Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States



For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



The three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an

enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of

disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now

proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more

alarming kind—those which will in all probability flow from dissensions

between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and

convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly

anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full

investigation.



A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt

that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united

in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be

thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To

presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against

their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive,

and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number

of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood,

would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at

defiance the accumulated experience of ages.



The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some

which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective

bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the

desire of pre-eminence and dominion—the jealousy of power, or the

desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more

circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their

spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between

commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either

of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in

the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading

individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this

class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many

instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the

pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the

national tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.



The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a

prostitute,[1] at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his

countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the

SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the

MEGARENSIANS,[2] another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution

with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of

the statuary Phidias,[3] or to get rid of the accusations prepared to

be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the

purchase of popularity,[4] or from a combination of all these causes,

was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in

the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after

various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the

ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.



The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,

permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,[5] entertained

hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the

influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of

this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a

war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at

the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over

which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if

there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of

universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues

Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.



The influence which the bigotry of one female,[6] the petulance of

another,[7] and the cabals of a third,[8] had in the contemporary

policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe,

are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally

known.



To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the

production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,

according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.

Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from

which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of

instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature

will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of

the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference,

tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made

to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not

been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts

would have been plunged into a civil war.



But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this

particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who

stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the

States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of

republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency

to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable

humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics,

like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous

contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest,

and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.



Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest

of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit?

If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it

not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions,

and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over

human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility

or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than

monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the

latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires

of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not

popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,

resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent

propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often

governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are,

of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those

individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the

objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and

enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been

as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the

prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity

of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many

instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the

one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of

human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.



Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,

Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often

engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies

of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp;

and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.



Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very

war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into

the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn,

gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a

conquest of the commonwealth.



Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition,

till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II.

found means to accomplish that formidable league,[9] which gave a

deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.



The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and

taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They

had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were

among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of

Louis XIV.



In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose

one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the

predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have

been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom

has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the

people.



There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as

royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their

representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs

into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and

sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that

memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA

and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known

that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the

ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,[10] protracted

the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a

considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.



The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure

grown out of commercial considerations;—the desire of supplanting and

the fear of being supplanted either in particular branches of traffic,

or in the general advantages of trade and navigation; and sometimes

even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other

nations, without their consent.



The last war but two between Britain and Spain, sprang from the

attempts of the English merchants, to prosecute an illicit trade with

the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their part, produced

severities on the part of the Spaniards, towards the subjects of Great

Britain, which were not more justifiable; because they exceeded the

bounds of a just retaliation, and were chargeable with inhumanity and

cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coasts, were

sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a

spirit of resentment, the innocent were after a while confounded with

the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the

merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon

after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from the

body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war

ensued; which, in its consequences, overthrew all the alliances that

but twenty years before had been formed, with sanguine expectations of

the most beneficial fruits.



From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose

situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason

can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an

expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present

confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough

of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have

amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections,

weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time

to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a

practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as

well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the

happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?



Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and

credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and

ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State

of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and

the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare—!



So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the

tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of

discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,

that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a

sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation,

constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses

himself on this subject to this effect: “NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he)

are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces

them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution

prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing

that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves

at the expense of their neighbors.”[11] This passage, at the same time,

points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.



PUBLIUS.



 [1] Aspasia, _vide_ Plutarch’s _Life of Pericles_.



 [2] _Ibid_.



 [3] _Ibid_. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with

 the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of

 Minerva.



 [4] _Ibid_.



 [5] Worn by the popes.



 [6] Madame de Maintenon.



 [7] Duchess of Marlborough.



 [8] Madame de Pompadour.



 [9] The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of

 France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and

 states.



 [10] The Duke of Marlborough.



 [11] _Vide Principes des Négociations_ par l’Abbé de Mably.









THE FEDERALIST.