Check an AI evidence record without trusting us

Aegis Latent Core commits a signed, hash-linked record of every governed AI call before the response reaches the caller, and issues a portable proof that a third party verifies without trusting the gateway, the vendor or the operator.

Verify it in three commands

pip install aegis-latent-sdk
git clone https://github.com/JuanLunaIA/aegis-latent-core
python aegis-latent-core/tools/sales/prove_it/prove_it.py --demo

The verifier makes no network call. It accepts one genuine record and rejects two forgeries. This is the exact output of that commandV:

1. genuine record, root it belongs to (must be INCLUDED)
leaf 2 of 3  scheme=aegis-mmr-inclusion-v2
INCLUDED

2. one altered field in the record (must be NOT INCLUDED)
leaf 2 of 3  scheme=aegis-mmr-inclusion-v2
NOT INCLUDED

3. genuine record, root you did not obtain (must be NOT INCLUDED)
leaf 2 of 3  scheme=aegis-mmr-inclusion-v2
NOT INCLUDED

all 3 cases behaved as required

The three records are generated fixtures, not captured from a running gateway. The third case matters most: a proof checks only against a root you obtained by a path the discloser does not control.

What a passing check does not establish

It does not establish	Because
That the AI response was correct, safe or appropriate	The record commits to what was sent and returned, not to its quality.
That the request passed a security boundary	The WAF is bounded pattern detection, not an injection boundary (UC-042).
Who produced the record	With the default HMAC-SHA256 chain any key holder can forge. It authenticates a key, not a party (UC-041, CLM-090).
That the timestamp is accurate	It is the issuer's unattested clock unless an RFC 3161 token is attached.
That the record set is complete	An inclusion proof says nothing about what is absent. There is no non-membership proof.
That the record is admissible	Admissibility is a judicial determination this software does not create (UC-022, UC-034).
That the operator could not delete records	Tampering is detected, not prevented. An operator with filesystem access can destroy the chain; you would see the break.

Facts you can re-read

Fact	Value	Reproduce
Latest release	v5.0.1, published 2026-09-24V	`git ls-remote --tags origin 'v5.0.1*'`
PyPI gateway `aegis-latent-core`	5.0.1, published 2026-09-26V	`curl -s https://pypi.org/pypi/aegis-latent-core/json`
Commit latency, p50 / p99	0.617 ms / 1.216 msV	`python scripts/run_benchmarks_5.0.1.py --json`
Claims register	Every public claim has a locator and a boundaryV	`python scripts/verify_claims.py`

The latency figures come from one shared, unpinned four-CPU container with a real write-ahead-log fsync per commit. They are not a capacity claim. Re-run the harness in your own environment before planning against them.

What we do not claim

Certification of any kind, or that one is in progress.
Legal compliance, or that any regulation is satisfied.
Court admissibility.
Production readiness or production capacity.
External assurance: no independent penetration test or SOC 2 report exists yet (REG-H01, REG-H02).
Customer traction: no paying customer or signed pilot exists yet.

The full list of refused claims is in the Unsupported Claims register. What exists and what is still missing is on the data room page.