Supreme Court

Published Opinions 2016 - 2017 Term

In re Kurt H., No. 15-286 (January 18, 2017) 15-286New
The respondent, Eric H., appealed from a decree of neglect as to his son, Kurt H., entered in the Family Court, committing the child to the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families.  The child had come under the state’s care on October 6, 2014, after an alleged alcohol relapse by the child’s mother at a time when the respondent was incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions.  On appeal, the respondent contended that the trial justice erred in not allowing him to admit to allegations of dependency, as defined in G.L. 1956 § 14-1-3, and in finding that the child had been neglected by the respondent per the statutory definitions in chapter 1 of title 14 and G.L. 1956 chapter 11 of title 40.

After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in determining that the respondent should not be permitted to plead to dependency.  In addition, the Supreme Court also concluded that there was more than ample evidence to support the trial justice’s finding of neglect.  The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the decree of the Family Court and returned the record thereto.
In re Livia B.L., No. 15-217 (January 6, 2017)15-217
The respondent, Anthony Bucci, appealed from an order terminating his parental rights based on the abandonment of his daughter, Livia, and from the granting of a joint Family Court petition for Livia’s adoption by Marissa Levesque (Livia’s mother) and her husband, Derek Gray (Livia’s stepfather). On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial justice’s abandonment finding was erroneous because it rested “solely on proof of [the respondent’s] incarceration.”  The respondent further asserted that the trial justice ignored evidence of “[his] pre-incarceration attempts to seek visitation with his daughter,” “that [he] sent cards to Livia during his incarceration and that he made attempts to communicate with Livia through her mother,” and Levesque’s lack of cooperation in facilitating visits.
  
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s abandonment determination rested on sufficient factual findings and credibility determinations, which were supported by legally competent evidence.  Although the trial justice did not explicitly reference the testimony cited by the respondent, this was not akin to misconception or oversight, or otherwise clear error in the decision.  Further, the Court reiterated that a parent’s sporadic attempts to contact his or her child are insufficient to overcome a prima facie abandonment case.  Any evidence of the respondent’s attempted contact was “halfhearted” at best, and thus the trial justice rightfully declined to assign it weight in his decision.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.
Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association v. Preservation Society of Newport County, No. 15-241 (January 9, 2017)15-241New
The plaintiff, Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association, appealed the Superior Court’s dismissal of its declaratory judgment complaint.  This case arose from an application by the defendant, the Preservation Society of Newport County, for the construction of a Welcome Center near the entrance to the Newport mansion, the Breakers.  The plaintiff sought declarations that the Newport Zoning Ordinance prohibited the proposed Welcome Center.  A justice of the Superior Court declined to enter declaratory relief and dismissed the action.  He found that the issues the plaintiff raised in its complaint were within the authority and jurisdiction of the Newport Zoning Board and, thus inappropriate for a declaratory judgment action.  The hearing justice also found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the zoning board lacked authority to decide the issues raised in its complaint, and that the hearing justice was required to hear and decide its declaratory relief request.  It asserted that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable because two exceptions applied.  The plaintiff also asked the Supreme Court to determine the underlying issues of its complaint.
  
