outcomes come back inside a
signed receipt.

```bash
pip install 'avow[assay]'
```

```python
import random

from assay import score, verify
from assay.models import ScoreRequest
from assay.settings import AssaySettings
from avow import generate_signing_key, public_key_hex

key = generate_signing_key()
settings = AssaySettings()  # sample-size floor: 30


def evaluate(label: str, n: int) -> None:
    rng = random.Random(7)
    # a fraud model that is good, not perfect
    y_true = tuple(int(rng.random() < 0.3) for _ in range(n))
    y_score = tuple(min(1.0, max(0.0, rng.gauss(0.75 if t else 0.25, 0.22))) for t in y_true)

    receipt = score(
        ScoreRequest(metric="binary", metric_version="1", y_true=y_true, y_score=y_score),
        signing_key=key,
        settings=settings,
    )
    assert verify(receipt, expected_public_key=public_key_hex(key))

    r = receipt.payload
    if r.abstained:
        print(f"{label:<10} n={n:<4} accuracy = (none) -- {r.abstain_reason}")
    else:
        print(
            f"{label:<10} n={n:<4} accuracy = {r.score:.2f}  "
            f"95% interval [{r.interval_low:.2f}, {r.interval_high:.2f}]"
        )


evaluate("pilot", 12)
evaluate("full eval", 400)
```

```
pilot      n=12   accuracy = (none) -- assay.insufficient_samples
full eval  n=400  accuracy = 0.89  95% interval [0.86, 0.92]
```

The pilot run declines to produce a number. The full run reports 0.89 *and* admits the
true value is somewhere in [0.86, 0.92]. The receipt also carries precision, recall, F1,
PR-AUC, ROC-AUC, and a calibration report — see the reference section.

### 3. An action that was actually allowed — `writ`

Before your code does something irreversible — delete a record, move money, send an email
— `writ` checks a policy. If the policy says no, the action never runs. Either way you
get a signed receipt of what was asked and what was decided, so "the agent deleted it"
and "we blocked the agent" are both provable after the fact.

This matters most when the caller is an AI agent you do not fully control.

```python
from avow import content_hash, generate_signing_key, public_key_hex, verify_signature
from writ import Allowlist, EffectRequest, KeyholderEffector, governed_gate

key = generate_signing_key()
performed: list[str] = []  # stands in for the real system being changed


def perform(request: EffectRequest) -> None:
    """The privileged action. Reached ONLY through an allow decision."""
    performed.append(f"{request.action} {request.target}")


# The trusted host wires policy + action + key into the gate, then hands the agent
# exactly one thing: the gate. The agent never receives the key or the action itself.
agent_gate = governed_gate(
    Allowlist(frozenset({"read"})),
    KeyholderEffector(effect=perform, signing_key=key),
)

for action in ("read", "delete"):
    receipt = agent_gate(
        EffectRequest(
            action=action,
            target="customer-4471",
            args_digest=content_hash({"reason": "agent cleanup task"}),
        )
    )
    verify_signature(receipt, expected_public_key=public_key_hex(key))
    print(f"agent asked to {action:<6} -> {receipt.payload.decision:<5} (signed receipt verified)")

print(f"actually performed: {performed}")
```

```
agent asked to read   -> allow (signed receipt verified)
agent asked to delete -> deny  (signed receipt verified)
actually performed: ['read customer-4471']
```

The denied delete produced a signed receipt but never touched the system.

## Command line

For signing and checking receipts without writing code. The distribution is `avow`; the
command it installs is **`assay`** (there is no `avow` command). Python 3.13+ required.

```bash
pip install 'avow[cli]'                        # installs the `assay` command

assay --help                                   # note: `assay`, not `avow`
assay keygen --out signing.key                 # also writes signing.key.pub
echo '{"metric":"binary","metric_version":"1","y_true":[0,1,0,1],"y_score":[0.2,0.8,0.3,0.7]}' > req.json
assay score --request req.json --key signing.key --out receipt.json --ledger ledger.jsonl
assay verify --receipt receipt.json --public-key signing.key.pub
```

```
wrote signing key: signing.key
wrote public key: signing.key.pub
wrote receipt: receipt.json
wrote ledger head: ledger.jsonl.head (1 entries)
OK: receipt verified
```

### Auditing the ledger — `verify-ledger`

> The chained `verify-ledger` lands in `avow` 0.2.0 (this repo). The published 0.1.x
> shipped an earlier hash-only audit that could not see a deleted or reordered entry —
> upgrade for real tamper-evidence. Install with `pip install 'avow[cli]'` (Python 3.13+;
> use a fresh venv) and run `assay verify-ledger --help`.

