The Same Subject Continued



(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)



For the Independent Journal.



JAY





To the People of the State of New York:



My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people

would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to

by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show

that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be

more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the

State governments or the proposed little confederacies.



But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN

force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war

to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves

in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need

not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.



It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that

nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of

getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when

their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and

objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for

personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or

support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of

other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead

him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and

interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war,

which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve

our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings;

and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our

relative situation and circumstances.



With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can

supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding

any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign

fish.



With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in

navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we

suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our

carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing

theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to

restrain than to promote it.



In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one

nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they

had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with

commodities which we used to purchase from them.



The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give

pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this

continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,

added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address

of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the

advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the

wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.



Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the

one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other;

nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them

and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.



From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent

with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that

jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and

cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they

should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by

land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.



The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out

of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at

present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and

opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not

be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good

national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A

SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and

discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of

defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the

resources of the country.



As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be

provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us

inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in

question, more competent than any other given number whatever.



One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and

experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be

found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,

assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the

benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of

treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular

interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can

apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any

particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State

governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of

concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of

discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of

subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate

them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if

divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent

companies.



What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the

government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of

Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?

Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at

all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the

enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?



We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if

we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if

one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain

as to make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not

called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets,

their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let

England have its navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation

and fleet—let Wales have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its

navigation and fleet—let those four of the constituent parts of the

British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to

perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative

insignificance.



Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen

or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what

armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to

have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and

spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of

their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or

seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their

tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom

perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content

to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would,

nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of

other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable

that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances,

happen again.



But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or

confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men

and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from

which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms

of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them

and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would

be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching

over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the

powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these

embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.



But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one

national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain

it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and

they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national

government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently

regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our

resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established,

our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed

to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the

other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government

(each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem

convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably

discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain,

another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against

each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make

in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt

but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience

proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be

against themselves.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.