Because the parties disputed which standard of review applied, the Supreme Court first resolved this issue.  The Court applied a de novo standard because the hearing justice’s consideration of matters outside the pleadings converted the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.  The Court then held that the zoning board had the authority to decide the issues raised in the plaintiff’s complaint.  It also concluded that neither exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which the plaintiff raised, applied.   Finally, the Court declined to decide the issues presented in the plaintiff’s action, as they were within the zoning board’s authority.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision.
A. Salvati Masonry Inc. v. Michael Andreozzi et al., Nos. 16-39, 16-131 (January 6, 2017)16-39, 16-131
his appeal emanated from a payment dispute over the construction of a backyard patio at the defendants’ property on Old Farm Road in East Greenwich, Rhode Island.  In these consolidated cases, the plaintiff, A. Salvati Masonry Inc., appealed a nonjury-trial judgment for the defendants, Michael and Amy Andreozzi.  At the center of this appeal was the parties’ dispute about whether Salvati’s subcontract bid for exterior landscaping encompassed work on the Andreozzis’ backyard patio and whether Salvati received payment for work completed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.  Based on a careful review of the record, the Court concluded that, at bottom, the plaintiff challenged the trial justice’s factual determinations.  The Court held that the trial justice neither overlooked nor misconceived material evidence in reaching his decision; rather, his decision rested on his factual findings and credibility assessments, to which this Court owed significant deference.  Beyond mere conclusory trial testimony citations, the plaintiff did little to develop or articulate a discussion of its arguments for its book account, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, or mechanic’s lien claims.  Thus, based on insufficient development, the Court deemed these arguments waived under the raise-or-waive rule. 
State v. Michael Ciresi, SU-14-324 (January 6, 2017)14-324
The defendant, Michael Ciresi, appealed the denial of his motion to reduce his sentence, brought pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  On appeal, the defendant asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional because it exceeded the guidelines of the Superior Court’s Sentencing Benchmarks.  Specifically, he argued that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 15 of the Rhode Island Constitution were violated because, in departing from the benchmarks, the hearing justice considered facts that were not proved to a jury.  He also contended that the sentence’s departure from the benchmarks constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.  The Court first held that the hearing justice properly denied the defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence.  The Court then concluded that Rule 35 was not the proper mechanism for the defendant to raise his constitutional challenges.  Nonetheless, the Court deemed the Sixth and Eighth Amendment arguments unavailing because: the sentence was within the statutory limits, the hearing justice set forth his reasons for departing from the benchmarks, and the defendant failed to show that it was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. 
Jean O. Duvere v. State of Rhode Island, No. 15-225 (January 6, 2017)15-225

The applicant, Jean O. Duvere, appealed from the denial of his postconviction-relief application, asserting that his 2009 plea of nolo contendere to the offense of possession of between one to five kilograms of marijuana, with knowledge and intent, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01.1, should be vacated because his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Duvere raised one issue on appeal:  that the hearing justice erred in denying his postconviction-relief application because his original plea did not comport with Rule 11, as he was not assisted by a Haitian-Creole interpreter during his plea colloquy.

The Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that Duvere understood English, which made his plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Additionally, after reviewing the transcript of the plea colloquy and the decision of the hearing justice, the Court gleaned no error in the hearing justice’s finding that Duvere did not need a Haitian-Creole interpreter during his plea.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. 
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. James S. Dias et al., No. 15-307 (January 6, 2017)15-307
In this case, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the meaning of the term “same insurance company” under G.L. 1956 § 27-7-2.1(i).  The defendants, James S. Dias and Sarina M. Dunham, appealed from the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.  Dias suffered serious injuries in a motorcycle accident and sought to recover underinsured-motorist benefits from the plaintiff, asserting that he was entitled to those benefits pursuant to § 27-7-2.1(i).  On appeal, the defendants argued that summary judgment was granted in error because material issues of fact remained in dispute.  Moreover, the defendants contended that the hearing justice incorrectly determined that the plaintiff and another company, Progressive Northern Insurance Co., were not the same insurance company for the purposes of applying § 27-7-2.1(i).

The Supreme Court held that the language “same insurance company” in § 27-7-2.1(i) was clear and unambiguous.  Therefore, the Court ascribed to those words their plain and ordinary meaning when interpreting the statute.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that, for the purpose of the statute, the plaintiff and Progressive Northern were not the same company, even though they were each wholly owned subsidiaries of The Progressive Corporation.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment.
Paul E. Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education et al., No. 15-332 (December 21, 2016)15-332
The plaintiff, Paul E. Pontarelli, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, the Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education and the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA), as set forth in G.L. 1956 chapter 46 of title 42, by failing to provide adequate notice of a September 8, 2014, council meeting (count 1) and for its failure to provide any notice of meetings held by the Compensation Review Committee (CRC) (count 2).  The Superior Court disagreed and granted the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment on both counts.  The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Superior Court. 
As to count 1, the Supreme Court held that the notice published for the September 8, 2014, agenda did not sufficiently specify “the nature of the business to be discussed.”  Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on count 1 with instructions for judgment to enter in the plaintiff’s favor and for the Superior Court to determine the proper remedy.
As to count 2, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that the CRC was not a “public body” pursuant to the OMA, and, consequently, was not subject to its terms and, therefore, it affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants.
Michael Vieira v. Amy Hussein-Vieira, No. 15-329 (December 21, 2016)15-329
The plaintiff, Michael Vieira, appeals from a Family Court final decree granting both his complaint for divorce and the defendant’s, Amy Hussein-Vieira, counterclaim for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.  In addition to dissolving the parties’ marriage, the decree awarded them joint custody of their two minor children, granted the defendant physical placement of both children, ordered the plaintiff to pay child support, and partitioned the marital assets.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial justice’s visitation, child-support, and distribution of marital property findings were incorrect and not supported by evidence or law.
 