`score` also appended that receipt to `ledger.jsonl` and wrote the ledger's new **chain
head** to `ledger.jsonl.head`. Auditing takes two things, and neither is read from the
ledger itself:

- the signer's **public** key (never the secret seed) — *who* may write entries. A
  content hash alone is not enough: an adversary who edits an entry can recompute its
  (public) hash, so tamper-evidence rests on the Ed25519 signature, which only the
  private seed can produce.
- the **chain head** — *which* entries there are. Each line carries the hash of the line
  before it, so the last line's hash commits to the whole history. Pin those 32 bytes
  and dropping, adding or moving a line has nowhere to hide.

```bash
assay verify-ledger --ledger ledger.jsonl --public-key signing.key.pub --head ledger.jsonl.head
```

```
OK: ledger verified, 1 entry intact
```

Four samples is below the abstention floor, so that receipt honestly records
`"abstained":true` and no score. Now edit the stored entry to claim a confident answer
it never gave — change `"abstained":true` to `"abstained":false`, the sort of quiet
correction that leaves no trace in an ordinary log — and ask again:

```bash
assay verify-ledger --ledger ledger.jsonl --public-key signing.key.pub --head ledger.jsonl.head
```

```
FAIL: avow.ledger_integrity: tampered ledger entry: sha256:a2ada15199d7586958d9754a4adeba4d13a4e73122f9604f65a536fb4a4bad7e
```

Exit code `1`, and the coded cause names both the failure and the entry that caused it.
The check re-derives every entry's hash **and** verifies its signature under the pinned
key, failing closed on the first disagreement.

A ledger it cannot read is also a failure, not a pass. Mistype the path and you get:

```
FAIL: avow.ledger_unreadable: ledger is not a readable file: ledgr.jsonl
```

rather than `OK: ledger verified, 0 entries intact` — which would be a clean bill of
health for a file that was never opened. The same applies to a directory in the file's
place, a file whose permissions deny reading, and a line that is not a parseable receipt
(`avow.ledger_entry_malformed`). A missing or unparseable head file is a failure too
(`avow.ledger_head_unreadable`) — with nothing to check the ledger's end against, the
audit answers nothing. A ledger that *exists and is empty* passes only against the head
of an empty ledger, so an erased audit no longer reads as a fresh one.

Editing a line is the easy case. Now score a second request, then **delete** the entry it
wrote — every remaining line is genuine, correctly signed, and correctly chained:

```
FAIL: avow.ledger_integrity: ledger ends at 1 entries / sha256:72b555a34e…, but the
pinned head is 2 entries / sha256:c43e8018f8…
```

That is the check no per-entry signature can do. Deleting, truncating (including emptying
the file), reordering, replaying and splicing in an entry from another ledger all land
here, with exit code `1`.

> **What this check does not cover.** The head is only as good as its custody. Verifying
> against a head file that sits beside the ledger proves nothing against an attacker who
> can write both — copy it somewhere they cannot reach (another host, a git commit, a
> printout). Read [Honest limits](#honest-limits) before you rely on this file as a
> history.

## Honest limits

Stated plainly, because each of these is a real boundary on what avow currently gives you.

