The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered



For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON





To the People of the State of New York:



To the powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in

respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have

met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right,

is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence

of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now

endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.



It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form,

supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument;

without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to

the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of

America, as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The

proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected

that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity

of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article

of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or

two of our State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.



A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the

present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported

by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions:

either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies

should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE

the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion,

in any shape, to the control of the legislature.



If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised

to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the

whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the

EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting

of the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that

instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies,

there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important

qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which

forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any

longer period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of

it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up

of troops without evident necessity.



Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be

apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say

to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic

declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be

that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the

preceding models of the constitutions which they have established,

inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the

omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this

apprehension and clamor.



If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several

State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that

TWO only of them[1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in

time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound

silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of

the Legislature to authorize their existence.



Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible

foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to

imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it

was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated

either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of

a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him,

that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in

the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would

expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would

observe to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most

explicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace;

and a departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned

the discontent which appears to influence these political champions.



If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the

articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be

increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the

unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the

prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous

circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures in

this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of the

United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or

ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these

clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled

opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid

examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he

would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such

loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have

conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its

different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded a

new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the contrary, he

happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would

indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that

in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true

merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients

so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man

could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too

much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming

their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to

their understandings.



But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by

precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer

view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear

that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to

military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be

imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be

unlikely to be observed.



Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there

are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence

or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are

growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other

side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and

establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the

vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers

create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in

relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western

frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural

allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from

them. The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the

facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great

measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime

powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations ought

not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of

consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the family compact

between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason

considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of

political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not to

be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach

of danger.



Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a

constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier.

No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it

should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.

These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from

the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The

first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The

militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their

occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in

times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or

compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of

service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious

pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the

scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as

ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in

the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace;

a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a

simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a

constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity

of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the

legislature.



In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may

be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military

establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be

exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and

encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier

garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements

might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the

possession of which will include the command of large districts of

territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be

added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the

Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts

in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two

neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert

all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.



If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our

Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy.

To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the

defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation

has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its

fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose;

but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons

will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against

descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and

sometimes of the fleet itself.



PUBLIUS.



 [1] This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection

 of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two

 which contain the interdiction in these words: “As standing armies in

 time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up.”

 This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire,

 Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of

 rights, a clause to this effect: “Standing armies are dangerous to

 liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF

 THE LEGISLATURE”; which is a formal admission of the authority of the

 Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution

 says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to

 the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their

 constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two

 States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection;

 but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority

 in this respect.









THE FEDERALIST.