After carefully reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that it did not appear that the trial justice considered the child-support guidelines in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.2(a) and the adopted Family Court administrative order when calculating the plaintiff’s child-support order.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court perceived no error in the trial justice’s judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, awarding them joint custody of the minor children, granting the defendant physical placement of both children, and partitioning the marital assets.  As such, the Supreme Court remanded the record to the Family Court to determine the amount of child support in consideration of the child-support guidelines, and affirmed the final decree in all other respects.
Lisa Garant v. Michael E. Winchester et al., No. 15-339 (December 8, 2016)15-339
The plaintiff, Lisa Garant, appeals from a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, 18-20 Woodland Court Condominium Association. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the three-year statute of limitations on her tort claim should have been tolled pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-5-20 because her original complaint, filed before the three-year statutory period expired, named a fictitious entity as the defendant. The plaintiff asserted that she was confused as to the defendant’s identity as a result of having obtained contradictory information.

The Supreme Court held that § 9-5-20 did not operate to toll the three-year limitations period because the plaintiff had knowledge of the identity of the defendant before the statute of limitations expired. The Court reasoned that the record reveals that the plaintiff had access to, and did in fact access, public land records, which clearly indicated the correct name of the defendant prior to the expiration of the three-year statutory period. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Portsmouth Water and Fire District v. Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, No. 12-242 (December 6, 2016)12-242
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to a statutory petition for a writ of certiorari filed in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 39-5-1.  The petitioner, Portsmouth Water and Fire District (Portsmouth), seeks review of a Public Utilities Commission (PUC) order from docket No. 4025 issued in response to the Supreme Court’s remand order that required the PUC to make more specific findings of fact in a rate case involving the City of Newport’s Utility Department, Water Division (Newport Water or utility).  Specifically, Portsmouth is contesting issues surrounding a $1,584,171 debt that Newport Water owed to the city that stem from docket No. 3818.

The Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s holding that Newport Water realized $557,499 in savings from efficiencies, as described in docket No. 3818.  The Supreme Court held, however, that the PUC went beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s remand order when it ruled that Newport Water could use excess revenues to pay down its debt.  Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the PUC’s order to the extent that it allowed Newport Water to use the excess revenues to pay down the debt, absent further action by the PUC.  Finally, the Supreme Court held that it could not determine how much, if any, of the $1,584,171 debt has been repaid.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the PUC to certify to it how much Newport has repaid to the city.
State v. Jose Lopez, No. 15-245 (December 6, 2016)15-245
The defendant, Jose Lopez (defendant), appeals from judgments of conviction entered in the Superior Court, following a jury trial.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit murder.  The defendant, a juvenile at the time of the murder, was acquitted of one count of carrying a firearm without a license.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial.  Specifically, he argued that the trial justice overlooked and misconstrued material evidence and that the weight of the evidence did not support the verdicts in this case in light of the bias and interests of the state’s witnesses.

After a careful review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err when he denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.  The Supreme Court reasoned that it was within the discretion of the trial justice to credit the testimony of the state’s witnesses and reject that of the defendant.  Further, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the trial justice performed all the analyses required of him in rejecting the defendant’s motion.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction.
Michael F. Rose, Jr. et al. v. Stephen M. Brusini et al., No. 15-298 (November 29, 2016)15-298
The plaintiffs, Michael F. Rose, Jr. and RC&D, Inc., appealed from a decision of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in favor of Attorney Stephen M. Brusini and the law firm Orson & Brusini Ltd.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the hearing justice erred when he concluded that there was no evidence of proximate cause linking the defendants’ alleged negligence and any damages the plaintiffs may have suffered and that Rose’s own conduct was the proximate cause of his damages.  The Supreme Court held that Rose’s affidavit, which was submitted in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and subsequently overlooked by the hearing justice, raised issues of material fact on the issue of causation, and, therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate.  For that reason, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