- **A receipt proves integrity, not authenticity, unless you pin the key.** See the
  section above. This is the single easiest way to misuse the library.
- **The ledger's tamper-evidence is only as good as the custody of its head.** The
  entries are chained (each carries its position and the hash of the entry before it) and
  the audit walks that chain to a head you pin out-of-band, so deleting, truncating,
  reordering, replaying and splicing all fail — each of those five is a test in
  `tests/test_ledger.py`, and each guard has been watched go red with its check disabled.
  What remains is a **custody** limit, not a detection one: the chain moves the trust
  requirement from *N lines* down to *32 bytes*, it does not remove it. An attacker who
  can rewrite the ledger **and** the head you check against can rebuild a consistent
  history — that is why `score` writing `ledger.jsonl.head` next to the ledger is a
  convenience for copying it away, never a control. Keep the head where the ledger's
  writer cannot reach: another host, a git commit, a printout, a transparency log. And
  pin the *current* head — a head from three appends ago legitimately fails, because
  three entries you did not acknowledge is exactly the thing this is built to notice.
- **`writ`'s enforcement is in-process (v0).** The signing key and the privileged action
  live only inside the effector, which the gate captures in a closure; the agent receives
  the closure and never the effector, so the only route to the action is through the
  guard. But the credential is still in the same process, so same-process reflection
  (walking `__closure__`, for instance) could reach it. This is a capability-holding
  *approximation*, not true enforcement. Real un-bypassability — a separate-process
  broker or a WASM guest, where the caller's address space cannot reach the credential —
  is the v1 hardening. We claim no more than that.
- **The v0 policy decider is a plain Python predicate** (`Allowlist`). OPA/Rego is the v1
  decider.
- **`writ` signs the `args_digest` its caller hands it; it does not recompute it.** The
  gate never sees the raw arguments, so it cannot check that the digest actually
  describes them. A caller that passes a digest of one thing and performs another gets a
  validly-signed receipt attesting the wrong arguments. What the receipt therefore
  proves is "this signer claimed this action, target and digest, and the policy decided
  this" — not "these are the arguments the effect ran with". Closing the gap means the
  request carrying the real arguments and the gate deriving the digest itself; that
  changes `EffectRequest`'s public shape, so it is a v1 change, not a patch.
- **Browser key custody is same-origin, not hardware-backed.** In the browser build, keys
  are protected by the origin boundary alone — there is no secure element or OS keychain
  behind them.
- **Receipts carry no timestamp.** That is deliberate: it makes them reproducible (the
  same inputs always yield the same receipt). It also means a receipt cannot tell you
  *when* it was made. If you need that, record it outside the receipt, in something you
  trust. Ledger position is now evidence of **sequence** — the chain fixes the order of
  entries relative to a pinned head — but sequence is not a clock. Nothing in a ledger
  says an entry was written on Tuesday. For wall-clock time, use a real timestamping
  service.

## Reference

<details>
<summary><b>Packages and install matrix</b></summary>

One distribution, `avow`, exposes three import packages:

| Package | What it is | Depends on | Install |
|---|---|---|---|
| **`avow`** | the shared **envelope** — sign, hash, verify a receipt | pydantic, pynacl, rfc8785 | `pip install avow` |
| **`assay`** | the **measurement** face — an honest number in a receipt | `avow` + scikit-learn/scipy/numpy | `pip install 'avow[assay]'` |
| **`writ`** | the **action** face — a policy-gated effect, sealed as a receipt | `avow` only | `pip install avow` |

Dependency arrows only ever point **into** `avow`: `assay → avow` and `writ → avow`.
Avow imports neither, which is why installing the envelope alone never pulls in the heavy
scientific stack. Importing `assay` without the `[assay]` extra raises a coded
`ScoringExtraMissing`, not a raw `ModuleNotFoundError`.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>How the sealing works</b></summary>

Some terms, each in one line:

- **Content hash** — a short fingerprint of some data. Change any byte and the
  fingerprint changes completely. Avow uses SHA-256.
- **Canonicalization (RFC 8785 / JCS)** — one fixed way to write a JSON object as bytes,
  so that the same data always produces the same bytes regardless of key order or
  language. Without it, two systems could hash "the same" record differently.
- **Ed25519** — a signature scheme. A private key signs; the matching public key checks.
  Signing is deterministic: the same message and key always give the same signature.
- **Frozen subject** — the record being signed, declared immutable so it cannot be
  modified after signing.

`sign_payload` / `verify_signature` / `payload_digest` operate only on the canonical JSON
of a frozen subject, and never inspect its fields. That is why the same envelope carries a
measurement for `assay` and an action for `writ` with no change to the trust boundary.

Because payloads carry no timestamp, identical inputs yield an identical, reproducible,
offline-verifiable receipt.

`avow.ledger` is a hash-chained JSONL log, generic over the subject. Each line carries
its sequence number, the hash of the line before it, and the signed receipt; writes are
`O_APPEND` under a lock held across the read *and* the write, so concurrent appenders
cannot chain two entries onto the same predecessor. The audit fails closed on two
independent checks: **per entry** (re-derive the payload hash, verify the Ed25519
signature against a pinned public key) and **across entries** (walk the chain and require
it to end at a `LedgerHead` — count plus hash — pinned out-of-band, which is what catches
a truncated file). `append` returns the new head; `save_head` / `read_head` move it
around. See [Honest limits](#honest-limits) for the custody caveat. Coded failures live
in `avow.errors` (`avow.*` codes under `AvowError`).

