The Senate



For the Independent Journal.



HAMILTON OR MADISON





To the People of the State of New York:



Having examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and

answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I

enter next on the examination of the Senate.



The heads into which this member of the government may be considered

are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by

the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the

Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they are to

be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.



I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from

those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer

period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least;

as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been

a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The

propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the

senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and

stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator

should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these

advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with

foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly

weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and

education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity

between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents

may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and

hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign

influence on the national councils.



II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators

by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have

been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which

has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with

the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of

favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments

such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must

secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link

between the two systems.



III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point,

which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite

pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much

discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly

incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a

PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and

sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties,

however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common

councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a

compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal

character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the

principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is

superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the

Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of

theory, but “of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and

concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered

indispensable.” A common government, with powers equal to its objects,

is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political

situation, of America. A government founded on principles more

consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be

obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the

former, lies between the proposed government and a government still

more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must

be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless

anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate

rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.



In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each

State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of

sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for

preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be

no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they

are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against

an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.



Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of

the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper

acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the

concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a

majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated

check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as

beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of

the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to

them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be

exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be

able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable

exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty

and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our

governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the

Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many

in contemplation.



IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come

next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of

these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are

to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be

necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer

from the want of such an institution.



First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in

a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it

may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove

unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate,

as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and

dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check

on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring

the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or

perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be

sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and

now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than

superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the

improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the

dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to

distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will

consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine

principles of republican government.



Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the

propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the

impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious

leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this

subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the

United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a

position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that

need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity

ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less

numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and

consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable

duration.



Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of

due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is

not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from

pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short

time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public

occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive

interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves,

escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their

legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no

small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged

on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from

the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What

indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill

and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient

wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each

preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of

those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?



A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of

government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge

of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some

governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are

deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American

governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal

Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it

provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the

first.



Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid

succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out,

in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in

the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one

half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a

change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of

measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent

with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark

is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more

important, in national transactions.



To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a

volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a

source of innumerable others.



In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other

nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An

individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to

carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all

prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly.

His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to

connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the

opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to

another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy

distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent

emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking

undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation,

consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may

calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic

policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this

subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own

situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends;

that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to

every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating

councils and embarrassed affairs.



The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It

poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to

the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the

laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that

they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they

are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who

knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law

is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is

little known, and less fixed?



Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it

gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the

industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation

concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of

the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who

watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not

by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their

fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with

some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.



In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable

government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every

useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a

continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard

his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that

his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What

farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given

to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no

assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him

a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement

or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a

steady system of national policy.



But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment

and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a

political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and

disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more

than an individual, will long be respected without being truly

respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain

portion of order and stability.



PUBLIUS.









THE FEDERALIST.