State v. Erwin Grantley, No. 15-27 (November 28, 2016)15-27
The defendant, Erwin Grantley, appealed from a judgment of conviction after being found guilty of one count of assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling house (domestic), in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-4 and G.L. 1956 § 12-29-2(a)(2), and guilty of one count of breaking and entering of a dwelling house (domestic), in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-8-2 and § 12-29-2(a) and (b).  The defendant raised multiple issues on appeal.  He argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial and motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to the breaking and entering count.  Specifically, he asserted that he had implied consent to enter the complaining witness’s home, and thus, the state failed to prove lack of consent.  The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the count of assault with a dangerous weapon, maintaining that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.  In reviewing the denial of the motion for a new trial on the breaking and entering count, the Court held that sufficient evidence existed showing that the defendant lacked consent to enter the complaining witness’s home.  The Court declined to adopt an implied consent defense because the breaking and entering statute already provided a mechanism to challenge the state’s showing of consent.  Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to withstand the motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was also sufficient for the denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal.  Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly conducted the new-trial analysis with respect to the count of assault with a dangerous weapon.  The Court concluded that the trial justice adequately considered the evidence and assessed witness credibility in reaching her determination.
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.
Anthony Pullar v. Louis Cappelli, No. 15-303 (November 17, 2016)15-303
The plaintiff, Anthony Pullar (plaintiff), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Louis Cappelli (defendant).  The plaintiff argued that the defendant forfeited the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to assert the defense for more than three and a half years and by actively participating in litigation, including depositions and court-annexed arbitration.
 
This case presented the Supreme Court with an issue of first impression: whether a defendant may forfeit the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction through delay or conduct even when the defendant asserted the defense in its answer.  The Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of forfeiture developed by the federal courts and concluded that a defendant may forfeit the jurisdictional defense by failing to seasonably assert it or by conduct that demonstrates intent to litigate.
  
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and held that the defendant forfeited the jurisdictional defense by participating in discovery, pretrial proceedings, and arbitration for more than three and a half years before moving to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
In re King J.:In re Saint J., Nos. 14-277, 15-216 (November 3, 2016)14-277, 15-216
The respondent, Jason James, appealed from decrees entered in the Family Court finding dependency as to his sons, King and Saint.  On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial justice’s decisions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.  He challenged her finding that he physically injured King by removing his extra digit, arguing that the record lacked supporting medical evidence.  Further, he characterized the trial justice’s findings as “rife with extraneous and unproven allegations.”  The respondent argued that Saint’s dependency decree must be vacated because, in reaching her decision, the trial justice relied on her findings in King’s dependency decree.
  
The Supreme Court held that clear and convincing evidence supported both decrees.  The Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the trial justice’s finding that the respondent physically injured King by removing his extra digit.  The Court also held that it was appropriate for the trial justice to consider the evidence of King’s harm in determining Saint’s dependency.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decrees of the Family Court.
Mathew M. Cote v. John Aiello et al., No. 13-311 (November 2, 2016)13-311
The plaintiff, Mathew M. Cote (plaintiff), appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, John and Anna-Maria Aiello (defendants), dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for breach of an implied contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment after a nonjury trial.  The plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that an implied contract to purchase the defendants’ business, Richmond Ready Mix, arose from the statements of the parties and that the promises made by the defendants were not clear and unambiguous declarations to support a claim for promissory estoppel.  The plaintiff also assigns error to the trial justice’s dismissal of his fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, as well as the measure of damages awarded on his unjust enrichment claim.