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Inside <code>assay</code></b></summary>

A thin trust, honesty, and composition layer over reused libraries — it computes no
metric math itself:

- scikit-learn for precision, recall, F1, PR-AUC, ROC-AUC and Brier score
- `scipy.stats.bootstrap` for percentile intervals, with a **sample-size floor**; below
  it, assay abstains rather than invent a point estimate
- population-weighted **ECE** (expected calibration error) for calibration
- a positive-weighted composite with a propagated interval

`assay.receipt` defines the measurement subjects; the envelope signs them. Errors are
`assay.*` under `AssayError`. Every tunable — the sample floor, resample count,
confidence level, bin count — lives in `AssaySettings` and is overridable via `ASSAY_*`
environment variables.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Inside <code>writ</code></b></summary>

`writ.gate(request, policy, effector, *, emit=...)` evaluates a typed policy. On **deny**
it seals a signed `not_run` receipt and never runs the effect. On **allow** it seals an
`attempted` receipt and hands it to `emit` **before** running the effect, then runs it and
seals the `succeeded` / `failed` outcome — so a failed or partial privileged effect always
leaves a signed attestation of the attempt. Wire `emit` to `avow.ledger.append` for
durable, atomic capture — and keep the head it returns, or the chain has no pin; every
sealed receipt is verifiable through the shared envelope.

`EffectRequest.args_digest` is a hash rather than the arguments themselves, so the signed
record never carries raw payloads. It is the caller's claim about those arguments: the
gate signs it without recomputing it.

See the honest limits above for exactly how far the enforcement seam and that digest go in v0.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Key custody and cross-language vectors</b></summary>

`assay keygen` (and `avow.keys`) write a 32-byte Ed25519 seed to a `0600` file and the
public key to a companion `.pub`. Keys are never logged and never committed (`*.key` is
gitignored). The public key also travels inside each receipt for convenience, but that
embedded copy is **not** the trust anchor — a verifier pins the out-of-band key and passes
it to `verify`.

`testdata/vectors/` holds golden vectors generated by `tests/gen_vectors.py` (canonical
bytes and hashes, plus receipts signed with a fixed non-secret test seed). The Python
suite replays them in `tests/test_vectors.py`; the TypeScript `@edgeproc/avow` replays the
*same files* byte for byte, so any RFC 8785 number-serialization divergence fails in CI
rather than in production.

`@edgeproc/receipt-ui` (in `ts/packages/receipt-ui`) is the browser rendering layer: small,
fail-closed React components that verify a receipt against a pinned key and show the
verdict, built on the TypeScript `@edgeproc/avow` envelope above.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Working on avow itself</b></summary>

```bash
git clone https://github.com/hseshadr/assay.git && cd assay
uv sync --all-extras
uv run poe gate                          # Python: ruff, ruff-format, mypy --strict, xenon A, pytest
uv run poe gate-ts                       # TypeScript: biome, tsc --noEmit, vitest, build (needs pnpm)
uv run poe gate-all                      # both, mirroring CI's two jobs
uv run python demo/run_demo.py           # measurement face: 6 honesty acceptance cases
uv run python demo/unification_demo.py   # one envelope + one verifier, both faces
```

[`QUICKSTART.md`](QUICKSTART.md) is the shortest path from clone to a verified receipt.

See [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) for the data-flow diagram, the import
edges, and the native-vs-browser story.

</details>

## Status

v0, deterministic — no LLM anywhere in the path.

Two gates, mirroring CI's two jobs. `uv run poe gate` covers **Python only** (ruff,
ruff-format, mypy `--strict`, xenon A, pytest with statement *and* branch coverage
against a floor); `uv run poe gate-ts` covers the TypeScript package (biome, `tsc`
strict, vitest, build). `uv run poe gate-all` runs both.

Published releases: `avow` 0.1.1 on PyPI and `@edgeproc/avow` 0.1.1 on npm (0.2.0 prepared
in this repo, not yet released); `@edgeproc/receipt-ui` 0.1.0 on npm (0.2.0, adding the
injectable `labels` i18n prop, prepared in this repo, not yet released) — see
[`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md) and
[`ts/packages/receipt-ui/CHANGELOG.md`](ts/packages/receipt-ui/CHANGELOG.md) for what each
release contains. Read the honest limits above before depending on any of it.

## License

MIT © Harish Seshadri
