===========================
Django 6.0.10 release notes
===========================

*November 3, 2026*

Django 6.0.10 fixes five security issues with severity "low" and one security
issue with severity "moderate" in 6.0.9.

CVE-2026-108147: Potential memory exhaustion in ``MultiPartParser`` via base64-encoded file upload
==================================================================================================

When using ``django.http.multipartparser.MultiPartParser``, multipart uploads
with ``Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64`` could be buffered entirely in
memory, regardless of :setting:`FILE_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE`, before being
passed to upload handlers, potentially consuming excessive memory.

This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-111211: Potential log injection via unescaped geometry form values
===========================================================================

:class:`~django.contrib.gis.forms.GeometryField` and its widgets logged invalid
submitted values directly, allowing control characters (e.g. newlines or ANSI
escape sequences) to be written unescaped into logs. This could enable log
injection or forgery, letting attackers manipulate log appearance or
structure, especially in logs processed by external systems or viewed in
terminals.

This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-111362: Server-side request forgery via ``crs`` member of GeoJSON geometries
=====================================================================================

Earlier versions of the :rfc:`GeoJSON spec <7946#section-4>` allowed specifying
a coordinate reference system (CRS) by URL. Since GDAL still resolves these
URLs, any validation, save, or query path where a geometry is instantiated from
user input allowed an attacker to submit a malicious CRS that would make a
network request as the Django process user, or read a file, or both.

:ref:`Lookups against spatial fields <spatial-lookups-intro>`, the
:class:`~django.contrib.gis.forms.GeometryField` form field, and
:class:`~django.contrib.gis.geos.GEOSGeometry` now reject GeoJSON geometries
with CRS references to external resources. The
:class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.DataSource` and
:class:`~django.contrib.gis.utils.LayerMapping` utilities for loading trusted
data continue to accept these values.

This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
policy <severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-113593: Potential exposure of private data via empty and missing ``Vary`` headers
==========================================================================================

:class:`~django.middleware.cache.UpdateCacheMiddleware` and
:func:`~django.views.decorators.cache.cache_page` generated the same cache key
for a request that omitted a header listed in the response's ``Vary`` header
and a request that sent that header with an empty value. As a result, a
response cached for one of these requests could be served to the other, which
could lead to the exposure of private data.

Cache keys now distinguish between absent and empty header values, as required
by :rfc:`9111#section-4.1`.

Responses previously cached for requests that omitted a header listed in
``Vary`` will no longer be matched, and will be cached again on the next
request.

This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-113733: Password hash disclosure to "view only" admin users with custom user models
============================================================================================

Admin users with the view (but not change) permission to a user model were
displayed the entire password hash when the model was not
:setting:`AUTH_USER_MODEL`, or when :setting:`AUTH_USER_MODEL` inherited its
``password`` field from a concrete parent model through multi-table
inheritance.

This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<severity-levels>`.

CVE-2026-114582: Server-side request forgery via ``SpatialReference`` string input
==================================================================================

:class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.SpatialReference` passed string input to GDAL,
which by default resolves URLs and reads files. This behavior was not
documented by Django. Other affected methods included
:meth:`GEOSGeometry.transform()
<django.contrib.gis.geos.GEOSGeometry.transform>`,
:meth:`OGRGeometry.transform()
<django.contrib.gis.gdal.OGRGeometry.transform>`,
:meth:`GDALRaster.transform() <django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster.transform>`,
the :attr:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.OGRGeometry.srs` setter of
:class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.OGRGeometry`, and the
:attr:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster.srs` and
:attr:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster.srid` setters of
:class:`~django.contrib.gis.gdal.GDALRaster`. A URL or file path reaching any
of these would issue an outbound request or read a file as the Django process
user. The attack vectors could be combined to reveal local file contents by
observing outbound requests.

``SpatialReference`` now disables network and file access when parsing string
input on GDAL 3.9 and later. As a consequence, file paths and URLs are no
longer accepted as ``SpatialReference`` inputs. Dictionary references using the
``DICT:`` prefix, including those prefixed with ``ESRI::``, are rejected on all
GDAL versions.

Full protection requires GDAL 3.9 or later. Integer SRIDs are looked up
directly in the EPSG database, so prefer them when the input is untrusted. Or,
if strings must be used on lower GDAL versions, compare to an allow list. The
new ``gis.W001`` system check warns when the installed version of GDAL is not
at least 3.9.

This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<severity-levels>`.