The Supreme Court held that all of the trial justice’s findings and conclusions were supported by ample evidence in the trial record.  The Court was satisfied that competent evidence supported the trial justice’s finding that the parties did not enter into an implied contract, as both mutual assent and the essential terms of a potential agreement were lacking.  The Court was additionally convinced that the trial record supported the finding that the defendants’ statements were not clear, nor was it reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on such statements to his detriment given their ambiguity.  The Court determined that a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim cannot be based on statements concerning future possibilities.  Consequently, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.  Lastly, the Court concluded that the trial justice did not erroneously determine that interest was an appropriate measure of damages on the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim.  The plaintiff did not present evidence on a reasonable interest rate, and the link between the plaintiff’s loans and the company’s growth and profitability was attenuated.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment.   
State v. Terrel Barros, No. 15-13 (October 31, 2016)15-13
The defendant, Terrel Barros, appeals from judgments of conviction after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder (count 1), using a firearm during a violent crime (count 2), possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent crime (count 3), carrying a handgun without a license (count 6), felony assault (count 7), and discharging a firearm during a violent crime (count 8).  The defendant received consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder and using a firearm during a violent crime; three consecutive ten-year terms for possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent crime, carrying a handgun without a license, and discharging a firearm during a violent crime; and a twenty-year term concurrent for the felony assault.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice improperly excluded the testimony of a nonparty witness on the grounds that the witness effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  The defendant argues that the exclusion of the witness’s testimony was reversible error and, therefore, the defendant is entitled to a new trial at which the witness should be compelled to testify in front of the jury.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s appeal was not properly before the Court because the defendant failed to object when the trial justice ruled to exclude the witness on the grounds that he had validly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.  Accordingly, the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
Richard H. Boucher v. Kevin E. Sweet, No. 2002-7 (October 28, 2016)02-7
The defendant, Kevin E. Sweet, appealed from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Richard H. Boucher, in the amount of $48,155.35, plus interest, and counsel fees of $3,237.  The plaintiff executed an $80,000 promissory note to the defendant, secured by real estate in West Warwick, Rhode Island.  The plaintiff defaulted on the note and the defendant instituted foreclosure proceedings.  After the required notice and advertising, a foreclosure sale was held.  The defendant, the only bidder, purchased the property for $35,000 and subsequently filed suit in the Superior Court to collect the deficiency on the note.
  
In the Superior Court, a hearing justice granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The defendant appealed, arguing that the hearing justice erred in finding no improprieties in the foreclosure sale.  He contended that the defendant violated the sale terms, including paying the required deposit at the time of sale and signing an agreement encompassing the terms of sale.  The defendant asserted that the improprieties, coupled with the inadequate sale price, were sufficient to challenge the foreclosure sale.
 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s alleged violations of the sale terms were minor deficiencies and not evidence of fraud or collusion.  Thus, the Court concluded that the deficiencies did not amount to improprieties in the foreclosure sale.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment. 

Justice Flaherty did not participate.
State v. Elton G. Edwards, No. 15-147 (October 27, 2016)15-147
This appeal arose from a traffic stop on the evening of August 22, 2008.   After a jury-waived trial, the defendant, Elton G. Edwards, was found guilty on five counts:  felony assault on a police officer, simple assault on a police officer, resisting arrest, driving under the influence of alcohol, and obstructing a police officer.  The defendant raised one issue on appeal; he asserted that the trial justice, in his guilt findings, misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or was otherwise clearly wrong in his decision.
 
The Supreme Court held that sufficient credible and competent evidence supported the trial justice’s guilt determinations on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court concluded that because the trial testimony diverged significantly, the trial justice’s findings turned on witness credibility.  Although the trial justice rejected certain testimony, his rejection (after adequate consideration) was not tantamount to misconception or oversight.  Because the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence in reaching his decision, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. 

In re Briann A.T. et al., Nos. 15-170, 16-233 (October 18, 2016)15-170-16-233
The respondent, Marvin T. (respondent), appeals from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights to his daughters, Briann A.T. and Bri’Nayshia A.T., who were born on October 3, 2007 and November 17, 2010, respectively.  The respondent argued that the Family Court justice erred in terminating his parental rights.  Specifically, the respondent claimed that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent and, in addition, failed to comply with its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with his daughters.

The Supreme Court held that there was adequate evidentiary support for the Family Court justice’s findings of unfitness. The Court concluded that the record revealed the respondent to be uncooperative, recalcitrant, and unwilling to parent Briann and Bri’Nayshia.  Additionally, the Court was satisfied that DCYF complied with its obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification.  The Court determined that termination was in the best interests of Briann and Bri’Nayshia.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Family Court decree terminating the respondent’s parental rights.